Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

194. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to Desmond Fitzgerald of the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 9, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Madame Nhu

At her request, I visited Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu (the sister-in-law of President Diem) the evening of 7 September. She has made a brief trip to the U.S., without publicity, and stayed at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington with her parents, the Tran Van Chuongs.

Most of our conversation was of a personal nature, about family and mutual friends and acquaintances. However, she did touch on [some?] political topics. Included among her remarks were:

a. If the U.S. recognizes that Vietnam is the bastion of the Free World in S.E. Asia, then why does the U.S. take such an equivocal position towards Vietnam? Most U.S. officials in Saigon hardly act as friends and allies. When Communist guerrillas were attacking so hard earlier this year, Ambassador Durbrow saw her brother-in-law, President Diem, and didn’t offer U.S. help but, instead, said the U.S. was gravely concerned about the way President Diem was running his government, explaining that the U.S. had been just as gravely concerned over Syngman Rhee in Korea. (I reassured her that the U.S. really was a friend and ally, that help had been given, and that many people in Washington were understanding of Vietnam’s problems and wanted to help.)

b. The U.S. position on the Cambodian border issue was puzzling. Certainly the U.S. should realize that it should take a firm stand on this, as the world leader against the Communists, and openly announce that Vietnam’s border with Cambodia must remain inviolate and that the U.S. would take a dim view of any Communist intrusions across the border into Vietnam. Instead, the U.S. seems to be trying to make love to Sihanouk in Cambodia and seems to be blind to the fact that he looks upon the Chinese Communists as his true friends and has little use for Americans.

c. She said that it was sad that no Americans in Saigon ever stood up for the truth about her. Ironically, the ones to do so were the Germans, for whom she has no real fondness. A German writer had gone out and checked all the malicious stories of her alleged ill gotten gains, found them to be false stories, and said so. The German Ambassador corroborated the truth. She believes that many of these stories about her are spread by British and French officials to the Americans, who seem to relish repeating them. (She seemed quite emotionally upset about this.) Why doesn’t CIA come out publicly with the truth about her husband and herself, that they haven’t gained financially by their position? It’s hard to have to take the Communist propaganda attacks, day after day, knowing that she is number four on their death list (after Diem, Nhu, and Canh), and to realize that the Americans who profess to be allies and friends just keep quiet about the truth or else repeat vicious gossip.

d. She asked why other Americans were not assigned to Vietnam in the same manner as General Williams. Recently, President Diem told General Williams how deeply grateful all the Vietnamese were for the many fine things he had done for Vietnam. General Williams replied that he had only been doing his duty, that he had been assigned to MAAG to help Vietnam. Why, she asked, aren’t other Americans also assigned to help Vietnam? General Williams is loved by the Vietnamese as a true friend, which is what allies really expect from the United States. It is what has made the United States so different from other countries in the past. (I commented that I had had an opportunity to talk with General McGarr, who is replacing General Williams, and that McGarr had expressed much the same understanding of his MAAG assignment as did General Williams.)

e. She commented that Vietnamese had the habit of sizing up people by looking at them closely when they first met them. Perhaps this isn’t the wisest way of doing so, but this is the way that Vietnamese tell if a person is good or bad, if he is to be trusted or not. It is the reason why the Vietnamese will never be able to trust certain Americans who say with their mouths that they are friends but whose looks belie their words. Do Americans really believe and trust people like Durbrow and some of the other Americans in the Embassy. Why doesn’t Parsons visit Vietnam and find out some of those things himself, since he has such great responsibilities in Asia for the United States?

I advised her that she could best help her country and her brother-in-law, President Diem, by trying to make friends with some of the Americans in Vietnam. She is usually aloof and could do much more in making friendly overtures. Many Americans are now trying to help Vietnam, and she should recognize this. In reply to her comments that she didn’t go to American social affairs because of all the misunderstandings and talk about her afterwards, I said, oh, go on with you, you know that a lot of Americans like you, but you are in a place where you’re bound to have enemies. Just be sure that your enemies are those you feel worth having. She said this probably was wise, but that she has decided to spend most of her time working with the women of Vietnam, and feels that this is the most constructive work she can do now.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Confidential. A copy was sent to Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.