Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

63. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 5, 1955¹

Washington , July 5, 1955

PRESENT

• The Secretary
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. Phleger
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. McClurkin
• Under Secretary Anderson
• Admiral Radford
• General Taylor
• Admiral Davis
• Colonel Junkermann²

Secretary Anderson delivered a letter³ to the Secretary which essentially made the case in Telegram C–73136 of June 30.⁴ The letter recommended provisional suspension of the inspection provisions of the Armistice Agreement and removing the NNSC teams to the demilitarized zone. This would be done after informing the Sixteen and the United Nations. Having done this we would then proceed to introduce modern weapons as military circumstances dictate.

Mr. Robertson briefly summarized the meeting of June 3⁵ and the decision which had been taken as to correcting the military imbalance after reporting to the United Nations on our interpretation of the Armistice Agreement. He said it had also been understood that we would accept the reductions proposed in the NNSC as a stop-gap measure.

Secretary Anderson went back to a meeting that he, Admiral Radford, Mr. Hoover and DillonAnderson had had with the President to discuss this problem.⁶ At that meeting there had been an emphasis on the problem created in the Republic of Korea by the NNSC. Defense had suggested that the military commander should say in the Military Armistice Commission that the inspection system does not work. Until it was possible to agree with the Communists upon means to make it work, the United Nations Command was going to suspend the operation of the NNSC in the ROK on a provisional basis and move the teams to the demilitarized zone. The President thought that that might be an adequate solution but suggested that they talk with the Secretary of State. He had added that if this measure was taken surely the military commanders were ingenious enough to take care of their own best interests in Korea, but it was clear that they could not do it with the NNSC looking over their shoulders. Secretary Anderson went on to say that clearly there was a problem which was not taken care of by the Department of State proposal which would continue reports to a diminished NNSC. He said that, for example, we could not introduce 280 mm. cannon into Korea and give the Communists the right or opportunity to inspect the cannon. In addition, there is an even wider consideration in that the Soviet Union is already proposing machinery for general disarmament which would be roughly comparable to the NNSC. If we deal publicly with the NNSC in Korea in a way which emphasizes its ineffectiveness, the inherent weakness of the USSR proposals will be exposed.

Admiral Radford said that our great concern at the moment is not the early introduction of new weapons, which would be even some disadvantage to us. The right to introduce them would cause us a little difficulty since the ROK would want some of them and we do not want to give them to the Republic of Korea.

General Taylor said that the importance of the equipment needs in Korea varies from service to service and type to type. The Air Force has been hurt the worst and has had to move units out of Korea. However, the situation is not now critical, although a year from now it will be. He emphasized that it is not realistic to divide the problem of the NNSC and Paragraph 13(d) unless the NNSC could be handled first.

Admiral Radford pointed out that President Rhee will not allow any more mobile inspection teams in South Korea.

Mr. Robertson cited Ambassador Lacy’s telegram⁷ indicating his belief that the action proposed with respect to 13(d) would be greeted with enthusiasm by President Rhee and would make it possible to live for a while with the NNSC situation.

Admiral Radford said that he did not agree with Ambassador Lacy and thought that he hadn’t been there long enough to understand the situation.

Mr. Phleger commented on the way this problem has been switched back and forth two or three times between handling the NNSC and 13(d) but said that after the last meeting we had worked out our proposal reflecting what we thought had been agreed. He pointed out that the problem of 13(c) is entirely different from that of 13(d) and that linking the two problems simply because these were the two kinds of things the NNSC could inspect created difficulties. On the general problem of inspection, if the Communists have refused to carry out the intent and spirit of the inspection provisions something can be worked out to relieve the UNC of an unfair burden.

The Secretary said that he does not like the idea of blindfolding the inspectors so that we can violate the Armistice. To do so leaves us in a very bad position. As he had said in the earlier meeting, he prefers the device of putting a reasonable interpretation upon the Armistice.

Mr. Anderson said that he agreed completely and would be glad to have our position on the introduction of weapons handled publicly, but he believes that we must get rid of the inspection people first.

Mr. Phleger and Mr. Murphy asked why it was necessary to raise the issue of 13(c).

