Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

113. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Lemnitzer) to the Department of the Army¹

Tokyo, January 30, 1956—10:15 p.m.

FE 800331 (DA IN 197259). For OSD Wash DC for Asst Secy Gray. Refs: A. DEF 995198, 11 Jan 56.² B. C 75143, 31 Dec 55.³ C. DEF 983878 24 Jun 55.⁴

1. With respect to ref A, I consider that the soundest course of action which the United Nations Command could take in obtaining an early solution to the immediate problem of the Armistice Agreement would be to dissolve the NNSC and suspend paras 13c and 13d in a single action as indicated in para 9 of ref B. If it is impossible to obtain governmental authorization of this preferred course of action, then I recommend that the alternative course of action indicated in para 10 of ref B be approved and implemented without delay.³

2. While I agree that it is desirable from a political point of view for the Swiss and Swedes to effect the withdrawal of the NNITs from South Korea and recognize that the ideal solution to this problem would be reached if the Swiss and Swedes withdrew from the commission itself, I doubt that they will accomplish either of these goals within the next few months. As previously reported to you in ref B, I have been given no assurance by Pres Rhee that he will suspend the anti-NNIT demonstrations for any specified period of time. Even if Pres Rhee carries out the promise he made to the Zablocki Committee to stop the demonstrations for 3 months, only 5 weeks remain before 3 month period will have elapsed. We must assume, and current intelligence supports this assumption, that the demonstrations will be resumed in the near future if positive action is not taken in the interim. If we fail to take advantage of this respite by removing the NNITs from the ROK, the UNC will have gained nothing and lost much. It will be decidedly to our advantage, and likewise to the advantage of the Swiss and Swedes in attaining their professed desires, if positive remedial action now. Therefore, I recommend that, if the Swiss and Swedes fail to obtain agreement on withdrawal with the Poles and Czechs by 15 Feb 56, I be authorized to carry out my recommendations referred to in para 1 above, and in the order of preference indicated.

3. In either case, I feel that the argument and the basis indicated in ref C will provide the means for the replacement of obsolete equipment. However, with respect to para 13d, I feel that it is preferable to suspend it completely rather than “in part” since complete suspension would offer 1 less justification for the continued existence of the NNSC. In this connection, it is not clear to me how 13d could be opened “in part” as mentioned in ref A.

4. Action on the foregoing appears to create a most opportune time to make a similar decision with respect to para 13c and for the same reasons.

5. While noting State–Defense preference in ref A for solving the 2 problems separately which involve the NNITs and paras 13c and d, I still believe as I have previously reported, that it would be a better course of action to treat these matters in a single action. Separating the solutions of these 2 problems (removal of NNITs and suspension of paras 13c and d) would invite Communist accusations that we effected the removal of the NNITs from the ROK to enable ourselves to violate the Armistice Agreement by the introduction of equipment and personnel reinforcements.

6. In accordance with your request contained in ref A, the major items of combat matériel which I propose to introduce into Korea as replacements to restore depleted combat effectiveness of UNC forces are as follows:

A. Air Force

(1) For all–weather air defense, the F–86D would replace the F– 94B. The F–94B’s were withdrawn for modification and are no longer available for reintroduction into Korea. Currently, the United Nations Command has no all–weather fighter interceptor capability in Korea and cannot, therefore, engage an intruding enemy aircraft during the hours of darkness or during inclement weather. Approximately 25 F–86D’s would be stationed in Korea to provide a deterrent to intrusion and a capability for interception under adverse weather conditions.

(2) For tactical bombardment, the B–57 will replace the B–26. I propose to introduce the B–57’s into Korea for short periods of TDY and for mobility exercises. The B–26 light bombers have provided the UNC with its only offensive capability for night intruder missions and for tactical bombardment under all weather conditions. Because of their age and obsolescence, they are currently being returned to the ZI as the B–57’s arrive in the theater those units equipped with B–57 need to gain the experience of operating from bases in Korea in order to insure their ability to perform their tactical missions and to support such missions logistically.

