Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

71. Memorandum of a Conversation, Tokyo, March 19, 1956¹

PST/MC/9/1

Tokyo, March 19, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Assistant Secretary Robertson
• Ambassador Allison
• William Sherman, Second Secretary of Embassy
• Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama
• Deputy Prime Minister Mamoru Shigemistu
• Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono
• Nobusuke Kishi, Secretary General Liberal Democratic Party
• Bukichi Miki, Member, Proxy Committee Liberal Democratic Party
• Tsuruhei Matsuno, Member, Proxy Committee Liberal Democratic Party
• Chief Cabinet Secretary Ryutaro Nemoto
• Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Frank Takizo Matsumoto

SUBJECT

• General Discussion

The Secretary asked whether the Prime Minister had any particular matters which he wished to bring up. Mr. Hatoyama replied that he had nothing in particular which he wished to raise but that he would like to discuss a few matters involving basic principles. He recalled that former British Prime Minister Churchill had delivered a speech at Blackpool² at which he had made the point that peace had been maintained through strength, and that the present peaceful condition of the world was primarily due to the fact that the United States had sufficient strength to counter the Soviet Union. Churchill had pointed out that if the Soviet had possessed a preponderant degree of strength England would have been invaded long ago. The Prime Minister said that he had always believed in and followed this policy. He asked the Secretary whether he was right in so doing. He added that he hoped that the United States would continue to maintain her strength and asked whether his hopes were justified.

The Secretary responded that the Prime Minister was right in both respects. He noted that Admiral Mahan had said that the role of force was to give moral institutions an opportunity to take root and grow. United States power acted as an umbrella over the Free World and provided an opportunity for free institutions to become strong. With regard to the degree of strength which the United States now possessed in relation to that held by the Soviet Union, the Secretary said that he did not know the exact figures and could not say. However he noted that the United States had recently offered to make available 40,000 kilograms of fissionable material for use by friendly countries in developing peaceful atomic research. He said that this had come as a big surprise to many who had no idea that United States resources in this respect were on so large a scale. In any event they were many times that of the Soviet Union, and, together with the striking power provided by our numerous bases throughout the world, made our retaliatory power so great that it would be madness for the Soviet Union to challenge it by aggression. The Secretary said that it seems apparent that this power has created a genuine deterrent to war and has thus effectively limited the Soviet Union to such indirect action as attempting to create trouble between non-communist nations such as Israel and Egypt or Pakistan and India. The Secretary advised the Prime Minister to be confident that so long as the United States and Japan are allies, Japan will be protected by the greatest possible strength and that the United States is determined to preserve its power.

The Prime Minister said that when he had spoken recently with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Hearst had asked him what Japan wished from the United States. The Prime Minister had replied that he wanted first for the United States to protect Japan from Soviet aggression, and second, for the United States to have faith in Japan—that Japan was a solid member of the Free World and would continue to be.

The Secretary recalled his speech of May, 1951 delivered before the America-Japan Society³ in which he had discussed the whole subject of the U.S.-Japan security relationship and said that the policy which he had expressed then still stands.

The Prime Minister said that Japan was vitally interested in developing close relations with the nations of Southeast Asia and also in promoting close relations among those nations themselves. He pointed out that Japan was, at considerable sacrifice, endeavoring to pay reparations to all these countries. However, Japan was most interested in making sure that these reparations were put to effective use. Some sort of development organization, financed by the United States, which would enable these underdeveloped countries to put these funds to use was necessary. The Prime Minister hoped that the United States would give favorable consideration to this plan.

The Secretary replied that he shared the Prime Minister’s view and agreed that Japan could not really afford to pay reparations unless their effect would be to create economic prosperity. Reparations could not be sterile—it would be a waste which Japan could not afford. The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that he would have his experts study the problem from this standpoint. He pointed out that he himself was not an expert but that he certainly believed the principle to be sound.

The Prime Minister then said he had great hopes for a betterment of Korean-Japanese relations and asked that the United States do what it could to see this problem settled.

The Secretary replied that the United States too was anxious to see an end to the difficulties between Japan and Korea but said that we face a difficult but temporary problem in the fanaticism exhibited by President Rhee. He said that he characterized the problem as temporary because no one lives forever and even President Rhee is no exception.

The Prime Minister rejoined that Japan has exhibited a great deal of patience with the Korean problem and will continue to be as forbearing as possible. However, the issues involved were becoming sensational ones. The people who fish from the western coasts of Japan are being adversely affected and becoming more and more angry. He mentioned that the Korean patrols do not seem to bother old vessels operating within the Rhee Line but make it a point to seize all the new vessels in good condition. [1 sentence (1½ lines of source text) not declassified]

The Secretary replied that the United States too has had its problems with President Rhee and that we recognize his fanatic and frequently irrational attitude. At the same time it had to be admitted that Rhee is a dedicated man who has contributed a great deal to the checking of communist expansion in this area and whose country has sacrificed much. In some ways his actions have operated to the direct advantage of both Japan and the United States.

