Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Tokyo, March 18, 1956¹

PST/MC/9/2

Tokyo, March 18, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• Japanese
  • Mamoru Shigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Hisato Ichimada, Minister of Finance
  • Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
  • Naka Funada, Minister in Charge, National Defense Agency
  • Tanzan Ishibachi, Minister of International Trade and Industry
  • Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Minister in Charge, Economic Planning Board
  • Ryutaro Nemoto, Chief Cabinet Sec.
  • Takizo Matsumoto, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
  • Nobuske Kishi, Sec-Gen’l, Liberal Democratic Party
  • Mitsujiro Ishii, Chairman Executive Board, Liberal-Democratic Party
• Americans
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Berding
  • Ambassador Allison
  • Mr. Parsons
  • Mr. Lamb
  • General Lemnitzer
  • Maj. Gen. Biddle

SUBJECT

• Changes in Soviet Policy, Situation in Southeast Asia, US–Japan Relations

Ambassador Allison opened the two and one-half hour discussion by suggesting that the Secretary might first outline his views on the overall situation, particularly in the light of his trip to Karachi and Southeast Asia.² Thereafter, the Secretary would welcome comments and questions from the Japanese leaders present.

The Secretary began by analyzing in some detail the changes in Soviet policy over the past ten months, the possible reasons for the changes, and their significance. Soviet policy in the ten years after World War II had been based on the belief that Soviet goals could be accomplished only by violence; when this policy failed, different policies had been adopted. The change was apparent in the field of foreign policy and was most recently evident in the doctrinal changes and in the rejection of Stalinism at the 20th Party Congress. Though one could not be certain as to the reasons for this drastic change of course, several things seemed evident:

a. The change would not have taken place if things had been going well—successful policies are not usually changed;

b. Though we cannot be sure about the internal situation in the Soviet Union, there must have been important internal pressures helping to bring it about;

c. In the field of foreign policy the change must have been brought about in large part by the growth and strengthening of collective defense organizations among free nations, and the recognition that the Soviet could not attack one nation without risking involvement of the United States.

In the Secretary’s view, however, the change was a tactical one; Soviet objectives remained the same. Soviet tactics now apparently were to infiltrate neighboring countries, utilizing the large supply of technicians and the industrial capabilities which the Soviets have built up, and thereby to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish by open assault.

Moreover, there was no assurance that the Soviets would not revert to their old policy of violence if the free nations weakened in their determination and failed to maintain their strength. The Secretary was aware that the Japanese were particularly sensitive on the issue of atomic and nuclear weapons, but it was essential that the United States never permit the Soviets to gain supremacy in this field; our continued supremacy in fact was the only real defense of the free world. The development of nuclear weapons had now reached the point where our goal was not to develop increased destructive power but to control their use and make them more precise as weapons in order to limit the damage in their use ever became necessary.

One of the primary purposes of the Secretary’s trip had been to appraise the effect of the new Soviet policies in Southeast Asia. The Secretary had found in Southeast Asia a clear awareness of the danger of Soviet penetration and the risks involved in accepting Soviet aid. As a result of his trip, he had concluded that the Soviet economic penetration tactics were not likely to be successful, except in those cases where the Soviets were able to exploit emotions aroused over historical disputes, as had been the case with Egypt’s acceptance of Soviet aid to strengthen her hand against Israel. In general, though there were dangerous elements in the situation, e.g., in the hostility between Pakistan and India, the Secretary had been pretty well satisfied that the nations he visited were aware of the Soviet danger and were strongly anti-Communist. On balance, the situation was better than he had thought before visiting the area.

Incidentally, the most striking change for the better he had noticed was in Viet Nam. A year ago the situation had appeared all but hopeless; however, President Diem had worked near miracles over the past year. Viet Nam problems were not all solved, but they now appear to be of manageable proportions.

The Foreign Minister asked what the Secretary’s impression had been in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea.

The Secretary had found a greater degree of composure and confidence in Taiwan than was the case a year ago, when there was great nervousness that the offshore islands and Taiwan itself were about to be attacked. Of course, there was no certainty even now that attacks would not take place, but there was considerably more confidence in Taiwan, stemming of course in large part from the fact that the security of Taiwan was safeguarded through the Republic of China’s mutual defense treaty with the United States.

In Korea the Secretary had noted that President Rhee, whom he had not seen for 2½ years, had aged perceptibly in the interval. The President had not been so vigorously and even violently argumentative as in the past—even concerning Japan. His sentiments probably had not changed; but he was not so strong in pressing his views. There would perhaps be problems when President Rhee left the center of the Korean political scene, but the Secretary believed that his successor would be likely to maintain the same close ties with the United States as at present. The Secretary hoped, however, that a successor regime would be less strongly anti-Japanese.

The Secretary then outlined some of the basic principles of United States policy in Asia. The Secretary recalled that our Atlantic policy, as demonstrated by our action in the two World Wars, had been to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of the far side of the Atlantic. We have now developed a Pacific policy which in essence was the same as our Atlantic policy: we sought to have friendly powers on the western shores of the Pacific. Our participation in the Korean war, in addition to our moral obligation under the U.N. Charter, had been in part motivated by this belief; the Secretary had feared that if the Communists were permitted to over-run the Korean peninsula, the situation might well have developed into another world war.

