123. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Special Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale)1
SGN 62. Your memos of 17 March and 12 February excellent.2 As to Commando Forces. Thuan felt me out 13 February and got negative reply which he passed to Diem. As I began to hear thru military considerable talk, I queried Thuan about 20 February, he said Diem was going ahead. Directive was issued about 25 February. Diem has never mentioned subject to me and his officers say he has not because I do not approve. Deciding to handle my own way and in confidence sold my point of view to Thuan, Dung, Big Minh, Don, Chieu3 and Dinh and several division commanders. Their subsequent recommendations to President and implementing actions followed my position. As I told Felt little, chance to get Diem to lose [Page 349] face by rescinding directive published and widely circulated but good chance of getting it modified. First break came when Chief of Staff Chieu told me 10,000 was ceiling and not necessarily number to be raised. Have now been told twice in last week by Big Minh 4,000 would be maximum figure. This keeps total force well below 150,000 force ceiling. Believe Minh may be right. No Commando Companies assembled and in action as of this date. As to Tho and his military advice. Embassy says Tho made strong recommendation President turn entire anti-guerrilla job over to Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, arming them for this purpose but Diem declined. Personally cannot believe Tho made this recommendation. He and Big Minh are rumored to be very close and Minh would have told me. Tho recently talked to me about two hours concerning Army. I told him troops OK if all would let Khanh alone and get Civil Administrators on the ball. At Ministers Conference and in answer to criticism, Nhu and Diem in that order came to my defense and defense of MAAG and said any fault of troops not fault of me and MAAG but of VN officers failure to follow our advice. This presumably caused them look for new whipping boy. Believe it or not, even British Ambassador was giving GVN advice on reorganization and tactics. Fear he was aided by our fellow countrymen. As you say many back seat drivers without any responsibility like to give advice. Last August several VN officers attended British Jungle School, Malaya. MAAG was not in on this. Apparently incompetent officers physically and professionally were sent and made poor showing. This because threat gossip around Saigon and of course VN headache. Since VN know British leaked the information they now refuse to even consider sending more. The fact that at the time the British praised the Cambodian students poured salt into the wound. I was asked by Embassy if I couldn’t encourage the VN to send a second group. I didn’t get to first base. High U.S. civilian visitor last week asked high GVN official if they fully satisfied my work here although he did not engage me in conversation. GVN official considered this crude invitation to complain. As to Vietnamese politicos, Khanh told me during my visit to an operation with him several days ago “local administrators make ten Viet Cong behind my back faster than I can kill one in my front”. You know better than I there are not enough troops in Vietnam to whip the Viet Cong unless Civilian Administrators do their own job correctly.
Big Minh will accompany Thuan as far as Honolulu. Brig Gen Lampert4 will go with him to Honolulu and Washington. Lampert is well qualified and should without fail be present at all Thuan military conferences at least. Kindest regards.