Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

195. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Regional Director, Far East (O’Donnell) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs¹

Washington, September 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Possible Courses of Action in Vietnam

REFERENCE

• Memo for ASD/ISA from Secretary Douglas, dated 29 August 1960, subject: “Deteriorating Situation in South Vietnam”²

As noted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, conditions in Vietnam are deteriorating. The key element in the situation is the activity of the Viet Cong. While criticism of Diem’s government in metropolitan areas adds to his problems and interacts with Viet Cong plans, the Viet Cong remains the primary threat to security. To the end of meeting this threat, several proposals are herewith submitted for consideration.

A. Actions within the authority of DOD

(1) The emphasis of the MAAG function should be shifted from purely training and organizational advice in preparation for defense against external aggression to include on-the-spot advice and assistance in the conduct of tactical operations against the Viet Cong.

(2) Concomitantly, the MAAG should be staffed to a greater intent [extent] with officers skilled in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations and who are capable of operating in the field. This might include Marines for amphibious instruction on Mekong River operations. If the immediate threat is recognized as being Viet Cong, these proposals logically follow as a de-emphasis from conventional warfare against a wholesale DRV invasion. While the latter possibility is not discounted, it is felt that Viet Cong operations offer more immediate and a very deadly threat to Vietnam.

(3) Equipment required to support counter-guerrilla operations, including turbo-jet boats for Mekong River patrols, should be furnished on a priority basis. Items required by the Vietnamese in the psychological warfare area (see Appendix A) should be given a higher priority within MAP and expeditiously furnished. Advice and training in this field specifically directed against the Viet Cong should be stepped up.

(4) Small coast patrol craft should be made available to the Vietnamese Navy for purposes of restricting coastside supply shipment from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong.

(5) In the intelligence area, again the immediate emphasis should be shifted from conventional combat intelligence to counter-guerrilla intelligence training at the battalion level. Further, an attempt should be made through training and material support to strengthen the Vietnamese counter-intelligence effort in order to frustrate the Viet Cong subversive threat. Finally, RF equipment should be furnished so that an effort can be made to locate Viet Cong radio transmitters.

B. Recommendations requiring coordinated inter-agency action

(1) Strengthen the Civil Guard by making MAAG spaces available for trainers and by provision of small arms and other equipment through MAP supply channels plus utilization of ARVN supply, maintenance, and training facilities.

(2) During the emergency, the Civil Guard should be temporarily put under the Ministry of Defense in order to integrate the activities of the ARVN and the Civil Guard. The Ambassador’s concern that the Civil Guard will lose all identity as a civil police force, if this action is taken, is invalid, providing a strong US position to the contrary is announced and maintained.

(3) Emphasis on civic action type activities by the ARVN should be encouraged and advisory and material assistance in this field furnished through MDAP and ICA channels.

(4) The Department of State should reemphasize to the RKG the necessity for according the right of “hot pursuit” to the ARVN in its campaign against the Viet Cong. Since it is strongly suspected that the Viet Cong maintain their headquarters within Cambodia, and since considerable reinforcements to the Viet Cong came through Cambodia, the US should tell the RKG that we explore [deplore] their inaction in suppressing this activity. The effectiveness of the ARVN sweeps will be largely negated until the ROK takes steps to deny its territory as a sanctuary to the Viet Cong.

(5) Most importantly for the purpose of strengthening the morale of the Vietnamese, President Diem should be informed as soon as possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which the US government views the internal security situation, of our intent to provide material assistance, and of our unswerving support to him in this time of crisis.

(6) If a large scale operation against the Viet Cong is undertaken by the Vietnamese, the dispatch of Seventh Fleet vessels and Air Force patrols might be useful in deterring sea reinforcements to the Viet Cong.

Appendix A

Minimum Needs for Psychological Warfare equipment.

a. Leaflet vans: (for publications platoons).

(1) Operations Van (write and illustrate leaflets to be printed).

(2) Photo reproductions van (Photograph illustrations to be printed).

(3) Press van (print 1,000,000 leaflets in 24 hours).

b. Three Broadcasting Radio Mobile Groups (5KW) without complete OUTFIT.

(1) Emitter and Receiver of 25 KW for Army Broadcasting Station.

c. Three Line Radio Boats.

d. 20 Line Radio Cars.

e. 43 Public Address (high impedence?)

(10 loudspeaker groups for BSN NAI propaganda
30 for operations team (long distance)
3 for Aircraft equipment.)

f. 50 Projectors (16 mm) with screen.

g. One Secretary Machine (documents copy).

h. Five (5) teletypes.

i. 500 Radio (receivers).

j. Equipment and finance to set up “Army Movie Studio”.

k. 50 tape recorders.

l. Film (16 mm) for sound recording.

m. Maintain Annual Budget for psychological warfare activities $33,000,000 (piastres).

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Vietnam. Secret. Also printed in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1307–1310.
2. Document 189.