Admiral Radford said that it was only because (13(c) is one of the two kinds of inspections to be performed by the NNSC.

Mr. Phleger said that it was not necessary to attack the problem from this angle. It could be attacked from the point of view of lack of fulfillment by the Communists of their NNSC obligations under the Armistice Agreement.

The Secretary said that there is one new thought which had been advanced by Defense. Namely, that they apparently want to put into Korea some highly sensitive new equipment which they don’t want anyone to have the right to inspect.

Admiral Radford and General Taylor pointed out that it was not necessarily true that they wanted to do so right away but that this was in the cards, for example, with F860’s or new tanks.

The Secretary said that from the political standpoint this question has some of the same implications as the great debate about Yalta. The question had been whether we should denounce the Yalta Agreement. It had been decided not to do so but to keep ourselves in a flexible position under which we could continue to say that the Communists are violating the Yalta Agreement. If we had denounced it, the Communists could go ahead with any violations and we would have no more case against them. On the whole question of inspection he wants to be in a position at Geneva⁸ to point out constantly to the Communists the violations they have committed. He still thinks that all Defense wants to do can be accomplished without losing our trading position by giving the Armistice Agreement a reasonable interpretation.

Secretary Anderson asked if we still would not have our trading position if we handled the NNSC as Defense suggested. He said that we could say that the NNSC has not worked. We could offer to sit down across the table with the Communists and try to work out means of making it work more effectively, but that meanwhile we could suspend the operations of the NNSC in the ROK.

[Here there ensued a give and take on the question of Communist violations—the MIG incident⁹ and the abortive inspections in north Korea, a comment by Secretary Anderson on what General Hull had heard from the Swiss and Swedish members of the mobile inspection teams who had gone north (including marks of tires of aircraft on runways at airfields which had no aircraft to be seen) and the Communist jet aircraft activity as seen on our radar.]¹⁰

General Taylor pointed out that as long as the NNSC continues to operate we will be faced with a serious problem of ourselves having to violate the Armistice at the point at which the NNSC wants to perform a special inspection in the ROK because President Rhee has said he will not allow any more such inspections.

The Secretary said that he wants to study the problem a little bit more and have Mr. Phleger and Mr. Robertson look into it to see whether we can accomplish what Defense wants to accomplish without placing ourselves in the position of violating the Armistice. He said this position of “clean hands” will be particularly valuable to us in the next few weeks. He still believes that we can perhaps accomplish what we want to accomplish by interpretation. He suggested that perhaps there might be merit in playing with the idea of cutting down or eliminating the activity of the NNSC in the ROK until the NNSC in the north had “caught up” in number of inspections or kinds of activity.

Admiral Radford pointed out that we have conclusive proof of Communist violations in the north.

The Secretary asked whether we could get this conclusive proof in specifics rather than generalities, adding that we need to know the facts in order to stimulate our own imaginations as to solutions which might be possible.

Secretary Anderson asked the other representatives from Defense to see whether a list of specifics could be delivered, perhaps being divided into things which could be made public and things which must be kept confidential.

Admiral Radford pointed out that there was a serious problem of compromising sources of information if we used some of the material which we have.

[After the meeting. Colonel Junkermann told Mr. McClurkin ¹¹ that Defense is going to try by July 11—after communicating with the field—to provide State with the requested “list of specifics”.]

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korea. Secret. Drafted by McClurkin. The source text indicates the conversation took place in Dulles’ office.
2. Colonel Howard C. Junkermann.
3. A copy of this letter is in Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Korea.
4. A copy of CINCUNC telegram C 73136 from Tokyo is ibid., NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables—NNSC—Jan–June 1955.
5. See Document 57.
6. Reference is to the May 11 meeting; see Document 45.
7. Telegram 1452 from Seoul, June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/ 6–2955)
8. The Four-Power Conference at Geneva began on July 18, 1955.
9. The incidents discussed in footnote 2, Document 53, led to NNIT inspections in North Korea in response to UNC insistence that MIG patrols were being flown from North Korean airfields.
10. All brackets are in the source text.
11. On July 14, Admiral Davis sent a letter to Secretary Dulles enclosing summaries prepared by CINCUNG, UNCMAC, and the Department of Defense that detailed Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/7–1455)