Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

137. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 30, 1956¹

Washington, April 30, 1956

SUBJECT

• Chinese Communist Note of April 9, 1956, on Korea

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Hubert A. Graves, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. George P. de T. Glazebrook, Minister, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. James J. McCardle, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. D. G. Lloyd White, Counselor, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Counselor, Australian Embassy
• Mr. Pierre Millet, Minister, French Embassy
• Mr. William J. Sebald, Acting Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Niles Bond, Director, UNP
• Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Director, NA
• Mr. William Nunley, EUR
• Mr. Ralph Clough, Deputy Director, CA
• Mr. C.A. Norred, Acting Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA

Mr. Sebald said that he had talked with the Korean Chargé in the morning, and had given him a general outline of our thinking.

The Chargé was pleased, but had no instructions. Mr. Sebald said he had expressed appreciation for the restraint shown on the NNSC problem by the ROK in recent months, and had asked their continued forbearance. He had also asked and received assurance that the Chinese Communist note and our thinking on it, would not be publicized. Mr. Sebald said that the U.S. has learned that the Swedes have received a reply from the Chinese Communists merely referring to the Chinese Communist note of April 9 to the 16 proposing a conference. The Swedish Chargé has not approached us about it, and we have not called him in. Mr. Sebald then asked the representatives of the Embassies to report the views of their governments on the proposals we presented on April 26.²

The British Minister said his Government made no comment on the first three paragraphs of the U.S. draft reply to the Chinese Communist note. The British Government suggested, however, that in the fourth sentence of the fourth paragraph the words “has now rejected” be replaced by “has not accepted.” They further suggested, with respect to the last sentence of the draft reply, that there must be an opportunity to consider the Communist reaction to the announcement the U.S. proposes the UN Command make in the Military Armistice Commission, and proposed, therefore, that there should be further consultation on the exclusion of the NNSC teams from south Korea. In response to questions by Mr. Sebald, the British Minister explained that his Government concurs with the U.S. proposals except that after the announcement in the Military Armistice Commission that the teams would be removed from Korea, there should be an interval and consideration of the Communist reaction before executing such action.

The Canadian Minister said that the Canadian Foreign Minister is now on the way to Europe, and he had received only preliminary comment. The Canadian Government agrees to the rejection of the conference proposal on the grounds the U.S. proposes. The wording of the rejection probably should be redrafted, however, to give a fuller statement of the UN objectives and to use a factual phrasing with less temperature than the U.S. draft. With respect to the NNSC, the Canadian Government is not yet in a position to agree to the U.S. action. The employment of observers’ teams has been valuable in Korea and Indochina, and is a device we may wish to use in the future. It is not suggested that the present situation in Korea should go on indefinitely. In Indochina, however, the observers’ teams will not be stabilized until a transfer is made in July from French to Vietnamese authorities, and elections are held in Vietnam. The Canadian Government, therefore, suggests we postpone the Korean move, which would have undesirable repercussions, and try to solve the NNSC problem in gradual stages. First, we could urge the Swiss and Swedes to accept the Chinese Communist proposal for the time being, leaving one inspection team in each zone. Then we could propose in the Military Armistice Commission a modification of the terms of reference of the inspection teams. Later on, we could see to removing the remaining team.

Mr. Sebald asked confirmation by the Canadian Minister of his understanding that the Canadian Government’s views consisted primarily of a relation of the Korean situation to that in Indochina and a recommendation that the suspension of the NNSC operations be deferred. The Canadian Minister agreed. Mr. Sebald said that the U.S. sees no necessary relationship between the Korea and Indochina situations, and believes that the Korea case should be considered on its own merits. The concept of a solution through stages of action in our opinion has been overtaken by developments. We have tried hard with the Swiss and Swedes. The Communists are giving us a run-around, and we want to stop this merry-go-round.

The New Zealand Counselor said the New Zealand Government considered the U.S. draft reply acceptable in its first three paragraphs. They suggested, however, that the opening sentence of the third paragraph be rewritten as follows:

“In the absence of Communist willingness to negotiate on the basis of the UN objectives, the NNSC problem can and should be separated from the problem of unification.”

With respect to the NNSC, the New Zealand Government is worried about the UN Command taking responsibility for the action. Despite Communist violations, it is important we not expose ourselves to charges of infringement of the agreement before all means are exhausted. New Zealand suggests a strong statement of support for the Swiss and Swedish proposals, which might encourage the Swiss and Swedes to withdraw, and in any event would make UN Command action more palatable.

