Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

207. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 20, 1960—7 p.m.

866. Embtel 802 to Dept.² Given below are significant parts dealing with reorganization and strengthening civilian-political administration during 2–1/2 hour afternoon conversation and 3 hour dinner conversation 18th with Diem during Parsons visit with Irwin, Riley and McGarr also present (discussion re Laos reported Embtel 846³ and discussion re internal security reported Embtel 865⁴):

For the first time since I have been here, Diem for more than one hour talked from three and half pages of notes. It seemed quite evident that these notes had been worked up as an indirect reply to some of suggestions I had made to him October 14th (reftel). Following are principal points Diem made:

(a) While we had heard of impending Cabinet changes, Diem only mentioned elimination Ministry Information which being coordinated with civic action and youth organization to integrate all three activities into single agency under Presidency (following afternoon session we learned of other Cabinet changes reported Embtel 852⁵).

(b) He made several snide criticisms of opposition elements who only criticize but have no constructive suggestions and who basically took no active part in fight for independence.

(c) Diem discussed and criticized at some length poor rural administrative organization. He recalled some months ago he had asked Saigon bureaucrats to volunteer go countryside to bring better administration at province and lower levels, adding while fairly large number had volunteered more were needed and he giving instruction each ministry provide specific quota for this purpose. He added he is doing all he can to induce new university graduates and those from national institute of administration to go countryside. He explained it essential have one or two trained administrators at village level in order assist notables in village administration. He emphasized throughout it essential build “infrastructure” at village level not only to give better administration but also protection and intelligence, pointing out that unless peasants given good administration and protection they would not support central government.

(d) Contrary to what he had previously told me (Embassy despatch 149⁶) Diem made particular point that it vital to have trained intelligence personnel at village level. He planning have 2 or 3 intelligence cadres in each village as part of SDC or other village security force. These cadres would be from locality and would induce people pass on intelligence information in order permit GVN protect them better.

(e) In order to permit all elements VN society be represented national level, Diem planning further implement constitutional provision for a national economic council. He explained this provision had not been fully implemented because of other pressing matters and VC activities but he now plans implement it fully by having representatives of farmers associations, retailers, wholesalers, millers, industrialists, businessmen, trade unions, etc., elected to national economic council. This will be accomplished for instance by having local farmers association elect own officers, who in turn will elect representative to district association which will elect representatives to provincial level, and provincial level elect delegate to national council. Same procedure will be followed for other economic groups. He pointed out so far this had been done only in trade unions who elect representatives from lowest level who in turn choose representatives up to national level. He made particular point to say his brother Nhu had been very effective before and after independence in building up democratic unions which have now reached such a sophisticated level of organization that GVN trade unions are recognized by ILO as being perhaps most progressive in Asia outside Japan. Diem cited plantation labor management agreement as being particularly progressive as effective. He added because help of Nhu and other union leaders, Communist elements which had infiltrated unions and caused unwarranted strikes 1956–1958 had been eliminated and there had been no serious strikes since. Diem made particular point that this electoral procedure is a constitutional requirement which must be put into effect for all economic groups, implying that its implementation would answer my suggestion for election of village officials. He added although constitutional provisions have not been fully implemented, vice president as minister national economy had partially filled this role by having periodic public meetings with various business and industrial groups to discuss openly mutual problems in presence of press and thus assure that no favoritism entered into granting of licenses or other governmental actions, etc. (Preliminary comments: These elections may constitute somewhat of a safety valve but they will probably be well “supervised” by the NRM or Can Lao party organs.)

(f) He cited need better tax laws and particularly increasing substantially number of tax collectors in order raise revenues, stating this part of 3-year plan already discussed with us here and Washington.

(g) Cited need to organize, train and assist youth. He again indicated his brother Nhu active this field. Youth (18–35 years old) constitute backbone of country, are basically patriotic but must be helped and guided in their desire to build and protect country. He pointed out VC’s realize importance youth and therefore they trying to kidnap and train them as Communist cadre. It necessary, therefore, GVN train and in many cases arm youth in order give further protection villages and encourage youth help in community projects.

Comments: Diem, as indicated, was obviously answering indirectly my suggestions by outlining his plans to Parsons in effort create impression many suggestions I made were being carried out or planned. In view my suggestion Nhu be sent abroad it interesting Diem mentioned him in favorable light several times. Over-all emphasis this part of conversation was need to build from grass roots up, to protect and assist villages and by implication to win over rural population.