The Prime Minister said that he wished to bring up a problem which might seem small in relation to the big ones under discussion. He referred to the natives of the Bonin islands who are still in Japan and prevented from returning to their homes. He asked that the Secretary bear this problem in mind and give some consideration to finding a solution.

The Secretary replied that he had studied the problem and that at first he had been inclined to believe that the islanders should be allowed to return. However, the more he studied the problem the less confident he became. In the first place it was apparent that the islands could not sustain much population. Secondly, he did not want to create a situation which might become similar to that which Cyprus has become for Great Britain. The islands have a strategic value for the United States and the Free World. It was quite possible that after the islanders had been returned they would want more and more. The problem would not be solved merely by sending the residents back even though the immediate difficulty might be temporarily calmed. It was necessary to view the problem on a long range basis—not as something which could be settled by the simple expedient of allowing the islanders to go home. In the long run he believed that letting the Bonin islanders return might do more harm to Japanese-American relations than good.

The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to fill the Secretary with details which he did not want to hear and that he had been keeping the Embassy informed of developments, but that if the Secretary had any questions which he would like to ask concerning the current Japan-Soviet negotiations or Japan’s policy toward Communist China, he would be happy to answer them.

The Secretary mentioned that he had discussed Japan’s negotiations with the Soviet Union at some length on the preceding day when he met with various Japanese leaders. He had pointed out at that time that Japan had a greater capacity to obtain results from the Soviet than she realized. He believed that the Soviet Union wanted to obtain a treaty and wanted Japanese friendship, and he believed that the weapon of public opinion could be used more effectively than it had been so far. In the first place there was the question of the return of Japanese prisoners from the Soviet Union. The Russians had agreed to return these people over eleven years ago. The Secretary recalled that he had attended the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945 just after the surrender terms had been agreed to by the Japanese Government.⁴ The then Secretary of State Byrnes had raised the question of the Japanese prisoners who, according to the surrender terms, were to be returned to lead peaceful lives after Japan had been disarmed. Foreign Minister Molotov had then said, jokingly but revealingly, that the clause had been inserted in the surrender terms merely in order to induce the Japanese to surrender. Secretary Dulles said that it was foolish to make new agreements before old ones had been carried out. So long as the Soviets can use the same bargaining counter over and over again—sell the same horse twice—they will do so. The Secretary believed that there could and should be much greater moral indignation at such perfidy. In the second place, the Secretary believed that it had been a most insulting thing for the Soviet Union to equate Japan with Outer Mongolia—a country which was not really a country at all, and certainly not to be compared with Japan. He believed that if public opinion were to rise up on this issue the Soviets would give in. The Austrian peace treaty was finally achieved by just such patient use of public opinion—year after year reminding the world from every forum available that the Soviet Union had agreed at the conclusion of the war to give Austria back her independence. Finally they had given in because they felt the effect of world opinion. If Japan would do the same thing she would get results.

The Prime Minister asked whether all Austrian prisoners had been returned and whether Austrian figures on the number of prisoners held had agreed with those provided by the Soviet.

The Secretary said that, as far as he knew, there was no problem or dispute over Austrian prisoners. However, the situation in Germany was a different one. There the Russians were still refusing to return or make final accounting for numerous prisoners. They were trying to sell the same horse three or four times!

The Secretary said that he would be happy to hear the views of the Japanese Government on the current Japan-Soviet negotiations but that he was not familiar with the details.

The Prime Minister regretted that in Japan it had been impossible to whip up Japanese public opinion in the same way that the United States had been able to do in the case of the fifteen fliers held by the Communist Chinese. In spite of the fact that a great deal more than fifteen had been held by the Russians the people had not been so worked up.

The Secretary said that it was because of the pressure of United States public opinion that we had been able to secure the return of the fliers. There were however still thirteen civilians held by the Chinese whom we insisted on having returned.

The Secretary then said that on the subject of China he had also had a profitable discussion the previous day with various Japanese leaders. He did not wish to go into details but did wish to state basic United States policy on this question. This was to ensure that the powers of the Western Pacific (including Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Southeast Asia, New Zealand and Australia) remained friendly to us and are internally and internationally strong enough to maintain their independence against Communist Chinese expansion. So long as China remains hostile to the Free World we oppose any action which may tend to strengthen her morally or materially. This does not mean that we do not accept the fact that the Chinese Communist regime exists. It does and we have negotiated with it in the past. At the same time we are opposed to anything which will build up its prestige and power so long as we feel that that power will be used against us, or our friends in the West Pacific. We believe that this policy coincides with Japanese interests. We would however welcome free, intimate and continuous exchanges of opinion with the Japanese government on this matter. Our basic purposes are the same. Japan has had greater experience than we in dealing with the Chinese and we would be most happy to cooperate in determining the best policy with which to cope with China.

