45. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 30, 19551
SUBJECT
- Second Meeting with Shigemitsu: Defense Matters
PARTICIPANTS
- Japan
- Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
- Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Kono
- Secretary General of Japan Democratic Party Kishi
- Ambassador Iguchi, Japanese Embassy
- Ambassador Kase, Japanese Observer UN Delegation
- Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto
- Mr. Yoshimitsu Ando, Foreign Office Counsellor
- Mr. Koh Chiba, Foreign Office
- Mr. Takeshi Yasukawa, Foreign Office
- United States
- The Secretary
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson
- Admiral Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Assistant Secretary of Defense Gray
- G—Mr. Murphy
- Ambassador Allison
- FE—Mr. Sebald
- Mr. C. Sullivan, Department of Defense
- NA—Mr. McClurkin
- NA—Mr. Finn
The Foreign Minister opened by referring to paragraph 3 of his general statement given August 29 regarding defense matters2 and then read a prepared statement on this subject (copy attached).3 The Foreign Minister requested the Secretary’s views.
The Secretary said that he wished to make several general observations and that Admiral Radford would make some detailed comments. It is the present policy of the United States to withdraw its armed forces gradually from Japan as Japan’s forces increase. The United States has no desire to keep its forces, particularly ground forces, in Japan if they are not needed and if Japan can replace them. As United States forces are reduced, the United States will consider the feasibility of a comparable reduction of Japan’s contribution for their maintenance.
Regarding replacement of the present Security Treaty by another treaty, the Secretary thought it was premature to consider this at the moment, since it is not yet clear to the United States that a new treaty would be accepted and carried out by Japan with the solid backing and support which would be required. The Secretary said that he had been both impressed and depressed by the Foreign Minister’s presentation on August 29, which pointed up the difficulties faced by the Japanese Government in meeting the Communist threat. As the Foreign Minister had said, the Japanese Government was finding it extremely difficult to deal with the Communists under the Constitution and laws passed during the Occupation. The Secretary referred to the Foreign Minister’s statement that socialists and other leftists had been able to defeat certain bills desired by the Government and to attack the Government’s policy at every turn. The Secretary said that this made him wonder whether a new treaty arrangement would have the effective [Page 98] support it would require. The important thing for a mutual security treaty is a solid basis for cooperation. The Secretary was not confident that the Japanese Government had the unity, cohesion and capacity to operate under a new treaty arrangement. The United States would not like to move from something that now exists to something speculative. The Japanese Diet had ratified the peace and security treaties by large margins and these treaties therefore had a solid juridical and constitutional basis. A new treaty might possibly be ratified, but support for it might not be sufficiently wholehearted to be helpful to Japan-United States relations.
The Secretary said that the question is not one of fundamental policy so much as of timing. The United States wants a Japan which is able and willing to do what is stated in the preamble of the Security Treaty, namely, to assume increasing responsibility for its defense. As the Foreign Minister said, Japan has not yet reached this position. The Secretary said that Japan had already made great progress in this direction and he did not want to minimize Japan’s efforts to overcome various political and economic difficulties. The United States has always hoped that the Security Treaty can be translated into a different form of treaty when Japan has developed the capacity to defend itself. The time for this has not yet come. Japan’s political situation is very confused, and unfriendly elements in the Diet can block the Government’s efforts to build up its defense system.
The Secretary observed that the Foreign Minister might argue that a change in the treaty could alter Japan’s attitude. The Secretary said he doubted this. Opposition in Japan is not to the form of the treaty but to the fact of partnership with the United States. Pro-Communists and neutralist elements would attack a revised treaty. At the moment, therefore, the Secretary questioned whether the time is ripe for negotiations to substitute a new treaty.
The Foreign Minister said that the main danger to Japan is indirect aggression. Japan must cope with Communist propaganda and with Communist influences, which will increase under the present treaty system. Japan wants weapons to combat the Communists and this is what the Foreign Minister wants to get by revising the Security Treaty. Japan must have a new treaty system to replace the old one, which is inadequate to cope with internal difficulties posed by the leftists. The Foreign Minister said that he realized a change could not be made overnight and proposed that the fundamental problems be studied and a constructive solution devised.
