214. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Ockey) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Modernization of United States Forces in Korea
At the request of the Commonwealth representatives at the April 23, 1957 meeting,2 we undertook to prepare for their further consideration a specific plan as to the timing and method of presenting the introduction of new weapons into Korea. The State and Defense lawyers were subsequently asked to recommend the best legal rationale for our action.
NA believes that the action contemplated is fully justified legally and morally and can best be implemented and defended if we take the initiative and proceed in a perfectly open and above-board manner. I believe this is also in accord with your views.
NA, in consultation with IO and S/P, therefore, suggests the following course of action.
- 1.
- No later than June 1, 1957, the Senior United Nations Command
Representative in the Military Armistice Commission will make a
statement at Panmunjom to include these points:
- a.
- Communist weapon introductions and failure to report accurately to the NNSC or to permit inspection by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams has constituted flagrant violation of Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement.
- b.
- In contrast, the performance of the UNC has been in strict conformity with Article 13(d).
- c.
- Due to the passage of time it is now impossible for the UNC to replace its worn-out equipment with items of the same effectiveness and type, such items no longer being in production or available.
- d.
- In consequence of a, b, and c, the military balance which the Armistice was designed to preserve is being upset in favor of the Communist side.
- e.
- The UNC intends to continue to adhere to the Armistice and desires to preserve the military balance it was designed to assure.
- f.
- As one party to a contract, some of the provisions of which the other party has violated, the UNC has a legal and moral right to redress with respect to these provisions.
- g.
- (Based on a legal rationale now being worked out by the State–Defense lawyers.) The UNC intends, therefore, to begin the introduction of certain new items of equipment.
- 2.
- Simultaneous to the MAC statement, a joint State-Defense statement based on it would be issued in Washington.
- 3.
- As soon thereafter as possible, the Republic of Korea should announce the inactivation of four divisions.
- 4.
- No later than July 1, 1957, the Unified Command would transmit a full report of the action taken and reasons behind it to the United Nations Secretary General.
IO, in particular, feels that it is essential that the action be taken, announced, and reported to the United Nations at least two full months prior to the next United Nations General Assembly now scheduled for September. Alternatively, it should be deferred until after the General Assembly.
Another important element in the timing is the desirability of our being prepared to present President Rhee prior to General Lemnitzer s departure July 1, 1957, with a military package involving a four-division reduction in his ground forces counterbalanced by a jet wing increase in his air strength and supported also by the announcement of the decision to provide U.S. forces with increased air power through new weapons.
If you concur in the above plan, NA, in cooperation with L and IO, will prepare a Military Armistice Commission statement which we can propose to our Allies along with the timing arrangements outlined above.
Recommendation:
That you approve the course of action outlined.4