229. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McCarr) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), in Thailand1
MAGCH–CS 1438. Reference Def 985721 from OSD/ISA.2
[Page 651]Feel much has already been answered by other messages. Messages MAGTN–PO 14293 and MAGTN–PO 1432 giving situation and assessment indicated paratroops under coup leaders had surrounded palace. However, many reinforcing Army units loyal to government had arrived Saigon and mingling amicably with paratroops, with apparent capability defeating coup forces if necessary. We did not say that coup group in actual command of situation, on contrary, Diem’s agreement to negotiate with coup leaders based on desire not cause bloodshed by having loyal troops fight paratroops. Coup group was not and is not in control of military.
Diem has, however, passed control of government for time being to group of military generals who would work in consultation with revolutionary committee. Actually, Generals (Ty, Big Minh, Don, Xuan, Kim) not yet acting. Brig Gen Khanh, C/C Army, very loyal to Diem, has overall direction of military operations. This morning action described MAGTN–PO 14344 consists of fighting between loyal units and reported 3 companies paratroops. Other paratroops reported on Diem side. Maj Son, described MAGTN–PO 1429, states this group reportedly inspired by direction of a civilian Communist, although top military leaders not Communist. As of 0830 local, elements 5th Div had reinforced loyal troops in Saigon and it reported that two companies paratroops surrendered without struggle. Also, 300 weapons (rifles, machine guns, submachine guns, mortars) captured by loyalists.
With regard ability loyal military leaders to stabilize situation and continue campaign against Viet Cong, General Khanh reports he making every effort maintain unity of Army and has asked all rebel paratroop units move to General Staff headquarters vicinity airport and cease fighting. Believe military situation now under cntl and that good prospects last vestiges of rebel paratroop opposition will be disposed of.
When questioned about meaning of Diem’s statement that government entrusted to ARVN generals for “time being” General Khanh stated this to be in effect until government can be reorganized. [Page 652] Believe much of original purpose of coup group has been accomplished and that reforms will be made, although probably not as sweeping as coup group desired.
CHMAAG impressed strongly on Khanh necessity for getting Generals, who have been sitting on sidelines, in to the act in full support of actions to stabilize situation, and to unify armed forces as quickly as possible to continue fight against Viet Cong.
Comment: Situation created in 5th Military Region by removal large proportion of ARVN could become especially sensitive.
Aside from reported defection (cannot verify) 3 companies paratroops to civilian Communist leader, do not believe Communists have infiltrated Army to appreciable extent. Of course, Communists can take advantage continued unsettled situation to exert influence in armed forces in all traditional ways which are well known to all of us. Other than situation reported herein, no specific Communist moves reported nor known to be imminent.
Situation outside Saigon apparently normal except for increase VC activity in Tay Ninh province (reported previously).
Ambassador has advised of report that large crowd civilians gathered downtown shouting against Diem and stating if paratroops fail, civilians will oust Diem. If true, this to me constitutes greatest present threat since this group probably stirred up by Communists. Communists could well inspire public to unrest or popular revolt if Diem does not come out with proposed reforms ASAP. CHMAAG advised General Khanh and Secretary Thuan of urgent necessity such action and wide broadcast TF reform plans even before last elements rebels put down.
Learned later Ambassador had recommended similar action to Diem, personally. Later attempts verify mob action and activity described above not successful. However, such Communist inspired civilian action could well be logical next phase.
CHMAAG had known Lt Col Dong as student, Leavenworth and believe influence already exerted in discussions described previous messages.
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 83. VN 1960—Attempted Coup d’fetat. Secret; Operational Immediate. Sent also to the Office of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, at Honolulu. Repeated for information to the Department of Defense, JCS, CINCPACREPHIL Manila, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CHMAAG Cambodia, and CHPEO Laos.↩
- In this telegram,
November 11, 6:47 p.m. Washington time, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense asked the following questions of McCarr:
“Are there units loyal to President Diem which may still attempt put down coup? Does coup group have sufficient control of military to stabilize situation and continue campaign against Viet Cong strongly? What can be done and what is being done to maintain unity of armed forces? Are any MAAG well acquainted with coup leaders? To what extent would they have influence with leaders? In what ways, if any, can Communists take advantage of situation to exert influencé in armed forces? What appears situation outside Saigon area on the part of military, of the civil populace, of the Communists? Please include additional information you believe helpful.” (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 115, 350 Internal Political Affairs, Vietnam GVN, Nov. Coup (military messages))
↩ - See footnote 2, Document 226.↩
- Document 227.↩