Communist China had not concealed her ambition to control the Korean peninsula, Formosa, the Philippines, Indo China, Indonesia. She thus challenged the basic policy of the United States; and so long as Communist China’s hostile policy continued, the United States would not help her, economically or morally. Though the United States has been accused of being “unrealistic” for not recognizing the existence of Communist China, we recognized its existence all right; the question was whether we should extend recognition and admission to the United Nations and thereby strengthen her moral position. It was argued also that if we adopted a different policy, Communist China would become more friendly and amiable. We preferred, however, to have the Communists first demonstrate their friendliness. We simply could not take the risk—any more than we could have in the case of Hitler. Some argued also that it was inevitable that Communist China, as a major continental power, should dominate peninsular and island countries on the continental periphery. History, however, taught us exactly the opposite, as in the case of Greece, Britain, and the European “peninsula” to the Asian land mass. In any event, we did not accept it as inevitable that Communist China would dominate the western Pacific, and we were determined to use our power to prevent such a thing from happening. Our mutual defense pacts with free nations in the area, including Japan, were indications of our determination in this regard.

Turning to another subject, the Secretary said he was aware how deeply Japan desired to be admitted to the United Nations. It was the Secretary’s opinion that Japan would be likely to gain admission if the Japanese firmly expressed their indignation toward the Russians for excluding Japan and equating Japan with Outer Mongolia. The Soviets were most anxious to establish close relations with Japan; and if Japan’s indignation were made clear to them, the Secretary did not feel that they would long block Japan’s admission.

Minister Kono said that unfortunately the Japanese people did not react this way; they were used to having the Russians do strange, unreasonable things and could not seem to build up any resentment over such cases of Russian intransigence. Rather they tended in the case of the U.N. to put the blame on the Taiwan Government for Japan’s exclusion. The same was true with regard to the Japan-Soviet negotiations; the Soviets’ unreasonable behavior aroused little resentment among the Japanese.

The Secretary emphasized that Japan had been a great nation, which had played a great role in this part of the world. In the past Japan had demonstrated her superiority over the Russians and over China when that country acted alone, it was time for Japan to think again of being and acting like a Great Power, and not accepting these insults from the Soviets.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Nemoto said this was all very well in theory, but that in practice Japan was much too weak and helpless even in relation to ROK to do anything to protect her interests.

The Secretary said that ever since he had worked on the Peace Treaty in Japan in 1951 he had been greatly impressed by the ability of the Japanese people and their capabilities for exercising influence for good. One of the major purposes of the United States was to see Japan come back again as a Great Power in this part of the world. The Secretary looked forward to the day when the United States would not have to play such a large role here and Japan could resume her position of leadership.

Defense Agency Director Funada said that while Japan appreciated the generous peace treaty which had been negotiated under the Secretary’s leadership, it was regrettable that the Occupation-enacted Constitution had been permitted to remain in force, and the revision had been made so difficult. A large share of Japan’s present troubles, especially in the area of defense, stemmed from the restrictions which the Constitution imposed.

The Secretary replied that, while he had not been in a position of responsibility when the Constitution was prepared and was not aware of the details of its formulation, he did realize that it constituted a serious legal and psychological impediment for Japan. When the Foreign Minister had visited Washington last summer, discussion had taken place concerning the possibility of substituting a mutual security treaty for the somewhat one-sided Security Treaty presently in force.³ It had been apparent however that Japan was not prepared spiritually, nor did her Constitution permit her, to assume the equal responsibilities which a truly mutual security treaty involved. It was academic though at this stage to express regrets over the Constitution as formulated under the Occupation. In the long run, a nation’s growth had never been impeded by the restrictions of a Constitution; the Constitution must adjust to the nation and its needs, rather than the nation to the Constitution.

Minister Kono referred to the Secretary’s press statement on his arrival at Haneda Airport.⁴ Unfortunately the Secretary’s reference to Japan ( …⁵“The United States is well aware of the importance and constructive contribution which Japan can make to sound political, economic and strategic developments in the Western Pacific and South Asia, and I shall seek the opinion of Japanese leaders on these matters and also touch on some of the matters which particularly concern our two countries.”) had already aroused new suspicions, as in the case of the joint communiqué in Washington last year,⁶ that Japan was being called on to send her troops abroad to fight. Mr. Kono said he was sure the Socialists would raise this matter in the Diet, and he wondered if the Secretary would permit a denial that any such implication was contained in the Secretary’s statement.

It developed that there had been a misunderstanding in translation of the word “strategic”—the nearest Japanese equivalent for which has an exclusively military connotation. The Secretary explained that in his statement he had been thinking of “strategy” in its broader meaning—in the sense of planning and policy in all fields including economic matters. He had not meant to imply that in the military area Japan should assume any greater obligation than she now has, namely, to contribute increasingly to her own defense. The Secretary authorized the Japanese to make public clarification of this point, and it was agreed that after consulting with Ambassador Allison, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nemoto would make a statement to the press after the meeting ended.

