Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

196. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹

Washington, September 16, 1960—4:56 p.m.

Def 982994. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have approved the CINCPAC draft plan for counter-insurgency operations by the Government of South Viet-Nam. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, to coordinate plans and directives with the Department of State and other agencies for transmission to the Country Team for consideration and comment. Department of State has not had opportunity to comment on draft plan. Draft plan follows.

Quote:

PLAN FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

Task Organization

• a.^*
• b.^*
• c.^*

1. Situation:

a. General: Communist-inspired insurgency in South Vietnam, aimed at the destruction of the authority and prestige of established government is a prelude to further inroads designed ultimately to absorb South Vietnam into the Communist Bloc.

b. (1) A National Emergency Council in South Vietnam should be responsible for the over-all conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign, and should provide for full integration of civil and military efforts. This council should be headed by President Diem and should include the principal cabinet members including qualified military and civil police officials (2) U.S. support will be directed by Governmental Departments and Agencies through the Ambassador.

c. Enemy Forces:

• (1)^*
• (2)^*

d. Friendly Forces:

e. Assumptions:

• (1)^*
• (2)^*

2. Mission: Defeat Communist insurgency efforts in South Vietnam.

a. Objectives:

(1) GVN:

(a) Establish and maintain political and economic control and stability.

(b) Suppress and defeat disruptive Communist activities in South Vietnam.

(c) Interdict aid flowing to insurgents across Vietnamese borders, to include both police and military action in coordination with adjacent friendly nations.

b. Tasks:

(1) GVN:

(a) Establish an Emergency Operations Control System along the following guidelines:

1. National Emergency Council (See paragraph 1. b.(l)).

2. Director of Operations, possibly a member of National Emergency Council. Position to be occupied by experienced general officer assisted by staff of civil, military, and police officials. The Director of Operations to be responsible to the Emergency Council and to the Minister of Defense. He should formulate the Vietnamese national counter-insurgency plan, and issue all instructions to subordinate echelons relating to emergency operations.

3. A Commander’s Sub-Council with responsive Regional, Provincial, and Village Executive Councils to be organized, generally along the lines followed in Malaya to extend the authority of National Emergency Council down to village level.

(b) Insure that operations are conducted on a fully coordinated schedule to assure progressive reduction of insurgency.

(c) Establish concurrently means for assuring continued security and a base for political and economic stability and development.

(d) Assign high priority to the development of intelligence/counter-intelligence staff and operational procedures designed to provide not only timely and accurate knowledge of Communist activities and organizations within Vietnam, but also to provide information to enable the GVN to correct sociological and economic problems which the Communists are exploiting.

(e) Develop plans to assure integration of effort by all Governmental Agencies.

(f) Take extraordinary action starting at the highest levels of government and extending to the lowest political subdivision (the Village), to establish and maintain internal security.

c. Concept of Operations:

(1) Politico/Military Operations. In order to provide protection which the people require, it is necessary to exercise more than an ordinary degree of control over the population. Among the more important operations required are those for exercising control in such manner as to isolate insurgents and sympathizers from the support of the populace. Such techniques as registration and identification, food control, and control of movement, should be implemented as offering the best prospects for success. Control measures instituted should require support by psychological warfare and information programs to gain and maintain popular confidence and support.

(2) Military Operations. An effective continuing defensive system should remain in place, with a capability for reinforcing the permanent local security establishment since it is not sufficient temporarily to defeat or suppress insurgents or to establish control in one area and then move the counter-insurgency forces to a new area thus allowing insurgents to re-establish themselves. The regular military establishment of South Vietnam has the capability to fight either guerrillas or external aggressors. Militia type home guards and civil guards should be trained and equipped. Accelerated efforts should be undertaken to develop the para-military and police forces. For the duration of the emergency campaign, operational control of all security activities should be under centralized direction. Border and Coastal Patrol operations, being fundamental to the campaign to prevent insurgents receiving support from areas outside of South Vietnam, should be closely coordinated with Vietnamese ground, air and naval operations in the counter-insurgency campaign. These operations should also be coordinated with Cambodia and Laos, as feasible.

3. Administration and Logistics: US administrative and logistic support to the GVN will be coordinated by the Ambassador.

4. Command and Signal:

a. Command Posts:*

b. Command Relationships:*

End quote of Draft Plan.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 97–VN 1960—Over-all Security Plan. Secret; Routine. Drafted by Flesch and cleared by O’Donnell. Repeated for information to Chief of MAAG, Vietnam who was also to pass it to Durbrow for information. In a letter to Parsons, September 16, O’Donnell explained that this plan had been approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas on September 14. O’Donnell noted that both the Departments of Defense and State “are in agreement that immediate action is required to see the Diem Government safely through the present serious emergency.” The Department of Defense, according to O’Donnell, was pleased that Durbrow had accepted as an emergency measure that Department of Defense detail 40 advisers to MAAG Vietnam to train the Civil Guard in anti-guerrilla warfare and that the Guard be transferred from the Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense. (Ibid.) A copy is also in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 381 Vietnam.
2. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]
3. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]
4. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]
5. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]
6. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]
7. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]
8. To be completed, as applicable, by Country Team and GVN. [Footnote in the source text. All subsequent asterisks are to identical footnotes in the source text.]