121. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Army Staff for Logistics (Myers)1
Dear Sam: Yours of 5 March received.2
Things are rather tight just now because of the flare-up of Viet Cong activities in the 5th Military Region. Colonel Khanh is in command there now and if let alone and given proper help by the civilian officials in the area, should regain control in due time. Some sharp, nasty, fights are not unusual. However, the V.C. bands normally [Page 343] give the Army and the Marines a wide berth and disappear into thin air when they come along. They do, however, hit Civil Guard posts and grab off officials of isolated villages with apparent ease and at will.
When Army or Marines do make contact with the V.C. some sharp engagements take place that can and often do cause a half dozen or so casualties on both sides in a matter of seconds.
Diem recently came up with a directive to form 10,000 Commandos by forming a couple of companies of volunteers out of each regiment. As this would skim off the cream of officers, NCOs and privates, I’m doing my best to sabotage the project and may be successful as none of the Corps or Division commanders want to lose these people.
Others here think it a ruse by Diem to raise the Armed Forces to 170,000 but I’m not convinced of that as they have said from the start the entire deal is to be financed by the GVN from their own resources. I maintain they haven’t the money to do it. Thuan, who is charged with funding the money, admits to me he is at wits end. At any rate, none of the companies have been assembled to date although the Directive was dated 24 February for implementation by 1 March. Practically an impossible task. Diem didn’t consult me on this and I’m convinced he didn’t because Thuan felt me out and got a flat no which I know he passed on up.
Durbrow reports that Diem said he was going to give him a list of additional equipment he needed for the Regular Forces. When I asked Diem about this he said he would show it to me and get MAAG’s comments as to needs and feasibility once he got recommendations from his commanders and before he gave the list to the Ambassador. To date he has not done so.
However, some days ago, and before this flap started I made inquiries as to feasibility of stepping up some Commo equipment that was due in on the FY 59 and FY 60 program. Maybe that can be done as it’s really badly needed.
As to the bayonets. I see no reason to ask for air shipment and think you were right in not arranging for it.
You mentioned the 32d Regiment fight3 so I’ll fill you in briefly. The VC, possibly 200, although the reports were from 300 to 500, hit the Regimental Camp at 0230 January 26. About 250 of the Regiment in camp, the others were either on operation or in dependent quarters. Coming in from the North they over ran the sentry posts and got down through the 1st and 2nd Battalion areas before being stopped at the 3rd Battalion area. The fight lasted 60 minutes with about 30 plus dead. The V.C. were well fixed with heavy demolitions [Page 344] and destroyed or partly destroyed, about five buildings. Some made a bee-line for the Battalion arms rooms and got quite a few weapons. Some of these were later recovered. The Regimental Advisor was at billets in Tay Ninh about 12 km away and missed the show. The V.C. were driven out (or withdrew) and in the follow-up about 30 were killed. Two trucks, loaded with arms, were recaptured as the Vietnamese prisoners driving the trucks kept stalling them.
The brazenness of this attack shocked the Vietnamese to the roots and in that respect the attack may have been a good thing.
The Regimental Commander (Major) was tried and sentenced to reduction to Captain and no promotion for five years. The Division Commander (Lt Colonel), relieved from command and no promotion for five years.
The VC had the place well reconnoitered. They knew most of the Regiment was gone, they knew exactly where the arms rooms were, they knew exactly which building individual officers slept in and they headed for them. This affair really put the Vietnamese in a tizzy.
Now as to the rumors you hear about me going into striped pants. That idea, to the best of my knowledge, was first advanced by some Congressional Committee out here. Later someone sent me a clipping out of a Service Journal that suggested there was some talk of this or something to that effect. None of this has ever come from me. Frankly, the snow will very likely fall in Saigon before anyone in State will consider such a thing in a serious vein. This Despite the fact the published Mansfield Committee Report4 treated this MAAG, and in fact me personally, in a rather favorable way.
For background for your talks to the students at MAAG Institute, you know the situation in general. On occasion, as before, I get warnings from the VN, usually the President, to have my people be particularly careful during certain periods. Although I caution them, many probably pay little attention. That’s rank stupidity. You will be pleased to hear newcomers to this MAAG speak of your talks with high praise.
[Here follows discussion of personal matters.]
Lt General, USA
- Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Personal Correspondence 1960 (75).↩
- Not found.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 111.↩
- See Document 107.↩