The French Minister asked whether we wished to support the Swiss or the Swedish proposal. The French Government understood that the Swiss wished to leave one inspection team in each zone. He was referred to the first paragraph of the Communist note, which indicated some difference between the Swiss and Swedish positions but agreement on withdrawal of all fixed inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone.

Mr. Hemmendinger asked whether the New Zealand Government suggested approval of the Swiss and Swedish proposals in a public statement or in a diplomatic note. The New Zealand Counselor said that it should be published, but could be written into this note. Mr. Hemmendinger pointed out that the Swiss and Swedes have urged us not to issue statements associating them with us in the Armistice problems, because of their desire to preserve their neutral status. The New Zealand Counselor said we might explore the possibility with the Swiss and Swedes. He said he interpreted his instructions to indicate that the New Zealand Government reserved its position on action by the UN Command against the NNSC.

The Australian Counselor said he had received only preliminary comment from his Government. The Australian Government agreed with the first three paragraphs of the U.S. draft reply, although believing they might require some redrafting. On the NNSC issue, the Australian Government is anxious to avoid the appearance of unilateral action, which would give the Communists good propaganda material. We must make abundantly clear the Communist responsibility for the breakdown. Tying action against the NNSC with rejection of the Communist conference proposal makes it even more undesirable. The Australian Government suggests that it is better to avoid in our reply any implication action will be taken immediately in the Military Armistice Commission, and defer the action until some later time. The Australian Counselor suggested rephrasing the last paragraph of the draft reply to define the nature of Communist responsibility for the NNSC problem.

Mr. Hemmendinger questioned whether we should load our reply with propaganda on the NNSC, and referred to the contemplated statement in the Military Armistice Commission and past statements we have made there.

The French Minister said the French Government considered the U.S. draft reply acceptable on the whole. They suggest a need for caution in our action against the NNSC because of the situation in Indochina, and that we avoid giving the impression that the UN Command is violating the Armistice Agreement. The French Government suggests the last paragraph of the U.S. draft reply be written in more moderate language. A last approach to the Swiss and Swedes also would be desirable. And finally, when action is taken, it should be taken against the Swiss and Swedes as well as the Czechs and Poles.

Mr. Sebald said that on the whole he was disappointed by the response of the five governments. He said the U.S. has been carrying the main burden in Korea, and has lived with the NNSC problem long enough. We do not wish to go over old ground. We want to solve the problem and create a cleaner situation in the Armistice. We are proposing not the abolition of the NNSC, but merely the provisional suspension of the observation activities within areas under our control. He said he would like to reach closer agreement with the five countries first before approaching the 16. The French Minister pointed out that the note had long been in our hands, and that others of the 16 would be puzzled by the delay. Mr. Sebald said, however, that he felt a further brief delay would be worthwhile.

Mr. McCardle of the Canadian Embassy inquired concerning the legal grounds for the UN Command action, and was assured our legal case was well-based. Mr. Sebald discussed analogies to contracts in civil law. The British Minister expressed the view that the action was legally well-based. Mr. McCardle said they would be interested in our legal studies on such action. The French Minister suggested we separate our reply into two parts, dealing first with the conference and later with the NNSC. The British Minister said he felt this would play into the Communists’ hands. The French Minister suggested that we might make parallel démarches to the Swiss and Swedes as we did in the past. Mr. Sebald commented that they are concerned about their neutral posture, and pressures will not help. The French Minister suggested talking to them without pressures.

Mr. Hemmendinger said that today’s meeting seemed to indicate that we are allowing the Communist note to do exactly what was intended—to throw the Allied camp into confusion and delay solution of the whole question of the NNSC. We all agreed this was the Communist purpose, and failure to deal with the NNSC issue in the reply would be to fall into the trap. Mr. Sebald endorsed this statement. He suggested another meeting of the same group should be held before a meeting of the 16, and Mr. Bond concurred. The time set for the next meeting was 3:30 p.m., May 2.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–3056. Secret. Drafted by Norred.
2. Summarized in circular telegram 749, Supra.
3. The same group met on May 2 and, while Canada and Australia put forward revised drafts of the proposed reply to the Chinese note of April 9, there was little change in the positions taken by the various representatives in the meeting on April 30. (Memorandum of conversation by Norred, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–256)