238. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)1
SUBJECT
- Vietnam
In determining U.S. policy towards Vietnam in the immediate future, you might find the following personal observations of help:
President Ngo Dinh Diem will have the 1954 coup attempt of General Minh in mind as he deals with the leaders of the 1960 coup attempt and receives U.S. advice about punishment. In 1954, Diem was persuaded to let Minh and his key officers leave the country unpunished. A few weeks later, they were instigating a revolt by the sect forces against Diem which led to considerable bloodshed in March and April 1955. President Diem always felt that a little more firmness with a few individuals would have cooled many of the hotheads who later listed to Minh.
The 1954 and 1960 events have enough similarities to make the 1954 lesson fresh in his mind. Both coup attempts were in November. The military leader of each claimed inspiration from Nasser of Egypt and had rather close ties with former chief of state Bao Dai. Both had imprecise programs of political aims, stated as generalized ideals which sounded as phoney as a $3-bill to the people they hoped would rally to their cause, but which coincided with a French analysis of the desires of the U.S. Ambassador and his political staff. Both were certain that Army units wouldn’t act against them; both wooed the sect organizations and the same political parties; both seem to share the same friends and acquaintances in France and Cambodia.
The actions of the U.S. Ambassador undoubtedly have deepened President Diem’s suspicions of his motivations. Diem cannot help but wonder at U.S. objectives as voiced by such a spokesman. At the most critical moment of the coup attempt, the U.S. Ambassador urged Diem to give in to rebel demands to avoid bloodshed. Earlier, he had urged others to urge Diem to compromise with the rebels. The most charitable view that Diem could take would be that our Ambassador is a badly-informed man, but he would also then believe [Page 668] that the Ambassador has been far too prone to listen to the wrong people in Vietnam, people who are Diem’s enemies.
Actually, Ambassador Durbrow is not entirely to blame for these blunders. The invitation to engage in this badly-timed and demoralizing meddling in Vietnam’s affairs was given the Ambassador by the Southeast Asia desk staff in State message 775.2 This action, on top of many others which seem to have weakened both the U.S. position and the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia in the immediate past, should make us note that advice and actions of this staff carry definite hazards to the security of the U.S. Their advice and instructions on the next events in Vietnam deserve the most careful scrutiny and evaluation, particularly by Defense whose resources are called upon so heavily to carry out U.S. policy in this area. The long-known strategic value of Southeast Asia places a premium upon our military participation.
Finally, it appears that General McGarr, the MAAG Chief, came through this test of U.S. influence very well. Both the rebel forces and the loyal forces turned to him for counsel. He seems to have handled them with complete honesty and objectivity which will increase his potential for influencing the Vietnamese military in the future. This is a factor which should carry its proper weight in future considerations of our actions in Vietnam. Also, it should be borne in mind that this will subject General McGarr to considerable vindictive attack by the Vietminh and by those jealous of his increased prestige.
These observations are prompted by the fact that it is critical that U.S. policy makers have some deeper understanding of people and events in Vietnam, if we are to keep Southeast Asia free. It is our key piece in the area and must be handled correctly.
Although this memo deals with a most sensitive subject, you may wish to show it General Lemnitzer and Assistant Secretary Irwin who also are concerned with this problem.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Secret. Printed also in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1330–1331. A note on the source text, dated November 16, indicates that Douglas read the memorandum and planned to discuss it with Secretary Gates.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 228.↩