Office of the Historian

126. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense1

[Undated.]

BRIEFING FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT

  • Internal Security Situation, South Viet-Nam

BACKGROUND

  • Colonel Lansdale—Appraisal of present conditions (15 minutes)
  • Lt. Col. Flesch—DOD Actions (5 minutes); Question period (5 minutes)

During a conference on 20 February, Mr. Thuan informed General Williams that President Diem was going to form a special anti-guerrilla force (which he referred to as a Commando Force) of 10,000. Personnel to organize commando force would come from volunteers from the Army, reserves and Civil Guard. Training to be conducted [Page 358] under officers and NCOs drawn from the Army and to be conducted during March, April and May at Nha Trang. The over-all project to be under Department of Defense and financed by GVN. Commandos, after initial training, to be under direct command of various military region commanders for anti-guerrilla operations.

The Country Team, DOD and the Department of State all agree that the creation of another untrained force is not the solution to guerrilla problem of Viet-Nam.

On 4 February CINCPAC informed General Williams that anti-guerrilla capability could best be obtained by changing emphasis of training for selected elements of the Vietnamese Army. CHMAAG attempting to sell this idea to President Diem and obtain agreement that GVN will hold special commando force to 5,000 or less.

President Diem on 10 March informed Ambassador Durbrow2 that Viet-Nam needed additional equipment from United States to meet growing internal security problem. He listed items as follows:

  • Helicopters—C–45 AC L–19s
  • Speed up delivery of Ad–4s
  • Alligator amphibian vehicles
  • Communications equipment
  • Automatic weapons
  • Mortars, 60 MM

President Diem stated he would furnish a complete list of equipment to CHMAAG.

DOD and CINCPAC have requested that CHMAAG screen GVN list of equipment and other requirements and furnish single package requirements to enable DOD to request MSP funds and expedite delivery of equipment.

CINCPAC has inquired regarding availability, costs, lead time, etc. 100 assault boats, 16 foot and motors. These items are available and CINCPAC has been furnished information requested.

CHMAAG has inquired concerning unfunded and low priority communications equipment for Viet-Nam Armed Forces. To furnish this equipment, about $2,836,000 additional funds will be required.

GVN has requested a speed-up delivery of naval vessels recommended in ten-year naval program. CHMAAG recommended that this program be reduced by five years. CINCPAC does not concur with CHMAAG recommendation. CINCPAC does not believe Viet-Nam can train personnel and shore establishment to receive and utilize equipment as [at] this increased delivery tempo. Instead, he recommends that present equipment utilization be improved and Viet-Nam [Page 359] Air Force trained to operate more effectively with Viet-Nam Navy.

In the FY 1960 program for Viet-Nam, 20 AD–4 aircraft were included to replace the F–8F aircraft now on hand in the Vietnamese Air Force. The Department of the Navy has made available from present resources 20 AD–6 aircraft which will expedite delivery. The substitution of Ad–6 for the AD–4s will expedite delivery by approximately 12 months.

The MAAG strength in Viet-Nam will be increased from 342 to 685 beginning 15 April 1960. TERM will be phased out of Viet-Nam in December 1960. This is primarily a paper transfer of spaces from TERM to MAAG and will be accomplished by the assignment of all new arrivals in Viet-Nam to MAAG.

Other considerations:

A.
President Diem believes and has requested that the U.S. provide MAP support for a force level of 170,000 instead of 150,000. This would appear to be the appropriate time to press for this increase.
B.
President Diem would like to have the Civil Guard organized into a paramilitary organization under the Minister of Defence’s supervision instead of under the Minister of Interior. Under present mutual assistance laws, this force must be under the Minister of the Interior to obtain ICA funds for support.

Recommendations:

A.
That Country Team Viet-Nam be given time to work out with Government of Viet-Nam coordinated plans and recommendations.
B.
That DOD be prepared to request the Department of State for MSP contingency funds to expedite delivery of equipment.
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Secret. Additional information regarding the briefing anticipated in this paper has not been found.↩
  2. See Document 114.↩