Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

167. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington , September 11, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford at 2:30 Today, on the Introduction of Modern Combat Equipment into Korea²

The JCS have reacted strongly against sending to CINCUNC the draft telegram (Tab A)³ proposed by State, which solicited the views of General Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling on certain procedural and timing details regarding the introduction of modern combat equipment.

In a top secret memorandum to Secretary Wilson,⁴ shown in confidence to David Nes, Admiral Radford takes the position that: (1) in view of the lapse of time since the expulsion of the NNSC from Korea on June 9, modernization of our equipment in Korea to include atomic capability should be effected without delay; (2) reports of such introduction should not be made to the NNSC; (3) the suspension of paragraphs 13(c) and (d) of the Korean Armistice Agreement is consonant with NSC 5514;⁵ and (4) no similar action is contemplated for the ROK forces.

Admiral Radford then recommends that CINCUNC be authorized to begin the introduction of modern combat equipment, including items of atomic capability immediately and that such equipment not be reported to the NNSC. As a planning basis a list of items which is identical to that attached to my August 22 memorandum (Tab B)⁶ is proposed. A copy of this draft (Tab C)⁷ instruction to CINCUNC is attached.

In our discussions of the NNSC problem with the Sixteen, in our statements in the Military Armistice Commission, and in the August 15 Unified Command Report to the United Nations⁸ we have consistently and unequivocally maintained that the UN Command would continue to report honestly and fully to the NNSC and the MAC in the Demilitarized Zone and that the provisional suspension of the right of the NNITs to operate in south Korea would in no way affect the continued full adherence of the UN Command to all other paragraphs of the Armistice Agreement.

Defense was party to the instructions along these lines issued to UNCMAC and cleared the Unified Command Report. Likewise Defense has been fully conversant with our view that new equipment could be introduced within the terms of paragraph 13(d) as a matter of interpretation thus obviating any necessity to “suspend” this article.

Defense concurrence with this view was contained in Mr. McGuire’s letter of June 21 to Mr. Murphy ⁹ and appropriate instructions (Tab D)¹⁰ were subsequently issued within Defense and to CINCUNC.

The procedure now advocated by Admiral Radford is therefore contrary to the understandings previously reached between State and Defense on this question and would constitute a violation of the Armistice Agreement. It would maximize the adverse repercussions among our Allies and provide the Communists with the greatest possible propaganda ammunition. In addition were we to commence the introduction of modern equipment for U.S. forces without some similar provision with respect to ROK forces, very considerable adverse political repercussions can be expected in Korea.

With respect to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] L feels strongly that their introduction would constitute a direct violation of the Armistice. While the legal rationale behind this view is doubtless sound you may, in the light of certain practical considerations, wish to discuss this issue again with Mr. Phleger prior to your meeting with Gordon Gray.

Recommendations

1. That you discuss with Mr. Phleger the position to be taken with Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford on the question of introducing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] into south Korea at this time;

2. That you reiterate to Gordon Gray and Admiral Radford our views on using an interpretation of paragraph 13(d) rather than its suspension in introducing new equipment and on the necessity to continue reporting to the NNSC;

3. That in the light of the tenor of the discussions you endeavor to obtain Defense concurrence to soliciting the views of General Lemnitzer and Ambassador Dowling along the lines of State’s draft instructions; and

4. That you ask for Defense intentions with respect to providing the ROK forces with some modern equipment.

1. Source: Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 476, NA Top Secret File. Secret. Drafted by Nes.
2. For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum, infra .
3. Not found attached; see Document 165.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Document 24.
6. Not found attached; see Document 165.
7. Not found attached.
8. See Document 164.
9. See footnote 5, Document 157.
10. Not found attached.