Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

86. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Tokyo, September 14, 1955—8:50 p.m.

C 74014 (DA IN 167042). 1. I recently returned from an inspection trip to Korea during which I visited NNIT compounds at Pusan, Kunsan and Inchon and later discussed demonstration situation with President Rhee.

2. At NNIT compounds situation was as follows:

a. Pusan: 1500–2000 school children. They were in mass formations of 400–500 each, lined up in front of the main gate to Hialeah compound.

b. Kunsan: 300 men in mass formation at each of 2 gates of K–8 airfield.

c. Inchon: 250 men and women in mass formation in front of gate at end of causeway leading to Wolmi-Do Island.

3. All demonstrations were orderly. Commanders informed me that with few exceptions, number of demonstrators and activity then in progress at each compound were typical of demonstrations during last 2 weeks. A group of demonstrators is usually relieved as a unit and replaced by another group of similar size. Groups stay in position from 2 to 8 hours during daylight and early evening hours. Small groups of 30 to 50 demonstrators occasionally remain near the gates throughout the night. Frequently no demonstrators are present during hours of darkness. Activity usually consists of singing songs or following directions of leaders chanting in unison “Czech and Polish spies must go”, etc.

4. Later I called on President Rhee and, after recalling Ambassador Lacy’s meeting with him regarding NNSC and demonstrations (as reported in Seoul 264),² I told him of my visit to NNIT compounds and my disappointment in finding demonstrations still in progress. I explained that continuing the demonstrations would only make it more difficult to eliminate the remaining NNITs from ROK. I urged that, if he were really sincere in his desire to get rid of the NNITs, he would take the necessary action to terminate the demonstrations as soon as possible.

5. The President reviewed his meeting with Ambassador Lacy, following which he stated his position and defended demonstrations by repeating almost verbatim the contents of his letter to Ambassador Lacy on this subject (see Seoul 301).³ I told him that I did not agree with many of the things he had said and reiterated the importance of stopping demonstrations if the ROK really wished to help UNC solve problem of NNITs.

6. I then told President that aside from demonstrations making it more difficult for UNC to solve NNIT problem, there were certain features of demonstrations that were extremely objectionable to me, as follows:

a. They made it necessary for me to divert valuable US forces from the main battle position and from their primary mission of defending ROK.

b. From psychological point of view it was regrettable and, in my opinion poor taste, for school children to be participating in the demonstrations. I told him that they were not only losing valuable school time but their participation would inevitably arouse antagonisms in their minds against US forces who had only recently saved them and ROK from Communist aggression.

c. With regard to his statement that “We have found an overwhelming public demand for continuance of the demonstrations,” I told him it evident that my information indicated quite the contrary; that they were directed demonstrations in which laborers, farmers and school children were forced to participate or provide funds to support them. I told him that families in Pusan, Kunsan and Inchon were required to provide a member to participate in the demonstrations frequently or pay 100 hwan to hire someone to represent them. I cited the case of an American supported orphanage which, on being unable to provide personnel to participate in demonstrations, had been assessed 500 hwan to support demonstrations. When money could not be produced, the canvassers kicked a hole in the door of the orphanage. Upon hearing of this incident, President became very angry and demanded that he be provided with detailed information so that he might take corrective action. I told him that for me to reveal names and places would only result in retaliatory attacks against individuals and agencies concerned, but I was certain that if he desired, he had ample means to obtain the same information as I had.

d. I told the President that in flying over demonstration areas, I observed that demonstrators were being hauled back and forth from adjacent villages and cities by trucks and buses. I regarded this use of scarce motor transportation and consumption of large quantities of fuel for such purposes to be extremely wasteful and totally unjustified particularly when ROK was requesting, and US was providing ROK with, motor vehicles and POL under current aid programs. Again President became angry and said that he would promptly put a stop to such use of transportation.

7. Recent intelligence reports indicate that at Rhee’s direction instructions have now been issued by ROK Government to stop use of motor transportation in connection with demonstrations. This was confirmed in a conversation I had with General Chung II Kwon, Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, who is presently in Japan visiting US logistical installations. He informed me that the instructions were issued by the President early this week before Chung departed from Seoul. If these instructions are strictly enforced, it will become increasingly difficult for ROK to maintain present scale of demonstrations since participants will be required to walk long distances to reach demonstration areas. Use of motor transportation to move demonstrators will be checked frequently by compound commanders. If demonstrations continue or if instructions on use of motor transportation are not enforced, I shall again bring the matter to President Rhee’s attention on my next trip to Korea.

8. The foregoing is submitted for information purposes and as background against which to view the present situation in Korea.

1. Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables Aug-Dec 1955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Eighth Army Command in Korea for General Isaac D. White and to Seoul for Ambassador Lacy.
2. Ambassador Lacy reported in telegram 264 from Seoul, August 29, that he had called on President Rhee as instructed and requested that Rhee stop the anti-NNSC demonstrations. Rhee repeated his complaints about Czech and Polish “spies” and gave no indication that he would suppress the demonstrations. (Ibid., Central Files, 795.00/8–2955)
3. Document 84.