Office of the Historian

106. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

Washington, December 8, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

Seoul’s 640 (attached)2 indicates that President Rhee has agreed to call off the demonstrations against the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams for three months upon an undertaking by the Zablocki Subcommittee to do its best to get the teams withdrawn within that time. Seoul’s 641 (also attached)3 reports that the Federation of Patriotic Organizations publicly called for a halt of the demonstrations “until the end of the year pending an answer from the United Nations to the Federation’s demand for complete withdrawal” of the teams. This development, taken in conjunction with the fact that the Swedes in particular and the Swiss to a slightly less degree are taking positive steps to bring about the withdrawal of all the teams to the Demilitarized Zone, seems to me to make it in our interest not to act promptly on January 1 as you had agreed we would do in your letter to Gordon Gray.

I know the difficulty this causes in our relations with Defense, since we backed away from an earlier “firm” date. However, I do think that these new telegrams from Seoul have created a considerably different situation. The strongest arguments Defense has had for prompt movement have been that the continuing demonstrations create an ever present problem of serious conflict between our soldiers and the ROK citizens and that it is necessary to act during a relative lull in the demonstrations in order to avoid the appearance of [Page 196] acting under duress. If the demonstrations are in fact called off for three months as President Rhee has now said he would “do my best” to do, these arguments lose their force.

It is clearly so much in our interest to have the action taken by the Swiss and Swedes rather than by ourselves that I recommend that you call Gordon Gray and discuss the subject with him and see whether under the new circumstances he will not agree to allow more time for the Swiss and Swedes to work out a solution in the NNSC. I understand that he is scheduled to leave for the NATO meetings soon, so that you would probably need to call him tomorrow.4

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12–855. Confidential.↩
  2. In telegram 640 from Seoul, December 8, not found attached, the Embassy reported that, in separate visits on December 7, Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (supported by General Lemnitzer and Under Secretary of the Army Hugh M. Milton II), and Congressman Clement J. Zablocki (supported by a Congressional group which included Walter H. Judd and Robert C. Byrd) had urged President Rhee to end the anti-NNIT demonstrations still taking place in South Korea. Zablocki was Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and he and the other members of his subcommittee, who were in Seoul as part of a tour of the Far East, succeeded in winning from Rhee a promise to “do my best” to try to stop the demonstrations for 3 months to allow the United States to promote a solution to the NNSC problem. (Ibid.) Documentation on the Far Eastern tour of the Zablocki congressional party is ibid., 033.1100–ZA.↩
  3. In telegram 641 from Seoul, December 8, not found attached, the Embassy reported that the Federation of Patriotic Organizations had called a halt on December 7 to the anti-NNSC demonstrations. The Embassy noted that the chronology of developments suggested that the decision to call a temporary halt to the demonstrations was made before the visit of the Zablocki group. (Ibid., 795.00/2–855)↩

  4. Robertson initialed his approval.

    A note on the source text in Robertson’s handwriting, dated December 12, reads: “I discussed with Gordon Gray and have written him in confirmation.” In his letter to Gray, also dated December 12, Robertson reviewed the optimistic developments which showed signs that the Swiss and the Swedes would solve the problem if given a little more time. He also noted that the 3-month moratorium on demonstrations virtually eliminated the danger of incidents involving U.S. soldiers and South Korean civilians for that period, and created the possibility of a solution without apparent duress. (Ibid., 795.00/11–3055)

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