127. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1

969. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and Tokyo pass Macomber. Following is summary of Secy’s meetings with Rhee and Cabinet Ministers.2

Pres Rhee gave the Secy a very cordial reception for which the Secy expressed his appreciation. The Secy reviewed briefly the situation in the countries he had recently visited. Rhee told Secy that he would not raise any problems, that the ROK Ministers would present them at subsequent meeting, but that if the Secy wanted to raise any problems he would be glad to discuss them. The Secy continued to speak in general terms about the countries he had visited.3

[Page 234]

The Secy then met with the Acting Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Finance Minister, and ROK Economic Co-ordinator (Paek Tu-jin) at the office of State Council.4 Actg FonMin Cho opened the conference by referring to the Secy’s visit in 1950 and recalled that Secy had said to the National Assembly that “You are not alone”. Cho said ROK was conscious and appreciative of the fact that the Secy had lived up to his 1950 statement, and that the ROK acquired renewed strength from the Secy’s current visit. Cho said the Ministers would present certain of their basic problems to the Secy. He added that he was asking the Secy to share with ROKs their problems and anxieties. Cho himself concluded by saying that the major problem with which he was concerned was described in a memorandum which he was giving to the Secy (this memorandum concerns ROK-Japan relations5).

The Finance Minister then briefly outlined the following three questions. (1) Use of counterpart funds—an increased proportion of which he hoped could be devoted to reconstruction purposes. (2) Need for additional aid in fiscal year 1956 to avoid budgetary deficit. (3) Desirability of a long range US aid program. (He also gave Secy memorandum. )6

Minister Son then presented ROK request for substantial increase in military assistance amounting to $329,800,000 in FY 1957. This amount of additional aid would permit an increase of approximately 45 percent in ROK military strength above that prescribed in the agreed minute. (Memorandum containing details also presented.)7

Paek Tu-jin referred to extensive devastation during war, need for reconstruction, and said ROKs were working on a five-year plan of economic reconstruction which would involve expenditure $2.4 [Page 235] billion. Paek pointed out this plan did not take into account military requirements. He said that plan would be presented through proper channels.

In responding Secy said he recalled vividly his words which he had spoken to first meeting of ROK National Assembly. He said that he had always tried to be faithful to sentiment that ROKs do not stand alone. The United States was a firm and continuing friend of Korea. He commented that he would study the requests and have them carefully examined by experts.8

Then the Secy said it was necessary for the ROKs to understand certain basic concepts of US foreign and military policy. He outlined the difference in mission between forces in the front line and those in the strategic striking reserve. He pointed out that the answer to the combined Russian and Chinese forces operating with interior lines of communication was a strategic reserve with mobile striking power which is a deterrent and can be quickly employed against an attack at any point along the Communist periphery. The UALI [Secy?] said that in the event of Communist aggression this force was committed for common defense in the NATO Agreement, the SEATO Agreement and our various mutual defense treaties, including the one with Korea.

With respect economic aid, the Secy asked the ROK Ministers to bear in mind that he had received on this trip a total of requests which if met would destroy the soundness of the United States economy. He said that the amount of available US aid was limited by economic and political realities. He likened American economic aid to ammunition which must be rationed, which was not accorded on basis friendship, but as contribution to winning cold war. He said each country should quite properly present its case. He emphasized that the United States would weigh ROK needs in the light of the overall requirements and then allocate available American aid where it would best contribute to relieving our worldwide objectives. He added that the Korean aid program has been our largest one and that the amount of US assistance to Korea is a measure of the importance which we have felt Korea has had in the cold war.

[Page 236]

Macomber bringing copies of three memoranda mentioned above. Additional copies being transmitted as enclosures to memorandum of conversation of Secy’s meeting with ROK Cabinet Ministers.

Cameron
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–1856. Secret. Repeated to Tokyo.
  2. The Secretary arrived in Seoul on the morning of March 17, met with President Rhee and four Cabinet Ministers that afternoon, and left for Tokyo the following morning.
  3. No separate memorandum of Dulles’ conversation with Rhee has been found in Department of State files. Dulles summarized the conversation in his letter to the President, infra.
  4. A detailed memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with the four Korean Cabinet Ministers is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
  5. Copies of this memorandum and the memoranda given the Secretary by the Finance Minister and the Defense Minister are attached to the memorandum of conversation cited in footnote 4 above. The memorandum, dated March 16, noting the difficulties in relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, contained a request that the Secretary “accord understanding and assistance to the Republic of Korea in solving the problem with which it is confronted as a result of the intransigence of the Government of Japan.”
  6. The memorandum on U.S. economic aid to Korea, dated March 16, reviewed the history of Korea’s economic problems and requested the United States to make a concrete economic aid commitment on which the Republic of Korea could base a 5-year development plan. Attached to the memorandum as an appendix was a memorandum addressed to Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dealing with the claims of the Republic of Korea for supplies furnished to the U.N. Command.
  7. The request for additional military aid was based, according to the memorandum presented to the Secretary by Minister Son, upon a survey of “the growing threat of communist attack” and an assessment of the “inadequate free world defenses in Korea.” This memorandum was also dated March 16.
  8. On May 16, the Department instructed the Embassy in CA–9072 to respond to the military and economic memoranda given to the Secretary on March 17. With respect to additional military aid, the Embassy was instructed to respond that the United States “considers present forces, backed by U.S. striking power, adequate for the security of Korea.” With respect to the request for a long-term commitment of economic aid, the Embassy was instructed to remind the Rhee government that the executive branch of the U.S. Government was unable to enter into long-term commitments involving future appropriations of the Congress. The Korean plan would be carefully considered, however, as a basis for future planning for implementation of aid funds as they became available. (Department of State, Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, 320.1 Secretary’s Meetings with Rhee)