The Secretary mentioned that trade was also important. He had noticed a growth of trade between Japan and mainland China in terms of commodities which were desirable to Japan and which did not involve the strategic strengthening of China. We realize that this sort of trade may be necessary and have therefore from time to time agreed to review our lists of commodities banned from export to China, in the hope of helping our friends. However, we do not think it is advisable for China to receive commodities which will create greater strength for her.

The Prime Minister hoped that the Secretary would continue this policy of review. At the same time he said that Japan had no desire to export strategic material to the Communists. He asked that the Secretary have faith in Japan and trust her. Japan was not going to become Communist. She was a firm member of the Free World.

The Secretary said that it was extremely gratifying to hear so forthright a statement and that he was completely confident that Japan would remain with the Free World.

The Prime Minister recalled that at the time he founded the Liberal Party his very first statement had been that he was anti-Communist. For this he had been purged. However, his attitude had not changed and was not likely to in the future.

Mr. Miki then said that he had listened with great interest and appreciation to the Secretary’s remarks and wished to endorse what the Prime Minister had said about having faith in Japan. He wanted to add however that it was not just faith alone, it was more than that. He wanted the United States to rest assured that Japan was on its side and have no worries. He reemphasized that Japan was anti-Communist and was aware that it must be strong. He said that the conservatives had been able to merge themselves from a number of warring factions into a strong party. They would revise the election laws and they would eventually carry out revision of the Constitution. He was grateful for the aid which the United States has given Japan so far and asked that it be continued even more in the future.

The Secretary replied that everything which he had done or said in the past six years had shown his confidence in Japan. He was completely assured that that confidence was justified. He said that he realized that certain matters created difficulties from time to time but that these were relatively minor viewed against the background of not only words but deeds as well. The United States had made both a material and a moral investment in Japan. The Secretary mentioned the great effort which had gone into ensuring the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act last year which had paved the way for Japanese membership in GATT. It was one of the most difficult things that had been accomplished and had succeeded in passing the House of Representatives by only one vote. He realized that United States trade policy was not perfect but recalled that he had talked with the British Ambassador a few weeks ago when the Ambassador had complained about United States discrimination over British bicycle imports. At that time he had said to the British Ambassador that a pretty girl with a spot of dirt on her face attracted a lot of attention and unfavorable comment whereas a coal miner whose face is covered with dirt did not. United States trade policy was like the pretty girl—its weak points were noticed a great deal.

Mr. Miki then said that he wished to add one more thing. He said that the Japanese leaders understood why the United States had to do the things which it did. However, the Japanese people did not always understand. On such problems as the Japanese-Korean dispute they blamed the United States for not taking a firmer stand with Korea and for furnishing her with the weapons with which to attack Japanese fishing. On the question of the return of the Bonin islanders the people viewed the United States attitude as a heartless one. This unfavorable attitude on the part of the people could not help but exert an influence on national policy and might result in the creation of a great deal of grass roots anti-American feeling. The Japanese have a saying that even a mountain can be undermined and crumble because of ant holes. Mr. Miki said that the Japanese leaders would do their best to cooperate, but that he hoped that the Secretary would also try to find amicable solutions to some of these small problems.

The Secretary said that he appreciated Mr. Miki’s point of view and agreed that our two countries must work closely in an effort to solve problems such as this. At the same time, he added that he believed that Japanese leaders themselves could do more to help in educating their public to the basic principles involved.

Mr. Kono said that he wished to raise one final point. He asked that the Secretary try to arrange for the UN or some other international agency to take up and discuss the problem of Japanese immigration. He hoped that various nations of the world could be induced to accept Japanese immigrants and assist in the relief of the problem of overpopulation.

The Secretary agreed to look into the matter.

The meeting was concluded at approximately 12:00 noon.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Sherman.
2. Reference is to the speech delivered at the close of the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, England, October 9, 1954.
3. Dulles was not in Japan in May 1951. On February 2, 1951, in his address “Peace May Be Won,” delivered before the America–Japan Society in Tokyo, Dulles discussed the security relationship between the two countries. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1951, p. 252. On April 23, 1951, also in Tokyo, Dulles addressed the United Nations Association of Japan on the topic “Peace Without Fear.” This speech, too, contained consideration of the security relationship. Text is ibid., May 7, 1951, p. 726.
4. For documentation on the First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London September 11–October 2, 1945, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. II, pp. 99 ff.