Minister Kono recalled jokingly that when in Washington last summer he and his colleagues had promised that a conservative merger would be realized before they met the Secretary again. Well, they had done it. What would the Secretary like to have them promise now?

In reply the Secretary said only that the United States regarded the conservative merger as a very important achievement for Japan; if it had not been achieved, he felt there might have been a real danger that Japan would simply fall apart.

Turning to Japan-Soviet negotiations, Mr. Kono said that they were not going very well. From a variety of sources, including Domnitsky of the former Soviet Mission, it had been reported that the Soviets were seriously considering “drawing a line” on the high seas to exclude Japanese fishermen from North Pacific fishing areas; it had also been reported that because of Soviet naval maneuvers Japanese operations in the Sea of Okhotsk might not be permitted. These threats, Mr. Kono understood, were designed to “force” Japanese acceptance of Soviet terms in negotiating a peace treaty. If these threats were carried out, the effect on the Japanese fishing industry would be far more serious than that resulting from Korean enforcement of the Rhee Line.

The Secretary said he was not familiar with the details of Japan’s negotiations with the Soviets. However, if there appeared to be a real possibility of the Soviets taking such action on the high seas, it might be well for Japan and the United States to sit down together, study the problem and see what could be done. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had experienced considerable difficulty with some Latin American nations over assertion of territorial sovereignty on the high seas, and that in this respect the interests of Japan and the United States largely coincided.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu then suggested that some discussion should be devoted to Japan’s pressing economic problem, made more urgent by the need to support Japan’s large and expanding population. In the Foreign Minister’s view the problem, particularly in Southeast Asia, could be effectively dealt with only through close cooperation with the United States.

Minister Ichimada said that one important means of countering the Communist threat was to raise the level of living conditions in Southeast Asia. The trouble was that Southeast Asia badly needed capital, without which there was a danger that Japan’s reparations payments to the area might go to waste. In this connection, Mr. Ichimada had been most favorably impressed by Eric Johnston’s proposals during his recent visit to Tokyo. The Finance Minister hoped to discuss the problems in detail later with Mr. Robertson; at this time he wished only to emphasize that the Southeast Asian area was of vital importance, and that it deserved a larger share of capital investment than it was receiving. He noted that of World Bank loans, only 12% was allotted to Southeast Asian areas.

Minister Takasaki pointed out that a reparations settlement had already been reached with Burma, and that agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia would be reached soon. This would mean that Japan would be sending into the area sixty to seventy million dollars in capital goods as reparations every year. However, these nations did not have sufficient capital of their own to utilize the reparations payments effectively; Mr. Takasaki noted that of the interim reparations shipped to these areas immediately after the war, the major portion had been allowed to go to waste. Capital in these countries was therefore badly needed. If Japan were to offer it, however, she would naturally be suspected of attempting to “infiltrate” and “dominate” the area. Similar suspicions toward Britain and the United States might develop in these countries which have so recently won their independence if either of these nations were to sponsor a unilateral investment program. The need in Mr. Takasaki’s view was for a joint capital investment and loan program, in which all free nations with interest in the area would participate, thereby removing suspicion that any single nation was attempting to dominate the receiving nation.

Mr. Takasaki said further that there was an urgent need to develop Southeast Asia’s export potentialities. As it was now, the area had little to export but rice. But if basic raw material industries were developed, e.g., iron ore mines in the Philippines, these nations would have something valuable to sell Japan, and would of course be able to greatly expand their purchase of Japanese goods in return.

The Secretary pointed out in the first place that by far the greater share of direct economic aid under the American aid program went to these areas, and that this more than balanced the fact that their share of World Bank loans was relatively limited. The Secretary was not familiar with Eric Johnston’s proposals and could not comment on them. However, the idea of cooperation in this field appealed to him strongly, and in principle he believed it might be useful to study the possibility of coordinating United States economic assistance with the reparations program.

As the meeting ended, the Secretary said the talk today had been most informative and useful—more so in fact than any talk he had had in Japan since his work on the Japan Peace Treaty in 1951. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in return expressed his deep appreciation for the opportunity to speak frankly and exchange views with the Secretary.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Richard Lamb.
2. The Secretary left Washington on March 2 and was in Karachi for the SEATO Council Meeting held March 6–8. For documentation on his participation in this meeting, see vol. XXI, pp. 181 ff. He also visited Vietnam, the Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea.
3. See Document 45.
4. Full text not found.
5. Ellipsis in the source text.
6. See Document 50.

7. In Dulte 39 from Tokyo, March 19, marked “Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary for President,” Dulles summarized this conversation briefly and commented:

   “It was the best talk I have ever had with Japanese leaders, and it gave the impression first that they are beginning to feel that we can be treated as real partners and secondly that they are beginning to try to find a place for Japan in the postwar scheme of things.” (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–1956)