(3) For reconnaissance missions, the RF–84F and RF–100 would replace the RF–80, and the RB–57 would replace the RB–26. These units would be introduced into Korea for short periods of TDY on a rotation basis, for mobility exercises and for staging. Units equipped with these acft also need to gain the experience of operating from bases in Korea. Moreover, to augment my limited theater reconnaissance capability, these short–range acft must stage through Korea in order to increase their effective operational radius. (It is recommended that the presence of the RF–100 in this theater not be divulged to other nations.)

(4) As other new types of acft become available to this theater they too should be introduced into Korea for reasons similar to those outlined above.

B. Army.

(1) Gun, 280mm T131, with carriage.

(2) Gun, 75mm, T83 Skysweeper.

(3) Gun, twin 40mm, self-propelled M–42.

(4) Gun, 155mm, self-propelled M–44.

(5) Launcher, rocket, 762mm.

(6) Rifle, recoilless, 106mm.

(7) Latest surface-to-surface and surface-to-air guided missiles.

(8) Ammunition for above weapons.

(9) Tank, 76mm gun, M–41.

(10) Tank, 90mm gun, M–48.

(11) Tank, flamethrower, T–67.

(12) Armored personnel carrier, M–59.

(13) Tractor, cargo, medium, M8A1 (M8E2).

C. Justifications for introduction of the foregoing Army combat matériel are as follows:

(1) To replace obsolescent equipment and matériel. The current restrictions imposed by even the most liberal interpretation of para 13d of the Armistice Agreement are developing a situation that will attain a most critical stage prior to June 1958. As of that date, practically all the major items of combat matériel presently in the hands of US forces in Korea will be obsolescent or will require replacement.

(2) There are certain standard non-obsolescent items of equipment whose component parts have been redesignated [redesigned?] or adaptations developed. The redesigned or adapted component parts cannot be introduced into Korea under the restrictions currently imposed. Thus the standard non-obsolescent items available here are less effective than those supplied elsewhere.

(3) In order to alleviate partially the imbalance of potential strength existing between the opposing forces in Korea, it is highly desirable that Army weapons possessing an atomic delivery capability be introduced into Korea by United States forces.

(4) The nature and destructive capabilities of the 762mm rocket, 280mm gun, 75mm Skysweeper and surface-to-air guided missiles dictate that their employment be coordinated with all echelons of the field Army they support. Such employment involves communication and command control that can be mastered only by training, by tests, and frequent exercises with the supported combat units.

(5) A sound military program envisaged stockpiling of equipment adequate to meet emergencies. The stockpile should be so located as to be immediately available and not be dependent upon air and/or sea delivery.

(6) There is a growing inability to replace equipment destroyed, evacuated or expended due to discontinuance of manufacture of the equipment. Additionally maintenance of such equipment is becoming increasingly difficult because of the lack of spare parts which are no longer being manufactured. Already many different models of equipment serving the same purpose are in the hands of troops in Korea. This is serious enough in peacetime, but under combat conditions would be intolerable.

(7) The credits set up in accordance with the Armistice Agreement are out of balance with levels known to have existed at the close of the Korean conflict. This has been occasioned, especially during the early days of the Armistice Agreement, by equipment and material being cannibalized, destroyed, evacuated or expended without complete notification to the agency maintaining such credits to effect deletion of the item from stock records.

(8) Many items of controlled combat matériel have been turned over to the ROK Army. These items cannot be replaced for use of US forces as they do not come within the purview of “destroyed, evacuated or expended.”

(9) Many US replacements arriving in Korea have been trained on modern equipment and must be retrained here on the obsolescent equipment available to our units. The adverse impact on the effectiveness and morale of the Eighth Army is obvious.

D. Navy

There is no requirement for introduction into Korea of major items of Naval combat matériel at this time.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/1–3056. Top Secret; Priority.
2. See footnote 4, Document 109.
3. See footnote 2, Document 109.
4. See footnote 5, Document 110.
3. See footnote 2, Document 109.