44. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1

SUBJECT

  • General Taylor’s Recommendation for Abolition of the NNSC and Denunciation of Paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Korean Armistice2

General Taylor has proposed that the plan for reduction of the NNSC which that body approved be rejected in the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and that he be authorized to counterpropose that the NNSC be dissolved and the provisions of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement be revoked by mutually agreed amendment of the Armistice. If the Communist Command fails to agree, the United Nations Command (UNC) would declare [Page 86] those provisions of the Armistice relating to the NNSC and paragraphs 13(c) and (d) null and void.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) strongly resents the presence of the Communist members of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (NNITs) on ROK territory and has frequently threatened to take unilateral action to eject the Czechs and Poles if a solution is not found to the NNSC problem soon. The ROK attitude on this issue is a constant irritant in U.S.-ROK relations and ever present is the possibility that the ROK may take violent action toward the Czechs and Poles. Despite this situation, Embassy Seoul believes that, if necessary, “we may be able to live for the time being with the NNSC proposal for reduction in personnel in spite of President Rhee’s dissatisfaction providing the U.S. continues to work for abolition of the Commission”.3

General Taylor’s solution would have (a) the advantage of removing this irritant in U.S.-ROK relations; (b) make clear to the world the seriousness with which the UNC views Communist obstruction and violation of the Armistice; (c) make possible the modernization of U.S.-ROK armed forces; and (d) it has been argued by Defense that it would help deter the Chinese Communists from attacking Quemoy and Matsu by emphasizing U.S. intent to be prepared to fight on the Korean front if necessary.

Against these considerations must be weighed the basic fact that if we denounce these fundamental provisions of the Armistice, we open the way for complete disregard of the Agreement by the Communist side. Moreover, it is probable that such action would increase tensions in the Far East, jeopardize release of the airmen,4 and certainly provide the Chinese Communists with an exploitable propaganda issue.

Furthermore, our Allies have thus far been unconvinced by any evidence we have been able to offer them that paragraphs 13(c) and (d) should be denounced. They do not doubt Communist violations of the Armistice, but are unconvinced that the build-up is of such magnitude as seriously to jeopardize the security of the UNC and the ROK. Moreover, they do not anticipate any renewal of hostilities by the Chinese Communists. They believe strongly that denunciation of these provisions of the Armistice Agreement would increase Far Eastern tensions. Before concurring in such à step, they want to be assured that there will be a positive gain in terms of efforts to counterbalance the Communist build-up, and that an adequate public case [Page 87] for denunciation can be made. They understand that for both military and political reasons we do not want to permit the Communists to violate the Armistice with impunity, but in the absence of a demonstration that serious military risks are involved, they think that these considerations are transcended by the interest in relaxing tensions in the Far East. With a more convincing public case, and with assurances of intent and immediate need to strengthen our military position vis-à-vis the Communists, there is a slim possibility of obtaining Allied concurrence.

Without the concurrence of our Allies in denunciation of these Armistice terms, the U.S. would have to be prepared to assume sole responsibility for the decision in the United Nations. Our authority under the Security Council Resolution5 would probably not be regarded as going so far. The result would almost certainly be the effective dissolution of the UNC and the end of the Unified Command. Our Allies would, moreover, be in a position to consider themselves relieved of any obligations under the Joint Policy Declaration. Dissolution of the UNC would free the U.S. from close, frequent, and often troublesome consultation with its Allies on the Korean situation, who in any event are now providing only token military forces. Unilateral action by the U.S., however, could not remove the need for consultation on this policy, and would isolate the U.S. morally, cause further Allied misgivings with respect to U.S. Far Eastern policy, could increase the difficulties of united action by the Free World.

Recommendations

1.
That General Taylor’s recommendation not be approved at this time.
2.
That General Taylor be instructed to state in the MAC that the NNSC reduction proposal is not satisfactory to the UNC, but that the UNC will not object to it being put into effect while reserving the right to reopen the question.
3.
That before the UNC takes the above action in the MAC, the U.S. should make a further approach to the Swiss and Swedes after consultation with our Allies urging them to set a definite date for termination of their participation in the NNSC.
4.
That General Taylor’s authority to remove the Czechs and Poles to the Demilitarized Zone, if necessary for their safety, be confirmed.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Korea. Secret. Drafted by Jones.
  2. General Taylor’s recommendation was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as CINCUNC telegram C–72460, May 6. (Department of Defense Files)
  3. Quoted from telegram 1211 from Seoul, May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–755)
  4. Reference is to the U.S. airmen who were imprisoned in the People’s Republic of China.
  5. Apparently a reference to the resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council on July 7, 1950, which established a unified command in Korea under the United States and requested the United States to designate a commander for the U.N. forces in Korea. (U.N. doc. S/1588)