The Secretary emphasized his view that a new type of treaty should develop from the conditions contemplated by the present treaty, namely when Japan makes an adequate contribution to its own defense, when a healthy spirit of partnership with the United States has been created, and when anti-Communist elements are strong [Page 99] enough to ensure passage of their programs and an attitude of cooperation with the United States. The Secretary reiterated that Communists everywhere attack security treaties entered into by free nations with the United States, charging vassalage and subordination. A change of treaties in Japan will not eliminate such Communist attacks.
The Foreign Minister agreed but said that the attitude of the Japanese people as a whole must be considered. To educate the people of Japan may seem easy but is in fact very difficult. The danger exists that Communist influence in Japan will increase gradually and may become so great that the Government will not be able to cope with it. The situation in Japan differs from that in Formosa and the Philippines, since the Japanese people do not believe that they are being treated as equals under the present arrangements. The Secretary replied that Communists everywhere were trying to force the United States and its partners in the free world to break up and become isolated. The Secretary noted that the United States has a base agreement with the Philippines. The Foreign Minister replied that Japan would like to be in the same position, adding that Japan had to rely on the United States when the Security Treaty was concluded because it had no defense force but that now it does have a defense force. The Secretary commented that Japan’s present force is inadequate. The Foreign Minister replied that Japan will build up its force. The Secretary said that it would be a different matter to talk about changing the treaty at such time as Japan’s defense force is adequate.
The Secretary commented that it is premature to talk of changing the present treaty at this time but that it is not premature to consider what conditions would be necessary for concluding a new treaty. He agreed that both governments should cooperate so that Japan could build up its forces and that United States forces should be reduced as Japan was able to assume increased defense responsibilities. The Foreign Minister said that he thought it would take at least three years for Japan to complete its defense program but that the time had now come to study improvements in the present treaty system.
The Secretary said that the drafting of a new treaty would be a relatively simple matter. The real problem, however, is to assist Japan in its development of defense capacity and for this much preparatory work is needed. The Secretary suggested that Admiral Radford comment on the Japanese defense plan.
Adequacy of Japan’s Forces.Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Japanese defense plan is not adequate for the defense of Japan and that the military threat to Japan cannot be countered by the forces planned. Japan would need assistance to counter this threat and presumably United States assistance would be expected. Admiral Radford said that he assumed the Japanese referred to combat forces when they talked about withdrawal of United States [Page 100] ground forces. He pointed out that almost one-half of the United States ground forces in Japan of about 70,000 are support forces with logistic functions. He said that the Japanese plan did not appear adequately to take into account these logistic functions and that Japanese military planners were evidently being restricted in their efforts to plan for the manning of logistic functions even though they appreciated the problems. Admiral Radford also commented that the air and naval forces planned by Japan were not rounded out. He said that Japan should enlarge its force plan in order to count on withdrawal of United States forces. He agreed that Japan is developing forces larger than some countries in NATO and the Manila Pact but said that Japan’s economic and industrial capability is greater than those countries. The United States is planning to reduce the number of its combat ground forces in Japan as Japan develops its forces; because of our own necessities, this reduction may even be faster than Japan’s build-up of ground forces.
The Foreign Minister asked about the manner in which Japan should develop support forces. Admiral Radford replied that consultation in Tokyo would be the best way to work this out and that military men in Tokyo were already consulting on a partial basis. The Foreign Minister asked whether the United States was satisfied with this, and Admiral Radford said he thought the consultation could be improved. The Foreign Minister said Japan would make it better and the two countries in close collaboration could move ahead on defense problems in the future. He added that treaty questions should of course be kept under consideration.
