124. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with President Diem on Internal Security and Aid Matters
Assistant Secretary of State J. Graham Parsons and I called on President Diem on March 21 during Mr. Parsons’ visit to Saigon. Secretary of State for the Presidency Thuan was with President Diem during the interview. The call lasted for almost three hours, with President Diem doing virtually all of the talking. The salient points of the conversation are set forth below (a full memorandum of conversation is enclosed2):
Internal Security
Diem explained at length the background and history of the internal security problem and described his efforts to break up the Communist organization and the religious sects after the cease-fire, as well as his efforts to win over the bulk of the population. He attributed Viet Cong activity in recent months to a desire to counter the considerable progress his efforts had achieved. In explaining why the Self Defense Corps and the Civil Guard had not yet been effectively organized, he reminded us that we had stopped contributing money for the SDC payroll and had held up the organization of an effective Civil Guard by trying to impose our concept of a rural police instead of a para-military organization which he thought was required under the circumstances.
Diem stressed the need to build roads, canals and airstrips in inaccessible areas to block Communists infiltrating into South Viet-Nam via the sea and through Laos and Cambodia. To do this he said he required a) dredges to build roads in frequently inundated Delta areas and a road along the Cambodian frontier across the entire Mekong Delta to control VC incursions from Cambodia; and b) bulldozers to build a network of roads in forest areas further north along the Cambodian border.
He also said he needed the following MAP equipment: twelve H–34 helicopters, two squadrons of L–19 planes and 25 additional C–47’s in order to move numbers of regular troops to isolated areas quickly, for observation purposes and to move paratroopers on short notice; alligator amphibious vehicles to give security forces greater [Page 351] mobility in the Delta area; more modern telecommunications equipment for use against the guerrillas; and more patrol craft to prevent the VC from sending in men and equipment by sea.
Apart from stating that we would try to expedite delivery of equipment already programmed, I did not encourage Diem to expect additional equipment except perhaps some H–19 helicopters which both Admiral Felt and General Williams had urged be furnished. I promised that I would find out whether Johnson, Drake and Piper would be able to release equipment no longer needed in their road building projects and pointed out that Admiral Felt and General Williams were doing all they could to expedite the delivery of programmed telecommunications equipment, some of which had already arrived. I informed Diem that our military experts did not believe alligator vehicles would operate effectively in the Delta and recommended that 200 operable plastic assault boats be used in infected areas to carry out urgent operations. I explained that more patrol boats alone would not prevent secret landings which could only be prevented by the use of boats in conjunction with air patrols and coastal watchers. Diem did not agree with this. I said we were continuing to press for AD-type planes to replace the older F8F fighters.
United States Aid Policy and Projects
Diem clearly indicated that he did not agree with our announced plan of giving particular attention and aid to Taiwan, India and Pakistan which he believed would lead to a reduction of United States aid to Viet-Nam and other countries we had previously assisted. I explained the reasons for emphasizing aid to these three countries and said that this program would not mean we would cut aid to other countries, but that we would continue to assist Viet-Nam to attain the same level of achievement which these other countries had already attained and eventually to break through to higher economic progress.
Diem criticized at length the cumbersome methods of the DLF Program and pleaded with Assistant Secretary Parsons to do what he could to speed up these proceedings, and especially to cut through the bureaucratic delays connected with the vital East-West jet-capable 10,000 foot runaway project at Saigon Airport. Mr. Parsons promised to do what he could about the runaway and to expedite delivery of already programmed military equipment.
Comments:
Diem, who had returned a few days before from an extended visit in the Delta area, where he inaugurated the first “agroville”, was both serious and somewhat optimistic during the interview. He gave the impression that he is now convinced, contrary to the attitude [Page 352] he had shown when I last saw him, that the reports that the people in the countryside are disgruntled were exaggerated. Information received by the Embassy does not bear out Diem’s renewed optimism, but at least Diem appears to be taking some effective steps which will probably help in meeting the increased Communist threat.