114. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
2622. Reference: EmbDesp 267.2 Asked see Diem prior departure Baguio. He received me morning 9th. Following highlights conversation with Diem (Thuan present).
Diem more serious and apparently concerned than heretofore, outlined extra equipment he needs soonest to meet growing internal security problem which he labeled “war”. He needs more helicopters for reconnaissance and evacuation wounded, more C–47’s for par drops and L–19’s for liaison and observation, and urged further speed-up delivery AD4’s since F–8–F’s worn out and becoming less and less operable. Because difficulty attain mobility delta swamps he desires considerable number alligator amphibian vehicles (all French vehicles this type worn out). He particularly needs communication equipment since ARVN tables equipment only about 60 percent filled and only 32 percent of this equipment is new. To provide adequate fire power for commandos, needs additional automatic weapons and 60 mm mortars. He said he would give me full list prior my departure so I could discuss with Admiral Felt. Diem added list drawn up HQ committee of his highest ranking officers who had studied situation most carefully.
Diem told me he already had 4,500 volunteers from ARVN for commando units and their places in ARVN would be filled by reservists’ enlistments.
After his explanation of needs to face emergency I told him I questioned desirability deplete existing ARVN units by withdrawal volunteers which probably would have bad effect morale regular units. Furthermore, it would take considerable time to equip and train commando units. I added it would seem to me primary need is [Page 326] to use available forces immediately to face growing emergency since situation could deteriorate further while commando units being properly trained. Diem did not agree since claims must create elite corps from dedicated volunteers in order to meet situation. Furthermore he needs replace volunteers in ARVN in order continue regular training particularly of conscripts, guard ammo and POL dumps, as well as have sufficient regular units guard 17th parallel. When I asked why Civil Guard could not guard dumps he said they needed guard other installations and workers building new airstrips and other construction work in delta. I suggested since emergency is immediate it might be advisable minimize all regular training, and begin immediate intensive anti-guerrilla training of existing ARVN units. I recalled General White had indicated the possibility sending special force instructors here from Okinawa who could assist anti-guerrilla training regular units. Diem stated he desires have these instructors soonest but would use them to train commandos. Since Diem in effect is aiming to raise force level over 150,000 ceiling, I asked him where he expected to get equipment for additional forces. Thuan replied for him, stating from French stocks. Diem added also must have additional MAP equipment. I replied Congress had cut MAP funds considerably this year, this equipment programmed and budgeted many months ahead of time and therefore I doubted would be possible obtain additional equipment. In any event even if we should agree his suggestion, would take many months to receive MAP equipment and repeated necessary act immediately in what he terms growing emergency. Diem reiterated Viet Cong had opened all-out guerrilla war which would last long time and therefore it essential receive additional MAP equipment for long haul. He again pointed out his need for “alligators” soonest. I replied not certain if we have this type of equipment now and if so would take long time to deliver. In spite my arguments, Diem urged me request serious consideration be given furnishing all this additional equipment.
I took occasion to tell Diem I not convinced larger forces needed meet Viet-Cong threat since it appeared to me more important win confidence local population. If this done would reduce [VC] effectiveness large extent. I told him we were receiving more and more reports which may or may not be true, although they are persistent, that province chiefs and other officials have been acting arbitrary manner which had antagonized population. I stated we had many reports that province officials have conscripted thousands of peasants to build agrovilles and other faculties when only hundreds were needed and that many peasants conscripted deeply resented forced work on these projects during harvest time. Diem admitted some excesses may have taken place but stated crops are harvested over three month period and every effort being made to conscript only those [Page 327] not needed for harvests. Diem then admitted he now found it necessary slow down construction agrovilles, inferring because of resentment, but added once few model towns were built people would understand and be contented. He contends one of principal reasons stepped-up Viet-Cong activities is prevent construction agrovilles.
Since Thuan few days before had urged we furnish more naval coastal patrol craft I told them I had talked this matter over with General Williams and others who convinced even large additional number of craft would not be able by themselves control landings. More effective control would be coordinated use of ships, planes and particularly considerable number of coastal watchers to spot attempted landings. I recalled we had not been able control bootleggers during prohibition days because population against law. Therefore if population willing cooperate with Government and volunteers as coast watchers, landings would be kept to minimum. Diem disagreed, claiming rugged and/or marshy coastal areas made it impossible watchers be effective. While he did not make specific request for any particular type of craft, he mentioned need for small motor boats known as “Vedettes”; having traveled on “Vedettes” I questioned where they would be effective in South China Sea. Diem insisted they would be.
Comments: Diem was obviously not pleased by my arguments, but I felt I had to speak frankly and firmly because seems clear he moving in all directions without any clear-cut plan to utilize what he has on hand to meet situation and probably hopes use deteriorating internal situation to force US finally agree to his long sought after 170,000 force level. Since Thuan was present, I did not feel I could bring up alleged Can Lao corruption as suggested reference despatch and therefore confined my remarks to need win over population, comments on arbitrary action provincial officials and necessity to use forces and equipment now on hand. I made it quite clear I doubted we could get additional equipment but promised report his request.
After leaving Diem’s office, Thuan and I talked [garble] which I reiterated my concern about attitude population. He admitted provincial officials may have been over-zealous but assured me he and others are working on this problem which can be brought under control. I suggested to Thuan advisability Diem making periodic fireside chats to explain Government policies, why sacrifices are needed and describe beneficial results he hoped to attain from various projects. Thuan said President planning make one such talk but doubted he would desire it periodically. I stated our information indicated that one of principal reasons for peasant discontent is fact they have not been taken into confidence and told basic reasons for sacrifices they called on make and expressed hope Diem would not only make arrangements [Page 328] to explain this by radio but urge his ministers, deputies go to provinces for same purpose.
Thuan stated in confidence the GVN is receiving more and more confirmation that the VC have infiltrated military units to considerable extent.
General Williams, after reading draft this message, said he had used similar arguments to mine on March 8th in reply to Thuan’s exposition of plans for commandos, etc. General Williams has not yet been asked officially or otherwise to furnish the additional equipment Diem mentioned to me.
In order that all elements of the country team may have full knowledge of our evaluation of commando concept and its many pitfalls, I asked General Williams to furnish the team with a critical analysis.3 This analysis which brings out the arguments I used with Diem as well as others, will be used by all [garble] discussing matter with GVN officials in an effort to bring their thinking in line with reality.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/3–1060. Secret. Repeated for information to Manila for Durbrow at the U.S. Far Eastern Chiefs of Mission Conference at Baguio, to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, and CINCPAC PolAd.↩
- Document 111.↩
- Not found.↩