Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris¹

Washington, May 11, 1955—7:02 p.m.

Tedul 22. For Secretary from Hoover. Pass Admiral Davis.²

1. At urgent request of Defense, the Korean NNSC matter was discussed this morning with President. Secretary Anderson, Admiral Radford, Phleger and myself present. The President suggested that a message be sent to you personally concerning problem and his reaction.

2. You will recall that the NNSC in Korea unanimously recommended on May 3 to the Military Armistice Commission that the number of stationary inspection teams be reduced from 5 to 3 in each of the two zones in Korea and that the number of delegations on each of these remaining teams be reduced from two neutrals appointed by each side to one neutral appointed by each side.³ The United Nations Command must take a position on this proposal, which the Communists will doubtless approve, in the Military Armistice Commission. General Taylor has recommended that this occasion be seized to propose in the Military Armistice Commission that the NNSC be abolished altogether and that the provisions of the armistice with respect to the reinforcement of personnel and equipment, paragraphs 13c and 13d be abrogated by mutual agreement. If this counterproposal were not accepted by the Communists, General Taylor has proposed that the UNC unilaterally announce that these provisions are regarded as abrogated by reason of the Communist violations.

3. At the meeting I pointed out that our allies would not agree to action as proposed by General Taylor and that such unilateral U.S. action would destroy the United Nations structure through which we are operating in Korea and could be used by some of our allies to free them from any obligations under the Joint Policy Declaration. Anderson did not urge General Taylor’s proposal but alternatively suggested that Taylor be authorized as commander in the field to suspend provisionally the unworkable clauses of the Armistice Agreement which relate to the operations of NNSC and the inspection teams on the grounds that clearly inoperative and unworkable provisions of a treaty or agreement may be suspended by either party pending mutual agreement of the signatories upon satisfactory arrangements for making those provisions workable. This may be done without abrogating the entire Armistice Agreement. There are some precedents in international law to support such suspension of provisions as contrasted with unilateral and absolute abrogation of treaty terms.

4. President believes we must find some way out of difficult situation in which Communists violate armistice while we continue observe it. Re view our allies, he commented they have stake in our collaboration in other areas. He thought that as a first step we should proceed along lines suggested by Anderson and desired that we recommend to you that you speak to Macmillan and Pinay, telling them the “facts of life”, and obtaining acquiescence in this course of action.⁴ Thereafter we could take up matter here with Sixteen.

5. Suggest you point out that Sixteen participating nations agreed with us last fall that the NNSC was ineffective by reason of Communist obstruction and that we should make a tripartite approach (British, French and U.S.) to the Swiss and Swedes to persuade them to terminate their participation in the NNSC. The best we have been able to accomplish through this approach after many months of effort was the unanimous agreement cited above of the NNSC. You might point out that in addition to the serious matter of principle involved, it has been only with the greatest of effort and at the cost of very considerable strains on ROK-U.S. relationships that the U.S. has been able to protect the Communist personnel of the inspection teams. While the Swiss and Swedes have assured us that their agreement with the Czechs and Poles represents only a first stage and that they plan (at some undefined point in time) a further step, we believe that we can no longer run the risks involved of a possible conflict between UNC and ROK personnel over the safety of the Czechs and Poles. Moreover we have no assurance that the Swiss and Swedes will be willing in the future to act without the agreement of the Communists and there is no reason to think that the Communists will agree to elimination of the teams altogether.

6. You might also point out that the proposed action relates entirely to the operations of the NNSC and does not involve any impairment of the substantive provisions of the Armistice. For your information, Defense maintained that the harmful results of our continuing fully to carry out provisions of paragraphs 13c and d of the Armistice while the Communists continue to violate them cannot long be endured. The President said that this was a matter that should be considered later.

Hoover

1. Source: Department or State, Central Files, 795B.00/5–1155. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hemmendinger and Harry Schwartz of S/P; cleared by Murphy, Phleger, and Defense; and approved by Hoover.
2. Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs. Davis accompanied Dulles, who was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council meetings, May 9–11.
3. See Document 41.
4. Dulles’ conversation with Macmillan concerning the NNSC is summarized in Dulte 31, infra. Dulles did not discuss the matter with Pinay in Paris, but Murphy raised it with French Ambassador Couve de Murville on May 13; see Document 49.