114. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
822. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. I support the recommendations with respect to the NNSC and Article 13 (c) and (d) of the Armistice Agreement which have recently been made by General Lemnitzer.2 Consequently, I recommend that he be authorized to act unilaterally to remove the NNSC teams to the DMZ and to take necessary action with respect to Article 13 (c) and (d). I suggest further that instructions be sent to him within near future so that he can make plans effect this combined action no later than February 15, but permitting him flexibility of timing to avoid juxtaposition of action to any new Korean propaganda outburst. Although an interpretation of Article 13 (c) and (d) designed to meet his requirements might preserve more of the facade of the Armistice Agreement, it is my opinion (1) that needs of the Command should be the controlling criteria and (2) any interpretation would almost inevitably be considered such a transparent device that it might be more desirable propaganda-wise to meet the issue frankly and clearly. Since unilateral removal of teams to the DMZ will almost surely evoke Communist charges that we are preparing to violate the terms of Article 13 (c) and (d), I believe there is little to be gained in separating these problems. Simultaneous action on these two problems would produce only one occasion for Communist propaganda. To separate them [Page 214] would provide two occasions, on the second of which we could expect the Communists to revive the charges which had been made when the teams were removed and to link these developments. Consequently, I recommend simultaneous action to resolve these two problems.
I recognize that these recommendations are contrary to those which the Embassy has previously made on this subject. I base this reversal on the following considerations: (1) I have found General Lemnitzer’s argument concerning the military necessity for taking action with respect to the NNSC and Article 13 (c) and (d) entirely convincing. (2) I do not feel that we can delay any longer in carrying out the assurances first made to President Rhee more than 18 months ago in Washington that the NNSC problem would be solved to his satisfaction. (3) Rhee’s suspension of the demonstrations for 90 days, a period which ends March 10, affords us the first opportunity since August 1955 to solve these problems without the appearance of duress. (4) Our reading of the telegrams from Bern and Stockholm convinces us that the Swiss-Swedes cannot be expected to dispose of the NNSC problem in a way satisfactory to us by March 10. (5) I feel, therefore, that we, ourselves, must take advantage of this absence of duress and meet the issues squarely and satisfactorily. (6) There is in my judgment no possibility that Pres Rhee would agree to a prolongation of this suspension and that we must, therefore, assume that the demonstrations will be resumed with increased vigor when the suspension period ends if no solution has been achieved during it. (7) In fact, Sam-il Day March 1 (anniversary 1919 revolution usually celebrated with oratorical extravagances) provides an excellent earlier opportunity to resume the demonstrations which Rhee may not overlook.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/2–356. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated priority to Tokyo.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 109.↩