Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

202. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, October 7, 1960—11:23 p.m.

581. Embtels 624;² 751.³ Concur necessity your approach to Diem removes increase his popular support. However, suggest you seriously consider idea making approach to Diem and Nhu simultaneously to reduce risk Nhu will counteract effect of démarche after your departure. To create favorable atmosphere you will no doubt wish lead off discussion by informing him of steps proposed upgrade capability CG. as authorized separate telegram.⁴

We have following comments on reftel; but timing and manner approach left your judgment:

Body of suggestions might be grouped under two main heads: a) removal of Nhus and Tuyen and b) positive moves calculated increase popular support which can be announced publicly. Later might be outlined on “piece of paper”. In general we should not expect Diem make any publicized moves which would give impression he yielding too much. Also, in view probably traumatic effect of suggestion re Nhus and Tuyen, you may wish reverse order presentation and discuss positive moves first. You could then say that even if most of these moves announced in dramatic fashion and seriously undertaken, they not enough. This would be followed with discussion Nhus and Tuyen.

Concur in opening suggested paragraph 1 and first part paragraph 2. Might also state after thorough study it your carefully considered view GVN will face increasingly difficult internal political situation unless dramatic moves made to reverse present deteriorating trends. Small or gradual moves not adequate.

Re Nhus and Tuyen, since this important part demarche, would be unpalatable, it deserves most careful consideration. Believe it should not be dwelt on too long, but best points should be offered for Diem’s consideration. Agree main point should be that whether rumors true or false we are convinced that if they ignored, regime likely lose support it needs in struggle against Communists and that in all governments, such decisions have to be made.

As is often case in tense political situations, public resentment, justly or unjustly, has polarized around these three persons who not elected and whose roles and powers not defined. This is seriously impeding Government’s ability act effectively at time when it must be most effective. Might add 1) this suggestion personally painful owing to high regard we have for Nhus and Tuyen; 2) it is not based on suggestions from any members of the GVN or of any other Government; 3) we convinced decision regarding Nhus and Tuyen would remove major cause of resentment against regime. It would, we believe, increase support of Diem within the GVN and among the educated classes. Support these groups is as necessary as support of peasants; 4) you might suggest that President give Vice President and cabinet greater responsibilities, including Nhu’s advisory function, in order more rapidly strengthen constitutional government in Viet-Nam. Believe it would be unwise to suggest particular individual (such as Tho, Thuan or Luyen) for role of chief adviser lest Diem became suspicious.

For this reason also believe it best not suggest Tho for Interior or Thuan for Defense. However would be well suggest Diem consider Cabinet changes as necessary part of dramatic moves needed to regain popular interest and support, perhaps including two or three members of opposition who should be given responsibility for sake national unity and to weaken opposition criticisms which have attracted wide attention in Saigon and abroad.

As to surfacing or abolishing Can Lao suggest that to ask for this and removal Nhus and Tuyen simultaneously would be too much. Diem’s proclivity for playing cards close to chest and Vietnamese tradition that political parties usually have attributes secret societies would make it difficult for him really surface Can Lao. If considered necessary, question could be raised later.

Re topics of popular nature suggested reftel:

1. In order demonstrate his determination remove corruption and mismanagement Diem might well:

(a) Suggest National Assembly investigate any branch GVN and question any official except himself; authorize publication of findings.

(b) Suggest National Assembly set requirements for behavior public servants.

(c) Issue warning that he may require all public officials publish property and sources income.

2. He might announce that if press will take a greater role policing itself, Ministry Info controls will be reduced. He might appoint Committee (including some members opposition) to draft press code.

3. Doubt usefulness suggesting Diem publicize three year development plan until USG and GVN agree plan sound.

4. Suggest Diem fix and announce date on which villagers will be asked elect at least some their own officials.

5. Concur in urging he announce price paid to peasant for paddy be increased.

6. Suggest inform Diem we agree agroville program good way meet security problem but are concerned re execution. Urge he announce corvee labor on agrovilles and elsewhere be paid and agroville families receive some aid (possibly rice) during period readjustment (could be less than in High Plateau since Delta peasants still produce rice their own fields). If he asks how such measures to be paid for, concur suggest reply re higher taxes and deficit financing. Devaluation should also be emphasized. Diem might announce heavier taxes on rich for benefit peasants and agroville program. You might inquire whether training program for Vietnamese administrators and technicians should be increased to provide personnel needed for agrovilles and other insecure areas. Also might inquire re status information teams assigned to explain to peasants why they should leave homes and tombs ancestors to go to agrovilles.

7. Following suggestions made for your consideration and comment:

(a) Gesture to farmers such as easing term agricultural loans.

(b) Gesture toward students such as grant of certain number of scholarships by GVN or easing travel restrictions for study abroad.

(c) Gesture to plantation and industrial workers such as pay adjustments or fringe benefits. (This would require cooperation employers and might be undesirable from economic standpoint.)

Suggestion para 10 under consideration. Will advise.⁵

Concur suggestion your 751. Expect send further comment subject GVN administration in near future.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–660. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood. Cleared with SEA, FE, and INR; approved by Steeves. Repeated for information to CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Document 197.

3. Telegram 751, October 6, reads as follows:

   “While realize Department preoccupied by Lao, Congo and Khrushchev attacks against UN, I hope in near future consideration can be given to suggestions contained reftel [624]. Diem advisor Ladejinsky and Vice President in separate conversations have both urged me have another friendly but frank talk with Diem in effort to induce him take steps similar to those suggested reftel. They both pointed out Diem’s Assembly speech 3rd indicated mistakes in organization and working methods have been made and he has decided rectify them. Therefore they believe time is ripe have frank talk with Diem and urge him to change his working methods by taking advice of ministers and working through channels rather than trying make all political and military decisions himself. I concur that this suggestion should be added to those made in our 624.

   “Since Diem now undoubtedly preparing speech for Independence Day October 26th, I believe it would be helpful if I could be authorized have frank talk with him soonest along lines reftel.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10–660)

4. Reference to telegram 576 to Saigon, October 7. See footnote 2, Document 204.
5. Apparent reference to that portion of paragraph 10 in telegram 624 which refers to a possible letter from Eisenhower to Diem (see Document 208). In an interview with a Department of State historian held March 30, 1984, Parsons stated that although he had not been in Washington when telegram 581 was drafted, he did not recall in this general period consideration of alternative leadership in Vietnam: “Had there been strong advocacy of somebody else, had this been actively discussed as a policy that might be implemented soon, I think I would remember it, but I have no recollection of anyone in the government being an advocate at that time of getting rid of Diem in favor of somebody else. My recollection is entirely on the side of Diem as probably really the only possible leader with real authority and with strength and with proven policy objectives, anti-Communist policy objectives, and so on, who could control the country.” Parsons stated that his and other officials thoughts, as he recalled them, were “entirely concentrated on how we could get this inflexible, very private little man to come out of his shell, to lead a government that was closer to his people, show himself among the people, realize that he had a domestic political problem in addition to a Communist subversive problem.” Diem’s success in dealing with the insurgency being fomented from outside depended greatly “on the manner in which he led his country and the image that he and people around him had in the eyes of his countryman.” (Memorandum of interview; Department of State, PA/HO Files, Vietnam Interviews)