226. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), at Manila1
MAGTN–PO 1432. Situation still confused. My assessment, as of 2200 hours local time based on information available from GVN sources, coup leaders, and MAAG field advisors, follows:
Coup triggered by young junior officers of airborne brigade with no big name behind it. Senior officers Lt General Le Van Ty, Chief of Staff, Brig General Nguyen Khanh and other generals apparently not part of coup. Junior officers have been increasingly more outspoken [Page 646] about failure of GVN to handle VC threat, politics in military matters, and failure to announce traditional promotions on 26 October coupled with poor promotion and command policy of president. I do not believe senior officers will participate in coup unless they are convinced such participation will result in tangible benefits to people.
Comment: General Ty, since 2030 hrs local, broadcasting on public every 15 minutes; stating President had signed papers turning government over to General Ty and group of 18 civil and military leaders. He also request that troops go home, and that Col Thi (Paratroop leader) had stated same thing [sic], However Sec Thuan informed my chief of staff at 2200 hrs that this information not entirely accurate. This may indicate that Gen Ty’s actions require further evaluation. End of comment.
An unknown factor is Maj Gen Duong Van Minh, field command. He is reported to have a large following in the army, among which are the two corps commanders, Generals Don and Dinh, as well as number of other senior and junior officers.
Early today General Minh closeted himself at home with a few trusted members of his staff together with corps and regional commanders, Don, Dinh, Hoang, and Tam who originally gathered to discuss periodic review of national defense plans. His house was later surrounded by paratroops but probably because of his popularity, he was able to walk in civilian clothes, past guards and escape to friend’s home.
Because of his following and reliability, he could possibly become a symbol of leadership in present crisis. Presently he has done nothing to commit himself to any group although Secy Thuan considers him pro Diem. In past Minh has been pro American favoring many actions outlined in the U.S. counter insurgency plan, in which area he and his staff have also made similar studies. Despite his frequent moves during the day, he has remained in contact by telephone with his U.S. advisor and Asst Sec Def Thuan.
Coup leaders seem to be convinced of their aims but vague in their specific accomplishments. They refused to see me at my office but insisted that they meet with me at my quarters. Conferences with coup leaders and other participants indicated that although may not now demand abdication Diem, they are still insistent Diem rid himself of present entourage and yield to military control.
Both Maj Son, commander of task force mentioned my msg 1429,2 and Lt Col Dong, ostensibly second in command coup group [Page 647] but apparently brains behind it, appear sincerely interested prevent further fighting between brothers in arms. Also in view apparent initial success negotiations, possibility that situation may be solved without further fighting is encouraging. Troops both sides now deployed in contiguous positions with an atmosphere of comradeship prevailing. Currently all is quiet.
Am however much concerned over VC capitalization on withdrawal troops from capital and 5th regions to meet coup. Up to now, increase in VC activity reported only from Tay Ninh province West of Saigon near Cambodian border. MAAG advisors report VC activity other areas apparently normal.
Attitude people in Saigon generally curious but relatively apathetic, with normal heavy traffic throughout Saigon during day. Reported paratroops herded civilians in front of them in entering Palace main gate this morning thus preventing marines inside from firing.
Believe Diem may have been softened somewhat toward demands of rebels by JCEMO criticism non-Communist oppositionists and by numerous approaches of country team. Most elements of changes proposed by coup group, except military control of government, coincide almost exactly with proposals country team have made to Diem recent months.
Extent to which Diem may yet commit or may have committed himself to concessions to coup group cannot yet be determined. However, presently feel that certain concessions may be made—and in right direction—which may result in attainment many of our own objectives. These to include reforms of government making it more responsive to needs and desires of people and requirements of internal security situation. This is predicated, of course, on ability coup group to prevent communist infiltration their movement.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1160. Secret; Niact; Noforn. The Department of State information copy was received November 11, 9:42 p.m. Dispatached with date-time group 112021Z November. Sent also to CINCPAC, Honolulu; repeated for information to the Departments of State and Defense, JCS, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, the MAAG Chiefs in Cambodia, Taiwan, and Thailand, and the PEO Chief in Laos.↩
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In telegram MAGTN–PO 1429, November 11, McGarr reported on Major Son as follows:
“Maj Son, CO of rangers from capital region arrived in Saigon from Tay Ninh answering a call from the President. He left Tay Ninh at 0700 hours this morning, without knowing what the situation was in Saigon within 10 meters of paratroops. They are exchanging conversation with paratroops as they, rangers, do not know situation. Son also has one regt composed of 11 companies and 2 inf regts waiting on his call at a half hours distance from Saigon. Comment: Believe confirm presence of 3 regts within 30 minutes of Saigon. Believe Son means 1 regt minus 1 company plus 2 additional battalions. Anticipate that with the reported number of troops withdrawn from Tay Ninh, VC activity will increase soonest. End of comment.
“Maj Son feels that situation should be settled amicably without any bloodshed, otherwise VC would profit by it to gain more strength among the population and possibly initiate their own coup. Maj Son also feels that this political situation should be settled with the least delay, otherwise, again the VC would take advantage of this delay to gain popular recognition. Although Son stated he did not wish to fight paratroops, he ‘was ordered here by Diem, he is loyal to Diem buy if he must fight, he believes he can whip paratroops.’
“Maj Son added that President Diem is correct but his entourage lacks integrity.” (Ibid.)
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