120. Memorandum of a Conversation, The Pentagon, Washington, March 18, 19601
SUBJECT
- Conference on Internal Security in Viet-Nam and Related Problem of Civil Administration, held in Admiral O’Donnell’s office, 3–E–218, March 18, 1960, at 1030 hours
ATTENDANCE
- Admiral E.J. O’Donnell, USN, Far East Region, ISA
- Colonel E.G. Lansdale, USAF, OSO/OSD
- Mr. Ben Wood, Department of State
- Lt. Col. J.M. Flesch, USA, Far East Region, ISA
- Lt. Col. J.A. Murphy, USA, OCS, D/A Civil Affairs
- Mr. Jerry French, OSO/OSD
The conference was called to discuss the political situation in Viet-Nam and its relationship to Viet Cong guerrilla successes. In Viet-Nam the Communists have found some discontent with political institutions supporting national authorities and are enlarging upon this discontent among the people. They are creating a popular base to support Communist subversive and para-military forces capable of hiding when necessary. As the situation worsens, the military will be pitted more and more against the Vietnamese people. These political problems must be studied and an acceptable solution presented to the country team for consideration and recommendations.
Summary of discussions of subjects follows:
- a.
-
Civil Guard
The Civil Guard is not capable of coping with the present guerrilla capabilities nor would it develop sufficiently in the foreseeable future to successfully conduct counter-guerrilla operations. This is attributable to shortages of equipment, poor training, and improper command and control channels.
- b.
-
Command and Control
Apparently the mission of defeating the Communist guerrillas has not been given to the Vietnamese Armed Forces by the Vietnamese government. Instead, the guerrilla problem has been tackled by a series of ad hoc arrangements which largely by-pass the channels which would make use of the Vietnamese military establishment and its U.S. military advisors.
Until the beginning of this month, regular Army Forces were committed under the control and direction of province chiefs, some who are military men and others who are civilians. The province chiefs received their orders from President Diem. This resulted in uncoordinated military actions with military commitments of company-size units, in general, on an average of 40 a day in the past. In many instances, these companies were removed from the control of battalion and regimental commanders for these operations. It is apparent that many military sins resulted, negating the advantages of planning, combined arms, and joint operations.
Why the operations were handled in this fashion is a matter of great complexity, involving the strong personality of President Diem, the political factors in the provinces, relationship (and trust) between Diem and officials most concerned, and perhaps improperly applied methods based upon past experiences. It is sufficient to note here that these methods existed.
[Page 340]In early March, President Diem appointed Colonel Khanh to be the single military commander for operations in the Delta region. President Diem believes he has given Khanh enough authority so that the military now has the entire task, with a clear chain of command and control of all means, both civil and military, in the areas of operations. However, Khanh is directly under the Presidency, the General Staff apparently is still by-passed, and it is still not clear how firmly Khanh understands his authority nor how firmly he will be backed by the President.
- c.
-
Political Conditions
The fundamental of the Vietnamese situation is a political one. Without a sound political basis for operations, military actions can only provide a temporary solution. The political problem is not simple—it requires wisdom and sure skill to handle. The U.S. has advised and helped Viet-Nam create its present political organization just as it did the military establishment and the U.S. is obligated to review and advise the Vietnamese regarding solutions in solving the problem.
Political institutions supporting President Diem have a basic hard core which operates clandestinely. The Can Lao Party appears to be one of the major sources of difficulty in the present situation. Party members are scattered throughout Vietnamese government agencies and the military establishment and non-party members are sometimes hesitant to act decisively. Since government officials do not always know who are party members in their agencies, there can be a paralysis of action by the government officials.
Instructions are passed from the President direct to province chiefs by the Minister of the Interior and military channels. It can be assumed that little or no coordination has taken place between these different sources before instructions are issued. President Diem has an excellent knowledge of the thoughts and desires of the people as a result of his frequent visits and discussions with them throughout the country.
