Office of the Historian

69. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1

Washington, January 21, 1956.

SUBJECT

  • Japanese Defense Negotiations

1. In a joint Embassy–FEC message, Ambassador Allison and General Lemnitzer have requested authority to accept a general formula proposed by the Japanese for progressive reduction in the yen contribution the Japanese make to the support of U.S. Forces in Japan (Tab B).2 Under the formula, Japan will be permitted to subtract from its contribution to our forces for the previous year one-half of the amount by which it increases appropriations for its own forces and for facilities over that of the previous year. When applied, assuming appropriations for the Defense Agency and facilities as indicated, it results in the following (in billions of yen):

Agreed forJFY 56 JFY 57 JFY 58 JFY 59
Defense Agency 100.2 125.* 145.* 170.*
Facilities 10.5 8.** 5.** 3.**
Contribution 30. 18.85(22.9)*** 10.35(12.9)*** 0

*Appropriations required to support six-year defense plan. (Government approval of plan still contingent upon legislation establishing National Defense Council.)

**Cost as estimated by Japanese.

***Contribution which would have resulted from formula proposed by U.S.

2. The Embassy and FEC state that acceptance of the Japanese formula would have the following advantages: (a) Reduce Japanese pressure for revision of the Administrative Agreement; (b) Retain matching principle which would provide inducement for continued increase in Defense Agency budget; (c) Would facilitate smoother working relationship with Japanese on defense matters. This arrangement [Page 155] is also more favorable than that prescribed in the NSC policy for Japan, which simply says that we should seek to ensure that Japan applies to its own forces any amount by which its contribution to us is reduced.

3. The joint message lists the following as unfavorable considerations: (a) The adoption of the formula would result in future reductions in the yen contribution being from that of the previous year rather than from the full support contribution of $155 million (55.8 billion yen) as specified in the Administrative Agreement—It is our view that the abandonment of this unrealistic negotiating position, which has been adopted in the past without useful results, will do much to obviate the possibility of prolonged and acrimonious negotiations, (b) Should the Japanese seek reductions in addition to those provided for in the formula, our initial position will be weaker than if we had started with $155 million—We could counter the concession of agreeing to their proposed formula, (c) We might be in a somewhat less advantageous position to exert direct pressure on their Defense effort—The NSC paper provides that we should not press Japan to increase its military strength to the prejudice of political and economic stability.

4. We feel that agreement to the Japanese proposed formula would greatly reduce exacerbations in future defense negotiations and make a significant contribution to furthering our political objectives in Japan by indicating United States agreement to a planned phase-out of the Japanese contribution to our forces, which is viewed in Japan as the continuation of an Occupation-type relationship.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Tokyo authorizing the acceptance of the Japanese formula. (Tab A)3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–2255. Secret. Drafted in NA on January 20.↩
  2. Telegram 1649 from Tokyo, January 20, not found attached. (Ibid., 794.5/1–2056) The Embassy–FEC recommendation was worded by Allison in telegram 1649 as follows: “On balance, General Lemnitzer and I believe that it would be preferable to accept Japanese formula without specific link to six year defense plan. We therefore request authority to accept general formula as proposed by Shigemitsu but without provision reported in Embtel 1622 calling for consideration of further reduction in case USFJ expenses greatly decreased.” Regarding telegram 1622, see footnote 3, supra.↩
  3. Not found attached. Telegram 1533 to Tokyo, January 23, reads in part as follows:

    “Authorization granted accept general formula as proposed by Shigemitsu but without provision re further reduction in case USFJ expenses greatly decreased. Believe important in note exchange to clarify that formula refers to new funds appropriated each year.” (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/1–2056)

    In a January 27 memorandum, Robertson asked Dulles to approve the draft notes which had by then been prepared. The Secretary initialed the approval line. (Ibid., 611.94/1–2756) For text of the exchange of notes regarding reduction of Japanese expenditures under Article XXV 2(b) of the Administrative Agreement, effected at Tokyo on April 24, 1956, see TIAS 3555; 7 UST 761. For text of the exchange of notes regarding annual and progressive reduction of Japanese expenditures under the Administrative Agreement, effected at Tokyo one day later, see TIAS 3556; 7 UST 771. See also Document 75.

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