Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, February 24, 1956—6:24 p.m.

576. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Your 865.² You authorized see Rhee and in strict confidence inform him:

1. Considerable progress toward removal teams DZ being made Swiss and Swedes in negotiations with Czechs and Poles.

2. Swiss and Swedes proposed withdrawal all inspection teams DZ. Czechs and Poles countered with proposal reduce personnel substantially in DZ but leave one inspection team north and one south. Swiss and Swedes replied this proposal unsatisfactory.

3. Swiss and Swedes taking very firm position with Communists that all teams must be moved DZ soon and pursuing matter vigorously.

4. In view firm position Swiss and Swedes believe good possibility they will succeed in negotiations Communists. They have expressed appreciation cessation demonstrations which have facilitated their negotiating efforts and expressed hope period quiet in ROK might obtain while longer in order permit them achieve their objectives.

5. Swiss and Swedes have asked their efforts be kept strictly confidential otherwise impossible for them act.

6. U.S. has been able press Swiss and Swedes vigorously during period since anti–NNSC demonstrations ceased and will continue do so. Believe Swiss and Swedish efforts likely succeed if demonstrations not renewed in ROK. U.S. urges therefore continued patience on matter.³

In your discretion can also tell Rhee Swiss and Swedes continue feel action impossible if appears under duress.

For Your Information. Believed undesirable make flat statement Swiss and Swedes prepared withdraw NNSC unless Czechs and Poles accept current proposal removal all inspection teams DZ. Bern’s 901⁴ repeated Seoul 13 indicates Swiss not prepared say at this juncture they withdraw from NNSC entirely under these conditions. Believe in view earlier reports from Bern, also available Seoul, Swiss determined accomplish withdrawal fixed teams DZ. Swedes indicated in conversations with Department could say in addition above points that Swedes ultimate goal is get out NNSC. Swedes believe best pursue this goal step by step but will not stop efforts until ultimate objective reached. Swedes want no reference however their proposed second step and Swedish officials Washington indicate their conversations this matter with Department officials gave U.S. more information than their instructions authorized. End FYI. Defense informed.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–1656. Secret. Drafted by Jones; cleared with L/UNA, EUR, and UNP; and approved by Sebald. Repeated to Bern, Stockholm, London, Paris, and Tokyo.
2. In telegram 865 from Seoul, February 16, Strom asked for authority to tell Rhee, if the need arose, that a resumption of demonstrations made no sense in that the Swiss and the Swedes had reached the final stages of their negotiations with the Czechs and the Poles over the withdrawal of the NNITs to the demilitarized zone, and were prepared to withdraw from the NNSC unless the Czechs and the Poles agreed to the removal of the inspection teams. (Ibid..)
3. Strom reported in telegram 903 from Seoul, February 28, that he and Cameron had called on Rhee that morning to give him an aide-mémoire embodying the contents of numbered paragraphs 1–6 of telegram 576 to Seoul. Rhee rehearsed his case against the NNITs and stated that he felt that the failure of the United States to take action against the NNSC was associated with “softness against communism,” but he agreed to wait a while longer for a solution to the problem. (Ibid.,., 795.00/2–2856) A copy of the aide-mémoire given to Rhee is ibid.,., Seoul Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 69, 321.9 NNSC Jan.–April 1956.
4. Dated February 23. (Ibid.,, Central Files, 795.00/2–2356)