Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

213. Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, April 23, 1957, 3:30 p.m.¹

Washington, April 23, 1957, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Modernization of United States Forces in Korea

PARTICIPANTS

• Embassies
• United Kingdom—
• Sir Harold Caccia, Ambassador
• Mr. A.J. de la Mare, Counselor
• Admiral Sir Michael Denny, UK Representative of UK Chiefs of Staff, B.J.S.M.
• Brigadier H.M. Liardet, Chief of Staff and Deputy Head of Mission, British
• Army Staff, B.J.S.M.
• Group Captain J.R. Wilson, UK–U.S. Planning Liaison Officer, B.J.S.M.
• Canada—
• Mr. J.R. Maybee, First Secretary
• Major General H. A. Sparling, Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff
• New Zealand—
• Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador
• Mr. G.D.L. White, Counselor
• Air Commodore T.F. Gill, Armed Forces Attaché
• Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Pountney, Assistant Armed Forces Attaché
• Australia—
• Mr. M.R. Booker, Counselor
• Mr. J.R. Rowland, First Secretary
• Lieutenant Colonel R.A. Hay, Military Attaché
• State
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Ambassador Walter C. Dowling
• Colonel John M. Raymond, Acting Legal Adviser
• Mr. William Leonhart, NSC Planning Board Assistant, S/P
• Mr. John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, IO
• Mr. William T. Nunley, United Nations Adviser, EUR
• Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, NA
• Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
• Defense
• Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Mr. Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary, OSD/ISA

Mr. Robertson explained the problem facing the United States Government with respect to its forces in Korea along the lines of the attached talking paper² stressing that the Communist side from the beginning had had no intention of abiding by the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement. With respect to Korea the Communists’ intention was to saddle the United Nations Command (UNC) with an agreement designed to hold their forces static while providing their own forces an umbrella for a military buildup. The result of the subsequent deliberate evasions of the Armistice terms had been the creation of a situation whereby there was now greater Communist military strength in north Korea than at the time of the signature of the Armistice and, consequently, a weaker position for the UNC Allies at any future conference table.

Admiral Radford, assisted by charts and photographs, then reviewed in some detail the various ways in which the Communists had evaded or violated the Armistice terms. He referred specifically to the frustrations met by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), the failure of the Communists to report their equipment introductions, the rebuilding of destroyed airfields, and the introduction of a modern airforce as evidenced by photographs, radar tracks, Communist admissions, and the reports of defectors. The Admiral mentioned the growing pressure of the American public, press, and Congress against the continuation of a policy which placed American troops in grave jeopardy in Korea. He said there was no doubt in his mind or on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or military leaders in the field but that the United States must either modernize its forces in Korea or face the consequences of disastrous military defeat there. Admiral Radford then reviewed a list of weapons³ which the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to authorize CINCUNC to introduce.

In concluding the United States’ presentation, Mr. Robertson said that the military problem was obvious and that he fully recognized that there was also a most difficult political problem on which he desired the best advice and counsel of the governments represented at the meeting.

A discussion led by Ambassadors Caccia and Munro then ensued. The principal point around which the remarks of the four Embassy representatives concentrated was the need to have, more specifically, the United States plan both as to the timing and as to the presentation to world opinion of the action contemplated. Ambassador Caccia referred to the recent talks in Washington with the British Defense Minister and repeated the British attitude at that time that the United Kingdom would approach the problem in the spirit of obtaining an equitable and sensible result. In brief, what were the best arguments to employ to win the battle? Should the UNC take the initiative with a public statement or a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, or should it say nothing and await the inevitable Communist challenge? Ambassador Caccia then pointed out that the methods and timing proposed would have a very material bearing on the position which his Government would take.

Ambassador Munro agreed that some knowledge of the timing and methods contemplated was essential in order to obtain his Government’s position. For example, whereas Admiral Radford had produced charts to demonstrate Communist violations, how could these be proved to the satisfaction of world public opinion at large? In response to Ambassador Caccia’s inquiry, Admiral Radford said that some of the material he had used could be made public.

When Mr. Robertson repeated that the objective of the meeting was to present the problem and to solicit any ideas the Commonwealth representatives might have as to how to proceed, Ambassador Caccia asked whether the use of a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d) in order to maintain the military balance had been discarded. Mr. Robertson confirmed that it had not, and expressed the view that two methods were worthy of consideration, namely, a liberal interpretation of Article 13(d) or its suspension. There were advantages and disadvantages to both.

Ambassador Munro, expressing his personal view, said he thought surely there must be some way whereby one side to an agreement, following a breach of part of the agreement by the other party, would have some recourse without nullifying the agreement as a whole. Specifically, he was certain his Government would wish to know when the United States intended to introduce the new equipment and in what quantities. He was particularly fearful as to the timing. Were the action to be deferred until just prior to the September United Nations General Assembly, he felt that the United States would be in for serious trouble. Mr. Booker agreed that were the action taken just prior to or during the General Assembly, it would have undesirable consequences. He said his Government, too, would wish to know more specifically the United States’ plans for proceeding. Mr. Maybee agreed that this would also be the case with the Canadian Government. It would wish to know, for example, what was envisaged for the NNSC.

Ambassador Caccia then asked Admiral Radford whether in the latter’s opinion the action contemplated might not provide the Communist side a pretext for abandoning the Armistice and renewing hostilities. Admiral Radford replied “definitely not,” and said that on the contrary a continuation of weakness would encourage a Communist attack.

Ambassador Munro stressed again the necessity of coming up with a definite date as to timing and, in response to Mr. Sprague’s request for clarification, pointed out that were the UNC to proceed with a “fait accompli” there would at least be time for feelings to quiet down before the September General Assembly. Were the action to be taken then, the reaction might be undesirable.

Mr. Booker asked whether the idea of proceeding surreptitiously had been ruled out and Mr. Robertson replied that nothing had been ruled out but that in his personal view he felt that the action should be taken honestly and above board. Mr. Booker said that his Government was committed to this course.

The meeting closed with agreement that the views of the Governments concerned would be obtained on the method of introducing modern weapons and that, meanwhile, the United States Government would begin preparation of a specific plan as to the timing and method of presentation for further discussion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/4–2357. Secret. Drafted on April 25 by Nes and initialed as accurate by Robertson.
2. Not printed.
3. Attached but not printed; the list is identical to the attachment to Document 209.