Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

203. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 15, 1960—6 a.m.

802. Deptel 581.² Diem received me on the 14th for hour and fifteen minutes which permitted me outline new proposals train Civil Guard and have frank discussions re suggested steps to ameliorate deteriorating political situation.

After outlining new proposals for Civil Guard, which pleased him very much (reported in separate telegram³), in which Thuan took part, I suggested to President that I would like to have opportunity to talk with him alone. Thuan left. I then read 14 page triple-spaced French translation, of which I left copy, containing suggestions agreed to by Department in reftel (English text by pouch⁴). Before reading text I stated that on October 13 I had been in Viet-Nam for three and one half years, had found my assignment edifying, interesting, and most worthwhile. I mentioned solid and worthwhile progress I had noted in country since 1957 and congratulated President on his many fine accomplishments. I then stated that since I admired his courage and determination I personally desired to do all I could to help him, particularly in these trying times. I added I personally, and other friends of his here as well as those in Washington, have been giving much thought about how we might be helpful to him. Results of our thinking led to conclusion that we could be most helpful if we should make several suggestions which I could put to him in a frank manner as a friend. I then read the paper.

Diem listened intently and made no comments while I was reading except to remark after I had suggested he might get rid of ministers who had not carried out their responsibilities, by saying hardest thing to do is get qualified persons who will take responsibilities.

When I finished reading President stated that most of suggestions I had made conformed to his basic ideas, but added as much as he would like to put these into effect, stepped-up activities of the Viet Cong made it most difficult. He added that many people had been intimidated by Viet Cong and some had been won over so that it would be difficult to carry out some of steps regarding countryside. I replied while I realized difficulties I was firmly convinced after most careful consideration that it essential now to take many if not all of these suggested steps on a calculated-risk basis in order to create the psychological shock which I believed essential at this time. President made no further comment except to tell me that he would consider the suggestions I had given him.

I then again begged his indulgence and asked if I could bring up a most sensitive and delicate matter which I felt in his interest and in interest of Viet-Nam I should discuss very frankly. From notes in French which I read but did not leave with him, (copy by pouch⁵) I discussed growing criticism of his brother and Madam Nhu, as well as Dr. Tuyen and suggested that they should be assigned abroad. Diem did not interrupt me but assumed somewhat grim, and I detected, slightly hurt manner, his only comment was that these rumors about the Nhus were spread by Communists. I replied that I was sure that Communists were doing all they could to spread such rumors but I repeated that the unfortunate part about it is that more and more people are believing these reports—Vietnamese loyal to him, those who might be considered in the opposition, foreign civilians and foreign diplomats to say nothing of the press, I repeated, as I had previously, these reports were seriously damaging prestige of his regime.

After discussing the Nhus, I again apologized, first of all for bringing up this personal and sensitive subject, as well as the other suggestions I had made. I again asked his indulgence and forgiveness for speaking so frankly and added I hoped he would understand that I was talking as a sincere friend.

Comment: Considering the fairly frank criticism I made of his regime and family, Diem outwardly showed no real resentment. After I apologized for bringing up the Nhu question, Diem remained silent for a bit and we then discussed Lao developments in a matter-of-fact realistic way. I said I was sure that Parson would fill him in regarding latest Lao developments when he is here on 18th. I then reiterated my closing apologetic comments on the Nhu question and took my leave, which was quite cordial.⁶

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–1560. Secret. Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd. Printed also in Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1323–1324.
2. Supra.
3. Infra.
4. The text was enclosed with despatch 157 from Saigon, October 15, and was in a number of instances different from that contemplated in telegram 581 to Saigon, supra. Despatch 157 is printed as Document 205.
5. The English text is enclosure 2 to despatch 157 from Saigon.

6. In telegram 639 to Saigon, October 17, the Department congratulated Durbrow on the results of his démarche to Diem as reported in telegram 802 from Saigon:

   “Department gratified your success conveying most difficult message. Concur importance holding knowledge your démarche very closely, especially as you appear to have opened successful channel to Diem re Nhu. Matter will be handled on strictly Noforn basis in Washington.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–1560)