55. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

SUBJECT

  • Instructions from President Rhee to Ambassador Yang in Washington and Minister Kim in Tokyo2

Summarized below is the combined gist of an instruction (Tab A)3 to Ambassador Yang and a letter (Tab B)4 to Minister Kim.

1.
If the U.S. does not wish to repeat the 1950 tragedy it must give the ROK more arms. If the U.S. will not strengthen ROK forces it should withdraw American troops from Korea as the ROK does not want friends helping in Korea to be destroyed.
2.
Korea has to establish a fixed exchange rate, which all Koreans and foreigners will then be required to observe. In working this out the ROK may have to agree to a higher rate than 180/1.
3.
Asiatic nations will receive 2/3 of the $3,500 million allocated by the U.S. for foreign aid. The allocation for the ROK—$900 million—is less than the amount to which the ROK is entitled.
4.
Rhee suspects a large share of Asian aid funds will go to Japan in line with “Secretary Dulles’ policy”.
5.
Ambassador Yang is urged to talk to editors, commentators, U.S. officials, Congressmen, and Senators and advise them of ROK [Page 108]feelings in order to assure that an undue amount of aid funds do not go to Japan.
6.
Rhee urges Minister Kim to publicly repeat Japan’s claims of 85 percent ROK property and states that if the U.S. continues to keep silent “on this preposterous claim” some Koreans will begin to suspect a secret agreement between Japan and the U.S. as in 1905.5
7.
While it is well to keep in touch with fair-minded men such as Mr. Inagaki,6 one must never trust them too much. When American officials offer to mediate Korea–Japan problems, remind them that our experiences regarding fishing line7 taught us that we cannot count on America’s fairness in these matters.
8.
Japan is preparing to stand with the Communists against the U.S. The ROK should raise its voices against establishment of trade relations between Japan and Russia and Japan and Communist China.
9.
With a larger number of Americans opposed to yielding to Communist demands, it is time for the ROK to publicize widely its grievances.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/6–155. Secret. Drafted by Jones. Also sent to Sebald.
  2. Kim Yong-sik.
  3. Footnote [7 lines of text] not declassified.
  4. Footnote [4-1/2 lines of text] not declassified.
  5. Reference is to the Taft–Katsura Agreement signed by Secretary of War William H. Taft and Japanese Premier Taro Katsura on July 29, 1905. By the terms of this “agreed memorandum,” the United States recognized Japan’s dominant position in Korea and Japan disavowed “any aggressive designs” on the Philippines.
  6. Presumably reference to Heitaro Inagaki, President of Japan Neon Co., Director of Yamato Aviation Co., President of the Japan Foreign Trade Society, and former Minister of Trade and Industry in the third Yoshida Cabinet in 1949.
  7. Reference is to South Korean efforts to establish a boundary line in the Sea of Japan which Japanese fishing vessels could not transgress.