Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

Washington, September 2, 1955—8:53 p.m.

487. Your 621.² Following extracts from Dept. press briefing³ August 31 after issuance communiqué.⁴

To question whether reference to contribution to peace security Western Pacific “means during conversations you both had in mind some time in future Japanese troops will be sent outside Japan for preservation international peace and security in Western Pacific” replied “yes”. Clarified later during briefing as follows:

Query: With regard to sending forces abroad did Japanese discuss matter with that in mind? Were they ready and willing do that?

Reply: They recognized quite clearly, I think, that this is possibility which would arise if there were change in form of treaty. This clearly not something imminent any more than change in form of treaty imminent but is kind of problem which arises if form of treaty changed so that Japan incurs obligation for mutual or collective defense in area.

Query: Was that predicated on change in constitution?

Reply: That was one of things talked about as possibly necessary.

Query: Is that considered prerequisite by U.S.?

Reply: We have no judgment. Question is whether Japanese think it is possible under constitution or whether change required before they can.⁵

With reference to six year plan and force levels stated our military think larger forces, ground forces in particular, would be necessary in Japan to meet what they conceive strategic requirement to be.

Query: Some years ago Secretary Dulles said it was our belief they needed 10 divisions and 350,000 troops. Is that still our thinking that is what strategic requirements are?

Reply: Roughly that number men. I wouldn’t use number of divisions because divisions can be handled various ways. I think they tend think more rather than less divisions.

Query: In other words, we don’t think it feasible to withdraw our forces from Japan until strategic requirement of 350,000 men achieved?

Reply: That does not necessarily follow.

Query: Did U.S. argue for 350,000 figure and try to force it on Japanese?

Reply: No.

Query: That is the American thinking—the military people?

Reply: I wasn’t citing that as something which was discussed but as a long known U.S position which has been been talked about for long period of time but this was not subject of discussion at all.

Query: You have talked about infantry forces. What can you tell us about discussion of Japanese air and naval forces?

Reply: Not very much because it wasn’t mentioned. There wasn’t that kind of detailed discussion.

Query: Did anybody say “We have got to have 100 jet interceptors” or anything like that?

Reply: No.

Query: Six year plan could include buildup of Japanese air force?

Reply: Yes, and to that extent there was presentation of what thinking of Japanese defense authorities has been.⁶

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/9–155. Official Use Only. Drafted in FE/P and approved by McClurkin who signed for Hoover.
2. In telegram 621, dated September 1 but sent September 2, the Embassy reported that editorials unfavorable to the Shigemitsu–Dulles talks had appeared in the Japanese press. The Foreign Minister was being criticized for making commitments without Diet or popular support, with special attention being paid to the question of possible dispatch of Japanese forces overseas. (Ibid.)
3. Conducted by McClurkin.
4. The pertinent paragraph of the joint statement reads as follows:

   “It was agreed that efforts should be made, whenever practicable on a cooperative basis, to establish conditions such that Japan could, as rapidly as possible, assume primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland and be able to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security in the Western Pacific. It was also agreed that when such conditions are brought about it would be appropriate to replace the present Security Treaty with one of greater mutuality.”

5. In telegram 491 to Tokyo, September 3, the Department stated that it was advising newsmen that no commitments existed between the United States and Japan on the sending of Japanese troops abroad and that the subject had been discussed only in a hypothetical way. If asked, the Department said, it would state that it concurred in a statement made in New York on September 2 by Shigemitsu that no such understanding existed. In conclusion, the Department briefly summarized discussion of the issue in the August 30 conversation between Dulles and Shigemitsu; see Document 45. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/9–255)
6. In telegram 662 from Tokyo, September 8, the Embassy reported that there was a consensus among Japanese press and political observers that the troop commitment issue overshadowed all the good results which might have been expected from the Dulles–Shigemitsu meetings and that Shigemitsu continued to be under heavy attack from the press, the Socialists, and even a majority of conservative politicians. (Ibid., 611.94/9–855)