Province chiefs and village leaders have had little experience in civil administration and political affairs. These officials often lack the appreciation of the importance of winning the support of the populace. There is evidence that community projects to improve security, sanitary conditions, and economic development have been accomplished under the direction of province and village officials prior to solicitation of peasant support. Internal security problems and administrative responsibilities have tended to take precedence over informing and influencing the people.
Summary of proposed action to assist Viet-Nam in developing an improved political environment:
As a result of the deficiencies outlined in the summary of the discussion, the Vietnamese in rural areas have to some extent lost faith in the government officials and have doubts concerning the sincerity of the national government, but still remain intensely loyal to the President. Consequently, the Communists have a tailor-made condition in which they are prepared to exert their influence. It was agreed that probably the most expeditious means to assist the Vietnamese would be through some type of mutually-agreed advisor system at the province chief level. This advisor system could be utilized to assist in advising the President of Viet-Nam of deficiencies which exist and later, with his concurrence, to assist the provincial personnel in the application of proper techniques to correct these deficiencies. It is realized that this recommendation must be handled very carefully with the Vietnamese Government and presented in a manner which will not offend their nationalist pride.
Mr. Wood presented a proposed organization (previously suggested by DOD for utilization of a third nation personnel) for assignment of advisors at province and national level. This organization would provide advisors at province and national level. This organization would provide advisors at the national level to the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and advisors to province chiefs. It was his opinion that the advisors at national level should be selected from the Departments of State and Defense and advisors to province chiefs should be selected from a third country, preferably Malaya or the Philippines.
Colonel Lansdale said that although President Diem was favorably impressed with the counter-guerrilla operations in Malaya, he did not believe Malayans would be the best selection to advise the Vietnamese civil officials. Counter-guerrilla operations in Malaya were carried out under a colonial system in which U.K. officials had complete control of both the military and civilian echelons of the government. In this operation, the indigenous population was utilized as U.K. officials considered appropriate. In Viet-Nam indigenous government and military forces are in control and responsible for the counter-guerrilla operations. The Filipinos should be more adaptable and have better qualifications for advising the Vietnamese. Colonel Lansdale also felt that exceptionally well-qualified Filipinos are available and that his personal acquaintance with them would expedite the selection.
Mr. Wood stressed the importance of selecting advisors and of establishing mutual confidence with the Vietnamese officials before advice is given and recommendations made by the advisors. These [Page 342] advisors, initially, should report to the Saigon echelon to assure that adequate political information is available to the Country Team.2
Recommendations
It was agreed that the Departments of State and Defense prepare the details and organization proposed for a political advisory group for staffing, presentation to the Country Team, and CINCPAC for consideration.
Lt. Colonel, USA
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 101. VN 1960—Internal Security. Secret. Drafted by Flesch on March 25. A copy of this memorandum is also in Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Vietnam.↩
- In a letter to Durbrow, March 18, Usher reported the results of
this meeting and then summarized a subsequent discussion between
Flesch and Wood immediately
after the meeting. The subsequent discussion went as follows:
“On the subject of funds for extra military equipment which may be needed in Viet-Nam, Wood mentioned afterwards to Flesch that there are only $15 million left in the Contingency Fund and that if DOD had any requests for money from that fund for Viet-Nam, they had better be made promptly with plenty of support. It was suggested that in view of the time element Defense might wish to make a short list of the most essential items and ask for prompt screening by MAAG and CINCPAC in order to get the claim in on the Contingency Fund before the barrel became empty. Further requests for equipment which were decided on later might be applied against 1961 funds. Flesch said the radio equipment envisaged would, he believed, cost about $2.8 million. In connection with matériel for Viet-Nam, DOD is now planning to deliver about ten to a dozen AD–6’s in September 1960 and the rest in August 1961.
“Finally, it was suggested to Colonel Flesch that when the time came to look over names for the job of Chief MAAG, Admiral O’Donnell might wish to talk informally with Mr. Steeves before any final decision is made. Flesch agreed.” (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 100. VN 1960—Internal Security)
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