Joint Consultation. The Secretary said that it might be helpful if Mr. Robertson, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, could talk about consultation between the two governments. Mr. Robertson said that the suggestion had been made that a United States–Japan Joint Committee on Defense might be set up. The United States would be agreeable to this. Mr. Robertson said that the United States might be represented by the Ambassador and CINCFE who would be assisted by experts as necessary. He commented that such a committee should not, of course, conflict with existing arrangements under the Administrative Agreement but that this committee could have fruitful discussions on joint defense problems of a military nature.
The Foreign Minister said that he thought such a committee should not be at a government level but should merely make recommendations to the two governments. In response to Mr. Robertson’s question the Foreign Minister said that Japan would probably be represented by experts from the Defense Agency. Mr. Robertson agreed that this should be an advisory committee. The Foreign Minister suggested that the committee might also consider a future treaty organization. Mr. Robertson replied that the committee’s primary work should be [Page 101] devoted to defense problems but that the committee could have the effect of expediting Japan’s development of defense strength so that time for consideration of a new treaty would be accelerated. The Foreign Minister commented that perhaps the American Ambassador in Tokyo and the Foreign Office could consider various treaty problems.
Runway Extensions. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Gordon Gray, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, might discuss certain special problems. Mr. Gray said that the Defense Department is concerned about runway extensions in Japan. Agreements on this have been made with the Japanese Government and the Defense Department is encouraged to hear that the Japanese Government is now planning special measures to carry out this program. On the other hand the scope and organization of demonstrations in opposition to this program have been discouraging. It is important that the Japanese people understand that this program is in their own interest, particularly since Japanese aircraft will eventually need the extended space for their operations. Countermeasures against the current demonstrations are desirable and the United States is willing to assist.
The Foreign Minister agreed that we should take measures to keep the Communists down but said that use of force in this situation could be dangerous. He emphasized that the Occupation had abolished all laws for effectively dealing with Communists and that it is now almost impossible to handle them. The only power available to the Japanese Government at present is that of persuasion, and the Government must develop solid anti-Communist strength in order to muster its power of persuasion. The Foreign Minister stated that he is ready to accept a Joint Defense Committee but emphasized that Japan and the United States must go farther and talk about their fundamental treaty position in order to make clear that Japan is not on an unequal basis. Mr. Robertson commented that such a committee would be further evidence of cooperation between the two governments.
Mr. Robertson observed that Mr. Gray’s point on the runway extension was that the people of Japan should be convinced of the need for this program in the interest of their own defense. The Foreign Minister responded that the Japanese people do not listen to the Government, which has promised to extend the runways and may even be forced to confiscate the necessary land. This, however, might play into the hands of the leftists. The Foreign Minister added that the opposition to runway extensions is not genuine and is Communist-inspired.
Constitutional Interpretation. The Secretary then inquired whether Japan could send forces outside of Japan to help the United States if it were attacked, adding that this appeared doubtful and that the Japanese [Page 102] Government would have to be stronger before a basis of mutuality existed. The Secretary commented that the situation would be different when Japan had adequate forces, a sufficient legal framework and an amended constitution. He asked specifically whether Japan could go to the defense of the United States if Guam were attacked. The Foreign Minister replied that Japan could do so and that under its present system Japan can organize forces for self-defense. The Secretary said that this would not be a case of the self-defense of Japan but rather of defense of the United States. The Foreign Minister replied that in such a situation Japan would first consult with the United States and would then decide whether or not to use its forces. The Secretary said that he was not clear as to the Foreign Minister’s interpretation of the Japanese Constitution and added that he had thought the broadest commitment Japan could make would be to use its forces for the defense of Japan. The Foreign Minister replied that Japan’s forces must be used for self-defense and that Japan could consult, in the case of an attack in connection with a treaty, regarding the use of its forces.
The Secretary commented that consultation would not mean very much if the constitution prevented the sending of forces abroad. The Foreign Minister answered that Japan’s interpretation included the use of forces for self-defense and consultation as to whether or not forces should be sent abroad. He commented that Japan would like to have a treaty like the United States-Phillippine treaty and that this is possible even under the present constitution. The Secretary said that he had not previously realized that Japan thought it could do this.
