NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MILITARY PROGRAMS FOR KOREA
A Financial Appendix is also attached for the information of the
Council.6
The enclosure is intended as the first step in the review by the Planning
Board of the scope and allocation of military and non-military aid for
Korea called for by NSC Action No.
1624–c. In the light of Council discussion of the enclosure as to the
choice among the alternatives, the Planning Board will subsequently
prepare for Council consideration appropriate revisions in NSC 5514, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of
Action in Korea”, in accordance with NSC
Action No. 1624–c.
[Enclosure]
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MILITARY PROGRAMS FOR KOREA
General Considerations
1. The Republic of Korea depends on U.S. support for its military
defense, but does not consider the Mutual Defense Treaty and the
Joint Policy Declaration sufficient assurance that the United States
will in fact defend South Korea in the event of an attack from the
North. Koreans remember the U.S. withdrawal from South Korea shortly
prior to the attack in 1950, and believe that sizeable U.S. combat
forces and strong ROK military
forces must be maintained in South Korea to deter a new attack by
Communist forces and to assure the defense of the area in case of
attack.
2. With little complaint, the Koreans have made heavy sacrifices, in
the form of taxation and conscription, in support of their military
forces. The Korean will to resist is universally high; indeed the
Korean political and military leaders would have continued or
reopened hostilities with North Korea had not U.S. officials
frequently reminded them that U.S. logistical support, essential to
successful military action, would not be forthcoming. However, the
Korean will to resist can be expected to remain high only as long as
the Korean people and their leaders are convinced that the United
States is supporting them fully and that they have the military
capacity to resist.
3. However, Korean faith in the U.S. defense commitment is not
necessarily related to any particular U.S. or ROK force level, provided the South
Koreans believe that joint U.S.-ROK
capabilities are sufficient to give assurance of an intent to resist
aggression and to permit effective outside assistance to be brought
to bear.
4. If ROK forces are placed on the
3-year rotation basis in the near future, it may be difficult to
maintain present active strength unless the number of personnel
deciding to make a career of military service increases greatly. The
ROK Army has already returned
most of its personnel with combat experience to civilian life and
currently is having almost no success in persuading junior officers
and enlisted men to make a career of the military service. The lack
of a core of experienced professional soldiers in the ROK Army places severe limitations on
its future ability to use and maintain the more advanced and complex
weapons which soon will be indispensable for effective military
operations.
5. In November, 1954 the United States and the ROK initialed an Agreed Minute in which
it was stated that as the training load
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diminishes and ROK trained reserve strengths are attained, the total
number of active ROK military
personnel will be adjusted according-
6. Korean confidence in the U.S. commitment to the ROK will also be affected by the extent
of U.S. economic aid available for economic development. The Korean
economy is recovering from war devastation, but only limited
progress is being made in economic development; in the long run this
could pose a serious threat to political stability. A commitment to
continue the current level of economic development aid or an
increase therein would probably be considered by the Koreans as a
good indication that the U.S. Government has confidence in the
future of the ROK. While a
simultaneous major reduction in both economic development and
military assistance to the ROK would
no doubt have very serious and adverse repercussions in Korea,
particularly since the Koreans believe that Communist capabilities
have been increasing since the Armistice was signed, a military
reduction under the applicable proviso of the Agreed Minute could
probably be compensated in part, but only in part, by a long-term
economic aid commitment or an increase in economic aid.
7. ROK and U.S. military forces in
South Korea are a major symbol of U.S. determination to resist
further Communist expansion in the Far East. Other symbols include
U.S. commitments in SEATO, the
Republic of China and the Philippines; U.S. aid to non-Communist
Asian countries; U.S. military capabilities and commitments in the
Taiwan area, the Philippines, Japan and Okinawa; and the fact of
U.S. participation in the Korean war. Moreover, the Free World
through the Sixteen Power Declaration and UN Command in Korea is committed to resist renewal of
Communist aggression against the ROK.
8. The objective of the Communists continues to be to gain control
over the entire Korean peninsula. They probably will not resort to
force to obtain this objective, at least so long as the United
States retains forces in South Korea and remains committed to the
defense of the ROK.8 On the other hand,
the Communists almost surely will not yield in any significant
respect in maintaining their control over North Korea, thus
continuing a situation of tension and instability. Although the
Communists might reduce their active forces in Korea following any
major reduction in ROK forces, they
would retain the capability quickly to rebuild their strength to
present levels by the mobilization of trained reserves and by the
introduction of Communist forces from outside Korea.