It perhaps not just by coincidence that when Parsons and I called on Mau and assembly President Truong Vinh Le they discussed at some length internal security problem, opposition elements and need to win over passes [masses]. Although Parsons opened conversation with Mau by bringing up Lao developments latter did not pursue this lead until later but launched into long discussion internal security problem, and discussed at some length opposition elements, particularly Dr. Dan. Mau praised Dan as being patriot who had been active in independence fight but unfortunately has many unfavorable traits. Mau went so far as state it unfortunate Dan’s election to assembly annulled basically on not too important infringement of electoral law, adding he personally believed would have been better have small loyal opposition. He stated he member of commission drawing up law for presidential elections and he suggesting infringements such as those used against Dan be treated as administrative not juridical matters.

During half hour conversation Le told us that for more than year he has been telling president of mistakes made by government, adding he pleased president now realizing this and reacting to rectify them. Le indicated assemblymen becoming restive, wish to play more active role which they would be allowed to do. Le stated he favored having loyal opposition but due all-out VC attacks it essential now unify country and he doing all he can do to induce opposition elements to close ranks. It interesting he mentioned Can Lao party as playing important role in effort bring unity all elements. He particularly asked Parsons to make it clear in Washington Viet-Nam striving for democracy which it will attain once VC threat under control.

Fact Diem went such lengths to discuss organizational faults, etc., may be hopeful sign that after much prodding he seriously planning take at least some effective steps bring masses closer to regime.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–2060. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to Tokyo for Parsons and CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Document 203.
3. In telegram 846, October 19, the Embassy reported highlights of a 2–1/2-hour conversation between Diem and Parsons on October 18 in Saigon dealing with Parsons’ mission and the Lao situation. Diem drew the conclusion that since the Lao Army was unable to defend its own territory, South Vietnam was forced to deploy additional security forces along its border with Laos. Diem therefore stated that it was essential that he raise the Vietnamese force level to 170,000. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.15–PA/10–1960) Documentation on Parsons’ mission to Southeast Asia is printed in the compilation on Laos in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.

4. In telegram 865, October 20, the Embassy reported the significant discussion of the same Diem–Parsons conversation of October 18 relating to internal security in Vietnam. According to the telegram, the substantive discussion on this topic went as follows:

   “Diem elaborated in usual vein about internal security, efforts he making counterattack particularly against cruel methods used by VC, and need for additional ARVN forces. He stated at least three times that in view deteriorating Lao situation, increasing number VC cadres coming from north, and possibility all out attack across 17th parallel north, it essential force level be raised to 170,000. He emphasized need increase forces along Lao and Cambodian frontier, need to give more protection to villages and need to assign ARVN units to replace Civil Guard while latter receiving advanced training under new MAAG plan. He pointed out it necessary have sufficient divisions and corps at full strength to meet possible all-out DRV attack. To do this it necessary replace companies taken out of regiments be trained as rangers. He made strong plea for equipment to give army mobility, particularly pled for more and larger helicopters, more paratroopers and more marines.

   “Diem also described new tactics being used to run down and eliminate VC hideouts. He stated because of terrain, jungle and lack of roads it very wasteful and demoralizing send army on sweeps against elusive VC’s. He therefore now creating groups of 3 loyal Montagnards from area, and one well-trained robust Vietnamese form team to penetrate jungle in the areas north of the Delta, locate VC hideouts and eliminate them by surprise. He said this most arduous work requiring utmost physical stamina since teams remain in jungle for up to two weeks and come out fever-ridden and exhausted. Nevertheless these tactics very successful and he planning greatly increase number of terms.” (Ibid., 110.15–PA/10–2060)

5. In telegram 852, October 19, the Embassy reported these cabinet changes:

   “Nguyen Van Luong, Saigon Court Judge, replaces Nguyen Van Si as SecState for Justice; Bui Van Luong, Commissioner General for Land Development replaces Lam Le Trinh as SecState for Interior; Nguyen Dinh Thuan, SecState for Presidency, to serve also as Assistant Secretary Defense, replacing Tran Trung Dung; InfoMinistry converted into Directorate General (with Tran Van Dinh, Consul General at Rangoon to assume charge October 20, according InfoMin press conference).” (Ibid., 751K.13/10–1960)

6. Document 201.