192. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, June 21, 1957, 11:35 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Final Communiqué for Kishi Visit
PARTICIPANTS
- The Prime Minister of Japan
- Japanese Ambassador Asakai
- Member of the Diet, Takizo Matsumoto
- The President
- The Secretary of State
- Assistant Secretary Robertson
- Assistant Secretary Berding
- Ambassador MacArthur
- Brig. Gen. A. J. Goodpaster
- J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.
The Prime Minister called on the President at 11:35 a.m. The President complimented the Prime Minister on his speeches before the houses of Congress the day before. The President had had breakfast with 40 members of Congress, and they had unanimously expressed admiration for Mr. Kishi’s presentation.
[Page 411]The Prime Minister told the President that he had had lengthy conversations with the Secretary of State, that things had gone smoothly, and that they were about to make final the joint communiqué to be issued between himself and the President,
The President remarked that he would proceed as rapidly as possible, because he understood that the Prime Minister had to make a speech at 12:15.2
The Secretary then gave the President the draft communiqué, pointing out that the first part had been agreed to by himself and the Prime Minister, but that the second part was still under discussion. After the President had read through the draft, the Secretary explained that they were at that point considering whether to use the word “residual” or the word “ultimate” in referring to Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Secretary pointed out that at the time of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan he had stated, on behalf of the United States, that Japan had residual sovereignty. Later on, at a press conference, the Secretary had used the word “ultimate” in the same context, and the Japanese would now like to see that word used in the communiqué. The term “residual,” however, had been agreed to by a number of Allied countries, and he thought that we should stick to that word and not try to change bilaterally, in a statement issued by the President and the Prime Minister, what had been multilaterally agreed upon.
The President asked what the difference was between the two terms.
The Secretary replied that he did not know, but that if the Japanese found a difference, then it was important not to change the concept by the use of the different word; but that if the Japanese found no difference, then they would have no reason for wanting to use “ultimate” rather than “residual.”
Ambassador Asakai explained that to the Japanese the word “ultimate” contained the idea that the islands would one day revert to Japan.
The President said that was what he understood by “residual,” that the United States would exercise its rights for a period, and that the sovereignty would then return to Japan.
He was glad, the President continued, that the paragraph had been put in about the prompt withdrawal of United States ground combat forces. He was definitely in favor of that.
The Secretary then said that the truly important matter before them was not the question of the text of the communiqué, but the purport of what was happening. He thought that this visit and communiqué marked a major change in the relations between the United [Page 412] States and Japan. There would be immediate withdrawal of our ground combat forces, and the establishment of a new inter-governmental committee to consider the operation of the Security Treaty. Up until now the Treaty had been unilateral, but the establishment of the committee would go a long way towards it becoming bilateral in its practical applications in spite of the difficulty of formal amendment.
In these respects, the Secretary continued, our relationship is in the process of transformation and this is one of the most significant visits of foreign heads of government. This is being done deliberately, and with our eyes open. You (the President), I, we all believe that the important thing is to develop a relationship of real mutuality and real cooperation and our best chance to do that is under the leadership of the present Prime Minister. Fortunately at this period there is a Prime Minister in whom we can have confidence and who has a genuine dedication to the principles of the free world. As he had said to the Prime Minister at dinner the night before, we were going as far as we could to meet his legitimate demands. Some of his demands could not be met, but this was not because we did not trust him, but because our own legislation and our public opinion made it undesirable to move too far too fast.
We are making a big bet on this gentleman, the Secretary said to the President about Mr. Kishi, but it is a justifiable bet in the interest of our future relations.
The President said that he would like to make another point. I assure you, he told the Prime Minister, that your visit is the beginning of a constructive period. The Congressmen this morning were unanimous in their praise of you. Now that you have achieved this personal trust we can move constructively.
The Secretary then said that he had pointed out to the Prime Minister, in connection with the Bonin Islands, that security factors and the inability of the islands to sustain many people meant that at most a small number, perhaps 100 or 150, could be permitted to return. This was as big a permanent population as the islands had ever had, he said, since the other former inhabitants had been brought to the islands before the war for military purposes. It might be better if we could find some way to indemnify the former inhabitants. This was also the position of our Department of Defense. The question would be the amounts to be given and the source of the funds.
The President said that he would study this matter sympathetically.
The President told Mr. Kishi that he was very happy to have had this visit and that he thought it had been very useful. Mr. Kishi agreed that the discussions had been tremendously important and he expressed his deep appreciation to the President.
The meeting then adjourned, it being 12:00 noon.