119. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)1

SUBJECT

  • Security Situation in Vietnam

You might find a brief summary of current developments in Vietnam helpful in your thinking about U.S. actions to keep Vietnam securely on our side, as a keystone of our Defense posture in Southeast Asia.

The Communists. The Communist Vietcong have been strengthening their guerrilla efforts in Free Vietnam for some time. Until last July, these efforts were largely by terror squads of 3 or 4 men used to support the subversive activities of Communist political workers. Following some stepped up activity by the Vietnamese Army, the Vietcong guerrillas apparently have been reorganized and strengthened into larger bands more able to cope with Army activities. The Vietcong bands are now reported to run to 30, 50, 100, or more men, totalling an estimated 3,000 men. They seem to be operating mostly in the delta regions of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers, and in the more isolated area north and west of Saigon. Vietcong striking power was highlighted by a savage attack on an Army garrison at Tayninh on 26 January.

Counter-Guerrilla Forces. Against the Communist guerrillas, the Vietnamese have been using, without decisive results, 21 infantry regiments, a “home guard” of village “self defense corps” strengthened by a large part of the 48,000-man, constabulary-type Civil Guard. This is a familiar picture to those who have observed Communist guerrilla operations in modern times, including this same area of Vietnam prior to its independence.

Apparently, the mission of defeating the Communist guerrillas has not been given to the Vietnamese Armed Forces by the Vietnamese government. Instead, the guerrilla problem has been tackled by a series of ad hoc arrangements, which have grown like Topsy to meet contingencies, and which largely by-pass the channels which would make expected use of the Vietnamese military establishment and it’s U.S. military advisors.

Until the beginning of this month, regular Army forces were committed under the control and direction of Province Chiefs, some of whom are military men, and others civilians. The Province Chiefs [Page 337] took their orders from President Ngo Dinh Diem. This resulted in uncoordinated military actions, with military commitments of generally company-size units on an average of 40 a day in the recent past. In many instances, these companies were removed from the control of battalion and regimental commanders for these operations. It is apparent that many military sins resulted, negating the advantages of planning, combined arms, and joint operations.

Why the operations were handled in this fashion is a matter of great complexity, involving the strong personality of President Diem, the political factors in the provinces, relationships (and trust) between Diem and officials most concerned, and inferences from lessons based upon past experiences. It is sufficient to note here that these methods existed.

In early March, President Diem appointed Colonel Khanh to be the single military commander for operations in the Delta region. President Diem believes he has given Khanh enough authority so that the military now has the entire task, with a clear chain of command and control of all means, both civilian and military, in the areas of operations. However, Khanh is directly under the Presidency, the General Staff apparently is still by-passed, and it is still not clear how firmly Khanh understands his authority nor how firmly he will be backed up by the President. It is hoped, however, that having a single commander directly supported by the President will start getting results and start changing the gloomy security climate in Vietnam.

Commando Force. President Diem has ordered the immediate organization of a commando force of 10,000 volunteers. The volunteers are to come from both the regular Armed Forces and the Civil Guard. The plan is to have seventy-five 131-man companies, a commando group and support units. The primary strength of this force, 50 companies, will be committed in the Delta region.

The commando concept poses some tough problems. The volunteers will probably take the cream off regular rifle regiments, reportedly now understrength. Equipping the commandos will take special doing; perhaps 6,000 could be equipped by using the difference between authorized strength of 150,000 and current strength of nearly 144,000 in the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Also, it is likely that British irregular tactics developed in Malaya will be introduced, with the U.S. footing the bill; due to fundamental differences between Vietnamese and Malayan problems, friction can well result among advisors, suppliers, and operators.

Training. CINCPAC is working on the problem of training the Vietnamese. This problem, too is complex. For example, 12 of the total 21 infantry regiments used in current operations have not had an opportunity to accomplish critically important advanced individual [Page 338] and small unit training which is a fundamental military need for successful use of these units. Thus, the problem becomes one of how to rotate these regiments out of the line, to be trained and returned. The General Staff has found itself unable to cope with the problem. In addition, the constabulary-type Civil Guard is badly in need of proper training, organization, and equipment; effective action has been withheld from the Civil Guard problem due to sharp differences of opinion in both the Vietnamese and U.S. official families on jurisdiction and methods of deployment for the Civil Guard forces; these are much the same differences which needed resolution as early as 1955.

The Political Factor. As stressed in my previous memo to you,2 the fundamental need is to construct a sound political basis first. This will give meaning to the required corrective actions, military or otherwise. The constructive work has to be done in the midst of alarming contingencies, coping with Communist guerrillas on the one hand while being ready to resist a potential Communist invasion from the North, without weakening the strength of Vietnamese leadership or resources. It does seem obvious that it will require something extra and special by both Vietnam and the United States before this problem is licked.

  1. Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Lansdale i960 (136). Secret. This document is an attachment to the letter cited in footnote 3, Document 113.
  2. See Document 102.