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Statement of Alternatives
9. The remainder of this report will evaluate the probable political,
economic and military consequences of the following four alternative
military programs for the Republic of Korea. The term “dual
conventional-nuclear weapons,” as used in this statement of
alternatives and the following evaluation does not include storage
of nuclear warheads in Korea.
Alternative A is the present military program,
consisting of the following forces as currently equipped:
- (1)
- 20 active and 10 reserve ROK Army Divisions;
- (2)
- 3 ROK jet fighter-bomber
squadrons in training, and plans for converting the 3
remaining ROK fighter
squadrons into jet squadrons;
- (3)
- 1 ROK Marine Division and
coastal Navy;
- (4)
- 2 U.S. Divisions, and 3 fighter-bomber squadrons.
Alternative B (JCS minimum military requirements over the next two
years reported to the NSC on October
12, 1956) would involve the following changes in Alternative A:
- (1)
- Providing U.S. forces in Korea with dual conventional
nuclear weapons;
- (2)
- Converting 4 of the 20 active ROK divisions into reserve divisions, and
converting the 3 remaining conventional ROK fighter squadrons into jet
squadrons (making a total of 6 jet squadrons).
Alternative C would involve the following
changes in Alternative A:
- (1)
- Converting 10 of the 20 active ROK divisions into reserve divisions over a
3-year period;
- (2)
- Providing remaining active ROK forces with additional limited dual
conventional-nuclear weapons of types already in Korea9 and increased training in the use of these
weapons; and converting the 3 remaining conventional ROK fighter squadrons into jet
squadrons;
- (3)
- Providing U.S. forces in Korea with additional limited
dual conventional-nuclear weapons of types already in Korea,
and increased training in the use of these weapons. ’
Alternative D would involve:
- (1)
- Converting 10 of the 20 active ROK divisions into reserve divisions over a
three-year period;
- (2)
- Providing ROK forces with
jet air strength (under present conditions approximately 12
squadrons of fighters and fighter-bombers) sufficient
generally to offset North Korean air strength; and providing
the ROK Army with equipment
comparable to that of the North Korean Army, which under
present circumstances would involve
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measures such as an increase in
artillery strength but not the provision of dual
conventional-nuclear weapons;
- (3)
- Providing U.S. forces in Korea with dual
conventional-nuclear weapons.
Evaluation of Alternative A
Political and
Psychological
10. Continuation of the ROK military
establishment and U.S. forces in Korea at present levels would
continue to satisfy the ROK leaders
of U.S. intentions to defend the ROK. This involves no violation of the Korean Armistice
Agreement. Although present U.S. programs involve replacement of
obsolete equipment, the ROK leaders
want an army and an air force at least equivalent in size and
equipment to Communist forces deployed in North Korea, and they
would continue to press for such improvements.
11. U.S. allies in Asia would interpret this policy as an indication
of continued U.S. determination to maintain a strong anti-Communist
position in Asia. The Asian neutrals would continue to contend that
U.S. policy misinterprets the real threat to Asian stability and
security by over-emphasis on military aid and under-emphasis on
economic aid.
12. The Communists would continue to believe that the United States
would commit its forces to defend the ROK.
Economic
13. The South Korean economy would probably be in trouble today even
if there were no ROK military force.
It seems clear, however, that the need for very large sums of local
currency for this force has (1) contributed to the very heavy
inflationary pressures which divert businessmen from productive
enterprises to speculation, (2) forced a larger use of economic aid
for military purposes, and (3) by requiring heavy imports, promoted
artificially high levels of consumption. Local currency costs are
increasing and will continue in future years to increase due to
greater maintenance and replacement needs to keep the ROK military force in top condition,
increased food prices, particularly rice, and higher military pay.
The future may bring greater pressure on the end-use of local
currency generation as between military and investment to the
detriment of the latter unless total economic assistance is
increased. So long as present military programs are continued,
therefore, it is likely that there will be no acceleration in the
rate of Korean economic development and thus no reduction in South
Korean unemployment and no prospect of an assumption by the ROK of a greater share of its military
and economic support. The annual requirement for U.S. aid is,
therefore,
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growing rather
than diminishing. The cost of ROK
forces, however, is only a fraction of the cost of equivalent U.S.
forces.
Military
14. This alternative precludes complete modernization of U.S. forces
in Korea. U.S. units in Korea cannot be reorganized to conform with
the organizational structure of other comparable U.S. units, which
are acquiring a dual conventional-nuclear capability. As a result,
U.S. forces in Korea are forced to adhere to certain outmoded
tactical concepts. This has an adverse effect upon the morale of
troops assigned to Korea and denies the most efficient and effective
utilization of U.S. military manpower.