The Foreign Minister emphasized that Japan wanted to be an equal partner like other countries having mutual security treaties with the United States and said that Japan is determined to move ahead with its defense. The Secretary said that he thought appropriate language could be worked out in the joint communiqué to cover the ideas of both sides.
The Foreign Minister said that he wanted to be sure that the United States did not intend to keep Japan in a semi-independent position. The Secretary said that this was not the case, that Japan had made a treaty which had been overwhelmingly approved by the Diet and that this did not mean a semi-independent position. He emphasized that every treaty involves a partial surrender of sovereignty and that interdependence and cooperation rather than independence are the requirements. For Japan to consider itself as unequal is wrong; this is not the way the United States treats Japan.
The Foreign Minister said that every year Japan must negotiate with the United States regarding its budget. The Secretary replied that we should get away from the unnecessary difficulties of these negotiations. He then pointed out that every year the United States and the [Page 103] NATO countries have a budget review in December and that this process is part and parcel of the collective security system. Of course we should arrive at a system by which the yearly budget debates with Japan might be less acriminous and we should try to reach some automatic formula. Changing the treaty, however, would not accomplish this. Wherever there is a joint or composite effort, there must be joint discussion of the respective contributions. Admiral Radford commented that this problem appeared to have been covered earlier when the Secretary suggested that as Japan’s forces went up, its contributions would go down. The Foreign Minister said that Japan desired to know the size of the American forces in Japan and plans for their reduction, adding that there had been conflicting reports on this. Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford commented that a joint committee in Tokyo could go into this.
Mr. Kishi said that he was elated to know that the United States would discuss the question of treaty revision when the time is ripe. Mr. Kishi stressed that it is essential to improve the economic livelihood of the people of Japan and to eliminate unsettled conditions which produce communism. It is essential to consolidate the conservative forces in Japan and to devise economic plans to combat communism and to strengthen Japan’s defense program. This will facilitate withdrawal of the United States forces and revision of Japan’s constitution. The joint committee should discuss measures for the defense of Japan at minimum cost. Mr. Kishi said that as a member of the Democratic Party he wished to make these observations.
Mr. Shigemitsu then said that he would like to recapitulate the discussion in order to make sure that his understanding was correct. Although the Secretary had said that the time was not ripe for the immediate conclusion of a new defense treaty, the Foreign Minister understood that the Secretary was in agreement so far as its principle was concerned. On the other hand the internal situation in Japan makes it imperative to establish a system of defense based on a new defense treaty with the United States on the basis of mutuality. The Foreign Minister, therefore, proposed to begin forthwith work to prepare for a new mutual defense treaty to replace the existing security treaty as soon as Japan’s defense forces have reached the size deemed adequate for national defense. Such work might be continued through normal diplomatic channels. The Secretary said that he would like to study this recapitulation of the discussion further.
The Secretary emphasized that no nation is as eager to see Japan resume its rightful place as is the United States. A weak Japan is the contrary of everything the United States wants and has been working for. The United States would not have taken so many measures to assist the recovery of Japan if it had not wanted to see a strong vigorous Japan resume its rightful place in Asia. The Secretary said [Page 104] that he was concerned to hear that the only way Japan could assert itself is by turning against the United States, which is trying in every way to help Japan. The Secretary said he did not think this was a wise course. He expressed the hope that the situation in Japan would change and that conditions necessary for mutuality would develop. He added that the United States should not be required to provide security for the Philippines and for Formosa. Japan should be doing this, and the United States could withdraw its forces.
The Foreign Minister said that he had no illusions regarding these matters and that he was grateful to have the Secretary’s views. The Secretary commented that we would both be better off with a strong, vigorous Japan. The Foreign Minister reiterated that Japan wants to fight Communist influence and that that is the reason Japan is making its proposal regarding the treaty.
The Secretary and the Foreign Minister briefly discussed and agreed on the text of a press statement regarding the meeting.