Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

137. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Commander in Chief/Pacific (Felt)¹

Washington, April 15, 1960—3:06 p.m.

DEF DA975658. Following is summary of Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan’s official call on representatives of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, Viet-Nam, called upon the following representatives of the Department of Defense on April 5 and 6, 1960:²

• Hon. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense
• Hon. Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army
• Mr. Robert H. Knight, Dep. Asst. Sec/Def, ISA
• Adm. Arleigh Burke, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Dept/Navy
• Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Chief of Staff, Dept. of the Army
• Gen. Wifiiston B. Palmer, USA, Dir. of Military Assistance, ISA
• Gen. G.B. Erskine, USMC (Ret), Asst. to Sec/Def. for Spec. Oper.
• RAdm E.J. O’Donnell, USN, Director, Far East Region, ISA
• Col. William K. McNown, Deputy Asst. for Mutual Sec, Dept/AF

Summary of Mr. Thuan’s appraisal of internal security:

The Communists infiltrate personnel and supplies into Viet-Nam via the coastal region, the Mekong Valley, and trail through Southern Laos and Cambodia. Communist cadres infiltrate into South Viet-Nam to influence and organize the population and establish bases to receive large Communist guerrilla groups. The terrain, swamp and jungle, is very difficult in Viet-Nam and provides an advantage for Communist guerrilla operations.

The French, during their entire occupation, never controlled all of Viet-Nam but only the metropolitan areas and main roads. They never controlled the jungle which is just north of Saigon or the delta area to the south. Viet-Nam is attempting to control these areas and the Communists are reacting violently to the pressures of GVN security forces. GVN successes in the election of September 1959 and improvement of living conditions have caused the Communists to adopt new tactics to discredit the Diem government. Communist objectives have not changed but their time schedule has been disrupted. Captured documents indicate that their efforts will be increased during 1960 to intimidate the Vietnamese people and discredit the GVN.

Economic development will not eliminate the Communist guerrilla problem in Viet-Nam. The GVN is at war with the Communists and the military establishment must have the highest priority for funds and equipment to defeat the Communists, maintain security in the country, and create an environment in which the economy can grow.

Summary of Mr. Thuan’s request for equipment and other assistance:

Mobility of ARVN units must be improved to shorten the reaction time to guerrilla assaults. ARVN needs TO&E communications equipment, sufficient airlift to move an entire airborne battalion, some type of small boat (similar to air propeller driven boats used in the Florida Everglades) with a half squad (6 to 8 men) capacity, more helicopters to improve capabilities for supply and evacuation, and L–19 aircraft for observation.

Some type of small patrol boat is required for operations in shallow water close to shore to capture or destroy Communist junks infiltrating personnel and supplies. He requested that the 10-year naval ship replacement plan for Viet-Nam be compressed into 5-year periods. Special force personnel are required to assist ARVN with training in counter-guerrilla tactics. He requested that an outstanding general officer be selected to replace General Williams.

Request for Equipment:

• Air Force:
  • 10 C–47 aircraft
  • 6 H–34 or 6 H–19 helicopters
  • AC&W equipment
• Navy:
  • 15 picket boats
  • 25 swamp boats
  • Compression of 10-year naval program into 5-year period
  • Expedite delivery of AD–6 aircraft
• Army:
  • 15 L–19 aircraft

Mr. Thuan was informed that CHMAAG had submitted a program deviation request to provide funds and program actions for delivery of TO&E equipment for ARVN. He was also informed that the AD–4s programmed for the Viet-Nam Air Force had been changed to AD–6s and the first six of these aircraft would arrive September 1960, as opposed to previous schedule of December 1960 for the AD–4s.

No representatives of the DOD promised Mr. Thuan additional equipment or funds. However, all officials were attentive and informed him that every effort would be exerted to expeditiously meet any requirements submitted by CHMAAG and CINCPAC.

General Lemnitzer explained the importance of centralized command and intelligence collection, maximum utilization of resources and the maintenance of continuous pressure against the guerrillas. He also assured Mr. Thuan that an outstanding General would be selected to replace General Williams prior to his departure.

Admiral Burke stressed the importance of logistics in counter-guerrilla actions and said that combat units operating in the delta area should move supplies on barges with them. He also pointed out the effectiveness of bazookas, hand grenades, flame throwers, and individual weapons in such operations.

Colonel McNown stressed the importance of maximum utilization of aircraft on hand and stated that the Viet-Nam Air Force should guard against obtaining more equipment than they have the capability to maintain. He also explained the high cost of AC&W equipment which is normally considered in the long-range program.

1. Source: Department of State, G/PM Files: Lot 64 D 359, Vietnam—General and Counter Insurgencies. Secret. Drafted by Flesch on April 14 and approved by O’Donnell. Sent for information to the Chief of MAAG, Saigon and the JCS.
2. In a memorandum to Steeves, April 8, Usher described and commented on a problem which arose at the meeting between Thuan and Gates as follows:
   • “1. Both General Lampert and Colonel Flesch, who have played extremely straight with us at all times, sat in on Secretary Thuan’s conversation with Secretary Gates. They have assured us that while Thuan attempted to persuade the Secretary that the Civil Guard should be under the Vietnamese military, the Secretary did not agree.
   • “2. The Country Team decided more than a year ago that the Civil Guard should be under civil jurisdiction within the GVN. In recorded conversations with President Diem, General Williams has stood by this decision.

   “Comment:

   “General Lampert and Colonel Flesch are aware of our concern and there would appear little risk that DOD may attempt to exercise a modifying influence on the Country Team decision.” (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193 102.–VN 1960, Civil Guard)

   At the Acting Secretary of State’s staff meeting, April 8, Dillon gave the following report on the Thuan-Gates meeting: “Mr. Dillon said Secretary Gates had informed him that Thuan was pressing readjustment of military training and military programs to beef up internal security forces. Mr. Parsons commented that this was directly contrary to the country team recommendations since the latter’s concept is that the readjustment should be by increased guerrilla training of existing army units. Mr. Dillon asked that we inform Defense of the full facts.” (Notes by Calhoun, April 8; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)