233. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), in Thailand1
MAGTN–PO 1445. This message continuation messages MAGTN–PO 14322 and MAGCH–CS 14383 is my assessment of actions from 1135 hours to 2400 hours local although it was apparent order restored before that time.
Rebels continued hold out ARVN Hq, nearby Tan Son Nhut Airport and police headquarters, Cholon, until progressively defeated with final capitulation approximately 1400 hours. Throughout remainder afternoon troop movements observed to include truck movement paratroops in direction ARVN HQ and ARVN units to various positions of deployment around palace and throughout city for security. Activities appeared to be returning normal with friendly atmosphere existing between troops and people on streets.
At 1635 report received from MAAG Air Force Advisor VNAF C–47 had taken off Tan Son Nhut Airfield at 1400 piloted by Comdr 1st Transport Sqdn, Capt Tren, carrying top paratroop coup leaders and three majors rumored for Phnom Penh. This confirmed at 1835 [Page 658] by Gen Khanh who stated to CHMAAG that rebel leaders who departed were Col Thi, Lt Col Dong and Maj Soan. Stated also that Gen Hoang CG III Corps, and CAP region captured earlier at ARVN Hq by paratroopers may possibly have been taken along as hostage.
At 1800 President Diem broadcast message announcing cessation hostilities.
Diem lacking both loyal troops and a functioning staff yesterday called upon ARVN units within striking distance Saigon to relieve city. Son’s units from Tay Ninh, first to arrive afternoon eleventh, commenced neutralization of rebel paratroop military advantage. Arrival 5th MR troops under CO 5th Military Region, and elements 21st Div gave preponderance power loyal troops Saigon. At same time gave Diem staff and command control capability elements of loyal forces in action here.
Relatively prompt restoration of order with limited actual fighting and minimum damage to property indicate competent execution by Gen Khanh and Col Khiem of Diem’s desire to keep down bloodshed and effect minimum disruption of Saigon-Cholon area. It not yet known just what role individual senior officers of General Staff played in actively putting down revolt, since senior generals in house arrest and General Staff Headquarters offices taken over by paratroops early morning 11th. However, their role appeared small compared with Khanh’s (besieged in palace) and Khiem’s and Maj Son’s (Main commanders hastily formed fighting force).
Effective manner in which commanders and their junior leaders of loyal troops moved from home stations to Saigon and deployed for action in absence full knowledge situation and plans, is indicative of capabilities these units in the type warfare. However, must be realized this was mainly movement exercise with little resistance actually encountered. Absence of reported looting or other disorders on part of troops and this friendly attitude toward populace indicates good discipline and esprit.
Appears coup not Communist dominated but rather sincere, though misguided, attempt by junior commanders register dissatisfaction and force improvement government’s policies, both military and political. To date no concrete evidence Communist capitalization of coup except for previously reporting increase VC activity Tay Ninh region and possible attempts stir up Saigon crowds as reported earlier. Low level Viet-Cong activity so far reported could mean, in face Diem demonstrated strength, they not ready to risk main effort at this time.
Diem, in his 1800 12 Nov radio address,4 indicated he had put thing in order. Reference in text to “untruthful men” and fact he [Page 659] forced into agreement, however, leaves way open for abrogation reported 11 Nov agreement revolutionaries. Implementation of desired reforms will determine his intentions this regard. Believed that coup may cause Diem to proceed more rapidly with reforms than previously intended, although not to degree desired by coup leaders. The present activities of General Staff in reestablishing control over forces or changes which might be made in staff or command not presently known.
It is known that Vice President Tho and Gen Duong Van “Big” Minh both reported by Thuan to be opposed to concessions to rebels, had lengthy discussion with Diem late afternoon 12 Nov. Also reported that National Assembly appeared to be in session until at least 1200 hours local purpose not known.
As CHMAAG emphasized to Thuan and Khanh 12 Nov, any appreciable delay in returning troops to operational areas increases danger at attempted VC takeover of control of provinces. Will continue press Khanh and Thuan for quick action this regard.
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 83. VN 1960–Attempted Coup d’état. Secret; Priority; Noforn: Sent also to the Office of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Honolulu, repeated for information to the Department of Defense, JCS, CINCPACREPHIL, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CHMAAG Cambodia, CHPEO Laos.↩
- Document 226.↩
- Document 229.↩
- See footnote 4, supra.↩