15. The Republic of Korea Army, with 20 active and 10 reserve Army
divisions and other listed forces, would be capable of maintaining
internal security. ROK and U.S.
forces in Korea would be capable of resisting aggression by North
Korea alone. A military force of this strength would also be a
deterrent to any Communist attack unless such an attack were part of
an over-all Communist plan for world-wide military operations. Such
a force, with limited U.S. air, naval and logistic support, could
conduct a successful holding operation against an attack by those
North Korean and Chinese Communist forces now estimated to be in
North Korea. Against the combined Chinese Communist forces now in
Korea, Chinese Communist forces immediately available in Manchuria
and Northeast China and the North Korean forces, the forces would be
incapable of conducting a sustained defense without prompt military
assistance from the United States. The small ROK Air Force is capable only of limited air support
for ground operations. Its aircraft strength is markedly inferior to
that of the North Korean Air Force.
Evaluation of Alternative B
Political and
Psychological
16. The ROK would almost certainly
object to a cut of approximately 20 percent in their active military
force levels regardless of a simultaneous modernization of U.S.
forces in Korea to include dual purpose weapons. A 20 percent cut in
the ROK Army could have sharp
effects within the ROK if it were
interpreted as merely an initial step in U.S. reductions in the Far
East. However, these effects would be somewhat reduced by an
increase in U.S. military capabilities in Korea. Modernization of
U.S. forces would lead to increased ROK pressure for modernization of their forces. ROK objections to a 20 percent cut in
their force levels might be further reduced if some of the funds
saved in military aid were switched to economic aid
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programs. This would help meet the
ROK objection of increased
economic hardship and additional unemployment resulting from
military force reductions.
17. Our Asian allies’ assessment of U.S. policy and intentions will
depend on over-all U.S. policy and military posture in Asia as well
as on changes in levels of U.S. defense aid to South Korea. On
balance, our Asian allies would approve any modernization of U.S.
forces in Korea reconcilable with the Armistice Agreement. They
would interpret such action as an indication of continued U.S.
determination to resist Communist advances in Asia. However, if
“modernization” were to be carried to a point which they would
consider a significant violation of the Armistice Agreement, there
would be adverse reactions. In Japan there would be a particularly
serious reaction to the equipping of U.S. forces in Korea with what
would be regarded as atomic weapons.
18. The United States would be strongly censured for violation of the
Armistice Agreement by the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission, and by many of the signatories of
the Joint Declaration, as well as by Asian neutrals. These immediate
reactions would weaken the U.S. position substantially in the United
Nations and in relations with allies and neutrals alike.
19. The Communists would react to the introduction of any additional
types of dual purpose weapons by launching a major propaganda
campaign which would include charges that the United States was
violating the Armistice, was seeking to increase tensions in the Far
East, and was planning to use again atomic bombs on Asians. The
Communists might supplement their propaganda campaign and seek to
increase pressure on the United States to withdraw its forces from
South Korea by withdrawing the Chinese Communist troops from North
Korea, which they could do without critically weakening their
military position. The Soviets may introduce dual purpose weapons
into North Korea, either overtly or covertly.
Economic
20. The direct financial savings which would result from reduction of
any given number of ROK divisions is
at best a rough estimate, since little information from the field is
available. On the basis of past budgets such savings are averaged
for this purpose at $9 million per division in dollars and $7.5
million in hwan. This figure of $16.5 million may be overstated
since it does not include the cost of conversion of active to
reserve divisions. Conversely, this figure may be understated since
it does not take into account the current sharply rising trend in
maintenance costs. However, using this figure, Alternative B would
result in gross financial savings of $65 million ($35
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million in MAP, $30
million in local currency support). This estimate of savings does
not take account of the cost of providing U.S. forces with dual
purpose weapons, which are to be purchased in any case.
Military
21. This course of action enables U.S. forces to be reorganized in
accordance with latest approved doctrines. It also authorizes the
equipping of these forces with modern equipment and with weapons
possessing both a conventional and atomic capability. This would
result in the most efficient and effective utilization of U.S.
military manpower in Korea, and would bolster the morale of U.S.
troops assigned to Korea.
22. The Republic of Korea Army, with 16 active divisions and 14
reserve divisions, would be capable of maintaining internal
security. Provided the present U.S. forces in Korea are modernized
and the 14 reserve divisions reach and maintain their strength and
training goals, the forces projected would be superior in both
offensive and defensive capabilities to the North Korean forces
alone. Therefore, they would be capable of successfully resisting
North Korean aggression. They would provide a very strong deterrent
to combined North Korean-Chinese Communist aggression unless this
aggression was part of a much broader Communist plan. They would be
capable, with limited U.S. outside support, of conducting a
successful holding operation against the combined Chinese Communist
forces and North Korean Army forces now estimated to be in North
Korea. Should the Communists exercise their estimated reinforcing
capability with Chinese Communist troops immediately available from
Manchuria and Northeast China, the forces considered under this
alternative could not maintain a successful resistance without
immediate and substantial U.S. military assistance.
