Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

56. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Taylor) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Tokyo, June 2, 1955—4 p.m.

C 72818 (DA IN 143961). Ref: A. Tokyo 870;² B. C 72805.³

1. The predictable political and military disadvantages of long-term compliance with the armistice agreement, as seen by Amb Lacy and me, were reported to you by Refs A and B, respectively.

2. As indicated in Ref B, I believe that anticipatory planning for meeting the predictable deterioration of US/UN military capabilities in Korea, and consequently in the FE, is a matter of urgency. The dissolution of the NNSC and the elimination of para 13D of the agreement would provide some relief. The withdrawal of US/UN forces from Korea and their concentration elsewhere in FEC would free them from the restrictions of the armistice on their modernization as well as provide a sounder strategic distribution of force to meet US commitments in the FE. The view of this hq on both of these courses of action are a matter of record. However, it appears timely to take a broader look at the situation and to re-examine the entire armistice agreement to determine its suitability for long-term application to the situation in Korea.

3. The armistice agreement was never intended to apply for an indefinite period of time in the manner of a treaty or a mutual defense pact. Its highly restrictive provisions were acceptable to the UNC as a means of insuring that the Communists did not use the period of respite provided by the cease-fire to reinforce and re-equip its forces. In this respect, the armistice agreement has been an utter failure. In fact, the only substantive provision of the agreement which has been strictly observed by both sides is the cease-fire. It would appear desirable, therefore, for the 16 nations to recognize that the present agreement has, except for this essential element, outlived its usefulness and should be discarded in recognition of a de facto condition of peace in Korea. Since the replacement of the present agreement by a more suitable negotiated instrument offers only the prospect of an interminable period of fruitless wrangling with the Communists, a more promising course of action should be sought. As a final thought on this important subject prior to relinquishing the position of CINCUNC,⁴ I advance the following suggestions for terminating the Korean armistice agreement by the end of FY 56.

a. The US would call a council of the 16 nations which have contributing forces in Korea for the purpose of appraising the current military-political situation in Korea. As a result of this appraisal, it would be recognized that aggression against the Republic of Korea has been defeated. The council would take formal note of the fact that the armistice agreement had as its principal objective, following the cease-fire, the ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and that although no formal political settlement has been effected there exists a de facto state of peace. Without prejudice to the long-term objective of unifying Korea, the 16 nations would accept the fact that Korea is divided for the time being and that its unification must await future political developments.

b. The council would also consider the effectiveness of implementation of the armistice and take formal note of the fact that it has been flagrantly violated by the Communists and made to operate contrary to the intentions of its signers. If the NNSC or para 13c and d are still in existence, they should be cited as particularly objectionable parts of the armistice which make the instrument unacceptable.

c. As an outcome of its considerations, the council would then:

(1) Recognize a de facto condition of peace in Korea.

(2) Declare the intention of the UNC to continue to observe the cease-fire in the absence of a renewal of hostilities by the Communists.

(3) Announce the termination of the effective period of the armistice.

(4) Offer to withdraw UN forces from Korea if the Communists do likewise.

(5) Seek Communist agreement to the foregoing.

d. If the Communists reject these proposals, or if no definitive reply is received after a reasonable period of time, the UNC would then withdraw from Korea, except for a token force to be left as long as Chinese forces remain in North Korea and would henceforth disregard all portions of the armistice except the cease-fire.

e. In any event, the 16 nations would reiterate the joint policy statement, return the responsibility for the defense of Korea to Rhee, and maintain the UNC headquarters in the FEC outside Korea from whence it would continuously watch the situation in Korea.

4. I am aware of the obstacles to such a program, particularly in the difficulties of obtaining agreement among the UN elements and cooperation from Pres Rhee. However, the steady attrition of participating UN forces in Korea and the deterioration of our overall military strength reported in Ref B present as the only alternative to positive action leading to the dissolution of the armistice, the eventual loss of the UN complexion of our action in Korea and the progressive atrophy of the military strength of the FEC.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–255. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Embassy in Seoul exclusive for Ambassador Lacy.
2. Printed as telegram 1254 from Seoul, Document 50.
3. In telegram C 72805 from Tokyo, June 10, CINCUNC analyzed the disadvantages of continued compliance with the Korean Armistice and indicated the wide variety of advanced military equipment which would have to be introduced into Korea in order to repair the deficiencies identified by the subordinate commanders in the field. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–155)
4. On June 30, General Taylor became Chief of Staff of the Army; he was replaced as CINCUNC and CINCFE by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer.