Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

122. Memorandum From the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Lemnitzer) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

JCS 1992/791
CSAM 103–60

Washington, March 24, 1960.

ANTI-GUERRILLA TRAINING FOR VIETNAM (U)

1. I have noted in messages that the security situation in South Vietnam has deteriorated markedly during the last few months. The North Vietnamese-controlled Communist dissidents have extended their reign of terror in the rural areas and have shown an increased capability to mount raids and ambushes against selected targets near the capital. The boldness and frequency with which the dissidents have been operating clearly indicate that their capability has been reinforced with additional cadres and possibly materiel from North Vietnam by land and sea. Communist dissidents, numbering no less than 3,000, have demonstrated an increased capability to mount attacks, raids, ambushes, and other terrorist incidents in southern and central South Vietnam. Such actions plus intimidation of local villagers have caused rural populations to lose confidence in their Government, and will, unless checked, cause the nation’s stability to deteriorate even more rapidly.

2. President Diem of Vietnam considers his country engaged in an all-out guerrilla war with the Viet Cong which will last a long time and has requested² additional assistance in both matériel and training. To achieve over-all U.S. objectives in South Vietnam, it is considered necessary that the U.S. render timely and reasonable support.

3. In order to reduce and eventually to eliminate the terrorist activities of the Viet Cong, the populace of South Vietnam must be physically and psychologically separated from the terrorists and then the terrorists must be ruthlessly hunted down. These actions require a coordinated effort by the Vietnamese in the fields of psychological warfare, civil affairs, intelligence and counter-intelligence, and counter-guerrilla military operations by the armed forces, Civil Guard and police.

4. CINCPAC feels³ that an anti-guerrilla capability can be developed within the regular armed forces by changing the emphasis in the training of selected elements of the Vietnamese Army and other security forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare. The Department of the Army agrees with the CINCPAC concept, but feels that additional support in specialized fields is warranted and can be introduced overtly in Vietnam as a result of current developments with respect to the MAAG/TERM ceiling.⁴ The Department of the Army is, therefore, prepared to augment the CINCPAC capability by furnishing the Chief, MAAG, with special forces mobile training team personnel, including operational detachments and command and communications elements, psychological operations advisors, civil affairs advisors, and a language qualified counter-intelligence and combat intelligence training team.⁵

5. Additional matériel support to the Vietnamese forces, or acceleration of deliveries of matériel currently programmed, as considered necessary by CINCPAC should receive the full support of the Department of Defense.

6. In view of the critical situation in Vietnam, I believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should take definite action to assist the Vietnamese in their effort to combat the insidious guerrilla warfare being conducted against them. I therefore recommend that the message in Enclosure “A” hereto, be dispatched to CINCPAC, offering additional training support to MAAG, Vietnam, as one means of coping with this increasingly threatening situation.⁶

7. It is recommended that copies of this paper be forwarded to CINCPAC.

8. In consonance with the provisions of JCS Memorandum of Policy No. 83,⁷ it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to U.S. officers assigned to NATO activities.

Enclosure “B”

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Department of the Army can provide the following additional personnel to USCINCPAC for MAAG, Vietnam:

a. U.S. Army Special Forces. U.S. Army Special Forces are considered well qualified to conduct and train small unit indigenous forces for anti-terrorist operations. Twelve special forces detachments totaling 116 personnel can be made available to MAAG, Vietnam, to assist the Vietnamese forces in counter-terrorist operations. Three of these teams have previously been targeted for South Vietnam. In addition, a command, control and communication element comprising 50 personnel can, if warranted, be furnished to Chief, MAAG in order to provide a communications system capable of high speed communications with each element of special forces operating with a Vietnamese unit. Any special forces units so provided would be assigned to Chief, MAAG, Vietnam.

b. Psychological Operations. Based on experience factors gained from Philippines anti-HUK operations and more recently from Laotian activities, it is considered that a minimum of six (6) psychological operations personnel may be required to assist the efforts of MAAG, Vietnam. These personnel would have the mission of advising and assisting the ARVN in obtaining the cooperation of the indigenous population and reducing or eliminating its support of Viet Cong guerrilla elements. It is believed that CINCPAC possibly has sufficient resources available to him to provide these personnel. If not, some of these personnel can be provided by DA.

c. Civil Affairs. As in psychological operations, experience in the Philippine anti-HUK operations and more recently in the Laotian situation definitely demonstrated that Civil Affairs operations can effectively contribute to the separation of civilian support from the guerrilla activity and thus deny the guerrillas a base of operations. The development of this capability requires a local Civil Affairs organization which is a thoroughly integrated part of the local Armed Forces. A minimum of three well trained Civil Affairs officers could be made available to the MAAG in order to develop the indigenous Civil Affairs capability required. These officers would be utilized not only to train and indoctrinate the indigenous personnel but also as an advisory group to the MAAG for CA aspects of the counter-guerrilla operation which is presently being conducted. The indigenous Civil Affairs capability should include a Civil Affairs focal point within the military establishment and a G5 staff organization at all levels to include the division, suitably trained and indoctrinated Civil Affairs units and an aggressive civic action program which this Civil Affairs organization could carry out.

d. Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. A training team of 10 individuals, comprising both counter-intelligence and combat intelligence personnel, all of whom would be language-qualified. This team would assist and train the Vietnamese in counter-intelligence and counter-subversion activities, individual and unit combat intelligence, and techniques and control of clandestine intelligence operations against insurgent elements.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 99, 9155.3/4060 (15 Feb 60). Secret.
2. U.S. Embassy Saigon message to Secretary of State, No. 2622, dated 10 March 1960; on file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. Document 114.]
3. CINCPAC message to Office of the Secretary of Defense (and info addressees), DTG 142355Z March 1960 (AF IN 43393); on file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. Document 115.]

4. (1) OSD message to Commander in Chief, Pacific, DEF 973757, DTG 120010Z March 1960; on file Joint Secretariat.

   (2) Department of State message to American Embassy Saigon and other addressees, No. 1687, dated 17 March 1960; on file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. Document 118 and footnote 6 thereto.]

5. Enclosure “B” hereto. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Enclosure A is a draft message to CINCPAC, subsequently sent unchanged on March 30 as JCS 947802 following JCS approval of JCS 1992/791 at their meeting held on March 29. This message set forth in the name of the JCS the substance of paragraph 4 of JCS 1992/791, and requested CINCPAC’s views on training assistance and on any additional requirements necessary to insure the internal security of Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 99, 9155.3/4060 (15 Feb 60))

   Subsequent messages in the file cited above and in Center of Military History, Williams Papers, TWX s 1960 (71), between JCS, CINCPAC, and Chief of MAAG Vietnam during April indicate that agreement was reached to send to Vietnam three special forces training teams of ten men each, three intelligence officers, and three “psywar” experts, to arrive in time for training to begin June 1. “Civilian clothes should be worn on arrival in Saigon. Standard U.S. combat and khaki army uniforms will be worn during duty hours in Vietnam. Calibre of all personnel should be best possible since this first time U.S. will instruct ARVN directly.” (CINCPAC message 210017Z to JCS, April 21; National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 99, 9155.3/4060 (15 Feb 60))

7. Not printed.