Evaluation of Alternative C
Political and
Psychological
23. The reaction of the ROK leaders
to this alternative would be more vigorous than that under
Alternative B. ROK objections to
this cut in their ground forces might be somewhat reduced if some of
the funds saved in military aid were switched to economic aid
programs. As under Alternative B, this would help meet the ROK objection of increased economic
hardship and additional unemployment resulting from military force
reductions. ROK leaders would
probably argue that North Korea would still be superior in the air
and that the 50 percent reduction in active ROK ground force levels would not be fully compensated
by modernization [4 lines of source text not
declassified].
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The ROK leaders would seek to delay
reduction of their ground forces to agreed levels and there would be
increased danger that they might undertake unilateral action to
breach the Armistice before the reductions could become
effective.10
24. This Alternative would not violate the Armistice Agreement. The
reaction of Asian neutrals and certain political groups in other
non-Communist Asian countries, particularly Japan, would be adverse
but not as strong as in Alternative B above.
25. The Communists would probably react less sharply than in
Alternative B above, but the possibility would remain that they
would introduce dual-capability weapons into North Korea.
Economic
26. Potential direct gross savings, based on the same calculation as
under Alternative B, would be $165 million annually ($90 million in
MAP and $75 million in local currency support). Initially, savings
in military aid would be partly offset by the cost of providing the
ROK with additional equipment
and weapons, including dual-capability weapons. When a program of
troop reduction and matériel and weapons build-up is completed,
annual maintenance costs should be reduced as compared with existing
maintenance costs.
27. The savings in local currency support could be employed in a
variety of ways toward greater economic development of Korea, or
could be retained by the United States as savings, or could be
divided between the two purposes. In the first case, after a short
period of possible labor dislocation, greater than now exists,
development in Korea might proceed at a somewhat faster pace than
now and might in the long run reduce the need for external economic
assistance while building an economically stronger Korea.
Military
28. This alternative, as an objective for ROK forces, after completion of Alternative B, is
feasible. The continued limiting of the modernization of U.S. forces
would have the same disadvantages as are stated in paragraph 14.
29. The forces, as proposed under this alternative, would be capable
of maintaining internal security. They would be capable of resisting
North Korean aggression. They would be capable, with U.S. air, naval
and logistic support greater than that required under Alternative B,
of conducting a successful holding operation against the
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combined Chinese Communist
forces and North Korean Army forces now estimated to be in North
Korea. Should the Communists exercise their estimated reinforcing
capability with Chinese Communist troops immediately available from
Manchuria and Northeast China, the forces considered under this
alternative could not maintain a successful resistance without
immediate and substantial U.S. military assistance.
Evaluation of Alternative D
Political and
Psychological
30. Although pleased by the increase in air strength, ROK leaders would not consider that the
acquisition of an air force roughly comparable to that of North
Korea would offset the reduction of ground forces. ROK capability and temptation of
breaching the Armistice would be increased over Alternative A.11 As under Alternative C, increased economic aid
would partly, but only partly, mitigate the adverse ROK reaction to reduction in ground
force levels.
31. U.S. allies in Asia would probably react favorably to this
program and would probably ask for similar increases in their own
air forces. The reaction of the Asian neutrals would be similar to
that described in Alternative B above.
32. Communist reaction would be similar to that described in
Alternative B above, and in addition, the Soviet Union would
probably seek to increase the capabilities of the North Korean armed
forces, especially their air strength.
Economic
33. The savings would be similar to Alternative C, although on the
dollar side they would be offset by the cost of providing additional
jet air strength rather than providing dual-capability weapons.
Military
34. Alternative D, decreasing ROK
ground capabilities and increasing ROK Air Force capabilities, is not consistent with
present U.S. military strategy in the Far East which provides for
indigenous ground forces to be supported initially by U.S. air and
naval forces.
35. These forces, together with modernized U.S. forces, would be
capable of maintaining internal security. Because of the additional
air
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strength available,
these forces would be better equipped to deal with the initial air
battle stages of a surprise Communist attack and could resist an
attack by North Korean forces alone. They would be able with limited
U.S. air, naval and logistic support to conduct a successful holding
operation against attack by those North Korean and Chinese Communist
forces now estimated to be in North Korea.
