201. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- President Diem’s Comments on Agrovilles, Internal Security, and Need for Increased Security Forces.
Attached is a memorandum of a conversation with President Ngo Dinh Diem on September 26, 1960.2 The following is a summary of the memorandum:
Agrovilles. Diem discussed the success of the agroville program, stating that despite the initial problem of convincing peasants of its value, they could now see the advantages and are fully behind it. Diem stated, however, that since the program has cost a great deal of money it will be discontinued for sometime after completing “about twenty” agrovilles. He countered my suggestion that agroville inhabitants be initially subsidized by stating that, since they have the same paddy land as before, their income remains the same, and therefore they do not need subsidies as did the settlers in High Plateau.
Anti-Guerrilla Equipment. After asking the purpose of General Palmer’s visit,3 Diem stated he planned to urge him to step up deliveries of anti-guerrilla equipment, especially larger helicopters such as H–34’s and multi-rocket launchers. He also said he was sending a commission to Kuala Lumpur to inspect and possibly purchase several thousand surplus shotguns for the newly-organized Self-Guard Youth Corps.
New VC Tactics. Diem described current Viet Cong tactics as concentrating on isolated villages, kidnapping the women and children of Self-Defense Corpsmen and using them in the van of an advance on the village, to prevent the SDC from firing and thus permitting the VC’s to kill off the SDC defenders.
Increased Security Forces and Centralized Intelligence. Diem repeated his belief that additional security forces, both Civil Guard and ARVN, are needed. I inquired about his plan for a central intelligence agency, emphasizing the desirability that it extend down to district level as in Malaya to prevent fruitless sweeps. Diem replied he was trying to set one up but had not yet found a qualified person to head it. He stated the Province chiefs would handle the organizations in their areas, but was not certain whether District organizations could be established. I urged the importance of having effective grass roots intelligence.
Comment: Despite many reports from both GVN and non-government sources that the agroville program is a main cause of peasant disgruntlement, Diem made a special effort to convince me that the attitude of the population toward the program has become favorable. On the basis of our reports, it is questionable whether the known hostility to the program, because of corvee labor and other reasons, has been overcome in such a short time. Despite Diem’s contention that subsidies are not needed, we continue to receive reports that [Page 591] agroville inhabitants are dissatisfied because they have been displaced from their ancestral homes, live further from their paddy fields, have been required to spend some of their own money to build their new houses and because the prospects for higher income from their “garden plots” are uncertain.
It is significant that despite his optimism about the agroville program Diem has decided to give it up because “it costs too much.” Perhaps he has finally been convinced by all and sundry who have told him of the disgruntlement caused by the program that the “real cost” is loss of popular support for his regime. It is hoped that the quiet postponement of the program may have some beneficial effects. Because of the basic merits of the program it can be resumed later after the obvious advantages become apparent to the peasantry as a whole and the security situation is better in hand.
Diem, by again raising the need for more CG and ARVN forces, apparently is still thinking in terms of defeating the VC by force and is not paying enough attention to the political and psychological aspects of the problem. Although he says he is endeavoring to establish a central intelligence agency he apparently is not fully convinced of the fundamental necessity of such an organization with grass-roots branches as one of the principal tools needed to eliminate the VC threat.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/10–760. Confidential. Copies sent to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, and CINCPAC PolAd. Drafted by John Helble, Third Secretary of Embassy, on September 30.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Lieutenant General W.B. Palmer, Director of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, was scheduled to visit Vietnam in October.↩