Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

230. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Japanese Ambassador (Asakai) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, September 24, 1957¹

Washington, September 24, 1957

After an exchange of cordialities, Mr. Robertson reminded the Ambassador that he had told him the previous evening that he wished to say something more about the Bonin Island situation. It was a matter that concerned us very much but one into which the Secretary had not gone during his conversation with Foreign Minister Fujiyama on Monday. Mr. Robertson went on to say that, as the Ambassador knew, we were pulling back our forces from his country. The general situation was such that we could not abandon our strategic position until threat and tension eased. The essential factor in forcing us to maintain our strategic position was the fact that the Communists continued to have the same basic aggressive policies which they have pursued, as witness the fate of sixteen nations. Mr. Robertson gave examples of how the Communists in Asia continue to have an aggressive posture. He said that although they talk of peace they continue to build up their military forces. He mentioned ten Communist airfields between Canton and Shanghai which are equipped to handle jet planes. He spoke of the Communist successes in Indochina and their continuous military build-up. The Vietminh, he said, had 350,000 to 400,000 troops while Vietnam has only 140,000. Against this aggressive posture of the Communists the only real, forceful deterrent in Asia was the United States. What other country, he asked, would oppose overt aggression? Full responsibility fell upon the United States and whatever Asian allies it had. In the Korean war, for example, the maximum number of United Nations troops other than American was 35,000. The war was expensive in American lives, and it cost us $18 billion as well. Mr. Robertson said that he knew the Ambassador was aware of all this but he reminded him of it only so that he would realize the United States must keep its strategic posture in the Far East.

The position of the Bonins had changed, said Mr. Robertson. The United States had strategic uses for those islands which made them a defense for Japan as well as for the United States, and the Defense Department now had plans for the use of all of Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, necessitating complete exclusion. If the decision were being made now the Navy would not even bring back the first inhabitants. That they did so immediately after the war was only to protect them from discrimination in Japan. Their repatriation did not discriminate against others. Moreover, they were not difficult to deal with. They did not object to the presence of a United States military base near their homes.

Mr. Robertson said that no one this side of the President would be able to get the Defense Department to allow even a few hundred Japanese into these islands. Mr. Robertson himself had spent hours talking to the responsible officials in Defense. The Secretary of State himself had had several meetings on the subject. Mr. Robertson was sure that Ambassador Asakai understood. He certainly would if he were an American. We were sorry, Mr. Robertson stated, to have to say “no” to Mr. Fujiyama who was visiting the United States for the first time as Foreign Minister. Both Defense and State appreciated the importance of Japan and desired earnestly to solve the problems confronting the two nations.

Mr. Robertson said he understood the economic problem of Japan. Raw cotton sold by the United States to Japan was double the value of cotton textiles which the United States bought from Japan in return. Japan had had an adverse balance with the United States of $900 million over the last three years. Japan was one of America’s best customers, the best next to Canada and the United Kingdom. In agriculture it was the very best. He said that he was accustomed to telling these facts to Congressmen and other influential Americans at every opportunity. The Government was confronted with the necessity of convincing the general public that it was in the American interest to buy more from Japan. Proposed state textile legislation of discriminatory character was defeated in Georgia, Louisiana and Connecticut. Although the existing laws in South Carolina and Alabama were not being enforced, the United States Government would continue its efforts for their repeal.

Mr. Robertson said what he wished the Ambassador would tell the Foreign Minister was that the Bonin problem was the toughest problem he could possibly have posed at this juncture.

The Defense Department, explained Mr. Robertson, was opposed to pilgrimages of the exiled islanders to their ancestral graves in the Bonins. There were no facilities to take care of such pilgrimages and the Defense Department was against such visits for security reasons.

Mr. Asakai interrupted to say that the statement there were no tombs was ridiculous. Mr. Robertson agreed, and said that if he had been born and raised in the Bonins he would be able to find his own home and the graves of his ancestors even though he had not been there for over ten years. This was only an excuse; the real reason was the desire for complete exclusion. If pilgrims came it would cause problems.

Ambassador Asakai stated that when Prime Minister Kishi came the Japanese had received wonderful news—a ray of hope when the Secretary had agreed that possibly 200 or 300 Bonin Islanders might be repatriated. Mr. Robertson tried to correct the Ambassador who held up his hand and said he knew no promise had been given.

Mr. Robertson got out the minutes of the Kishi visit² and read from them to show the Ambassador that quite contrary to creating an expectation that repatriation was possible and likely, the Secretary had said that it would be extremely difficult, that the President might not even agree in principle, and that it would raise more problems than it would solve, but that despite this fact the United States was prepared to study the matter further. Mr. Kishi had asked how many islanders the United States might consider repatriating and the Secretary had said that the maximum would be 200 to 300, but that military security would be the determining factor. Mr. Robertson pointed out that in preparing the Joint Communiqué at the White House on June 21 the Secretary had purposely deleted the sentence dealing with the possibility that there might be limited repatriation.³

Mr. Asakai said the point was that when the Japanese got the statement from the Secretary they thought there was a ray of hope. Was this not a reasonable thing to do? Mr. Robertson replied that the Secretary had been very careful. Mr. Asakai reasserted that the United States had given the Japanese hope. Mr. Robertson agreed, and said that it was true that there had been the hope that Defense might be persuaded to let in 200, but this hope had not been realized. The Ambassador said that the Japanese hopes had been dashed yesterday. Mr. Robertson replied that he had done his best but had not succeeded, Mr. Asakai went on to say that the Bonin Islanders were very decent and cooperative people to which Mr. Robertson agreed, saying he had met some of them two years ago right in this room.

The Ambassador described the repatriation issue as a “hot ball”. The United States Government had carried it for two months after the Kishi visit but now the Japanese Government would have to carry it for awhile. The issue was, he said, blown up all out of proportion. Mr. Robertson commented that it was similar to the Girard case. He had been out talking to some ex-soldiers and had told them plain facts about the Girard case which they had never read in the newspapers. The Ambassador thought it was a matter of emotions—like the nuclear test explosions. Mr. Robertson said on a recent evening he had met a highly literate group and had held with them a round table discussion on mutual security. These people despite their excellent education and presumable ability to get at the facts had held highly distorted opinions and were in fact misinformed. If such people were misinformed, it was no wonder that the ordinary man on the street was swayed by emotion.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 294.94C22/9–2457. Confidential. Drafted by Martin on October 4 and initialed by Robertson indicating his approval.
2. For discussion of the Bonins, see Documents 186–188 and 192–193.
3. The conversation in question was the one held at the Department of State at 2:15 p.m., June 21; see Document 193.