Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

119. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, February 9, 1956.

Dear Walter: Thank you for your very informative letter of 30 January 1956² in which you enclosed a copy of your memorandum of conversation with the Swedish Ambassador and the Swiss Minister³ on the progress of their negotiations with the Communists with respect to the removal of the NNITs to the Demilitarized Zone.

I am seriously concerned about the time phasing of the removal of the NNIT’s to the Demilitarized Zone. I note also that you and your colleagues in the Department of State are no less concerned. I fully agree that the easiest method of accomplishing this objective is through the proposed action of the Swedish and Swiss Governments. It is imperative, however, in my opinion, that whatever action is taken be accomplished without concurrent demonstrative pressure from the Government of South Korea.

Several deadlines have passed without the amelioration of what you and I agree is a bad situation. The uncertainty, as I have previously pointed out has been troublesome to us and has had an unsettling effect upon CINCUNC in dealing with this problem in the field. It is not unlikely that the Communists will seek to prolong the current situation in the hope that CINCUNC, under pressure from President Rhee, will unilaterally remove the teams to the Demilitarized Zone and thereby afford them an opportunity to exploit such an action as a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Accordingly, I feel that the Swedes and the Swiss should be under the same compulsion of time, and that it would not be in the best interest of their reputation as Neutral Nations to be forced into a solution of the NNSC problem by publicly acknowledged pressure either from the United States or the Republic of Korea. For that reason, I believe that the Swedes and Swiss should communicate a date of February 25th to the Poles and Communists, prior to which mutual agreement with these two Governments must be reached, and that they should give us assurances that if mutual agreement is not reached by such a date, they would unilaterally withdraw their NNSC members out of Korea or at least to the Demilitarized Zone. Such a plan, in my opinion, may very likely be acceded to by the Communists, rather than accept elimination of neutral inspection machinery. It would appear that this date should allow ample time for the United States to take the necessary measures to accomplish the desired result should action by the Swedes and Swiss fail to materialize.

It is the position of the Department of Defense that any action should comfortably precede 8 March, the terminal date of the period of grace afforded by the Zablocki commitment.⁴ I feel it unnecessary to belabor the point that this commitment was, in a sense, a quid pro quo, and that our half of the bargain was to do our utmost to accomplish a solution to problems during the period of suspended demonstrations. It is probable that if steps are not taken which will assure definite results we will ultimately face the same problem after it has deteriorated from bad to worse.

On behalf of the Department of Defense, I feel that due to the time element, the proposal made herein should be implemented at the earliest practicable moment.⁵

Sincerely yours,

Gordon Gray

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–956. Secret.
2. Document 112.
3. A copy of the memorandum of conversation with Swedish Ambassador Boheman on January 25 was attached to the January 30 letter. The memorandum of conversation is printed as Document 111.
4. See Document 106.
5. Robertson responded with letters to Gray on February 13 and February 15. In the first, he noted that the Swiss and the Swedes seemed to be making progress in their efforts to achieve the removal of the inspection teams to the demilitarized zone. In light of the progress being made by the Swiss and the Swedes, Robertson felt that “we should hold up any unilateral action for the time being in order to permit these negotiations to come to a head.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–1356) In the February 15 letter, Robertson referred specifically to Gray’s proposal that the Swiss and the Swedes be encouraged to set February 25 as the deadline for a settlement of the issue. The United States, Robertson noted, had never pressed Sweden and Switzerland to issue an ultimatum to the Communists. To do so, he argued, would be counterproductive. There was little prospect of obtaining agreement from the Communists to such an ultimatum, and the Swiss and the Swedes would be certain to resent an attempt to dictate to them from Washington. (Ibid.,., 795.00/2–956)