193. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, June 21, 1957, 2:15 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Joint Communiqué on Kishi Visit
PARTICIPANTS
- Prime Minister Kishi
- Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishida
- Ambassador Asakai
- Director, American Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry, Koh Chiba
- Counselor of Embassy Tanaka
- Secretary of State
- Assistant Secretary Robertson
- Assistant Secretary Berding
- Ambassador MacArthur
- Mr. Becker, L
- Mr. Parsons, NA
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin
- J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.
The group met to continue consideration of the draft joint communiqué. Mr. Kishi opened the meeting by proposing that the words “and ultimate” be deleted from the phrase “residual and ultimate sovereignty.” He also asked that the phrase referring to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, “The United States will find it necessary to continue to exercise its present powers and rights” be changed to read, “The United States will find it necessary to maintain its present position.”
The Secretary suggested that this latter phrase be changed to “continue the present status.” Ambassador Asakai replied that that would do.
The Secretary then asked that the next sentence reading, “The United States will take measures to improve the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Islands and to promote their economic and cultural advancement” be changed to read, “The United States will continue its policy of improving the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Islands and of promoting their economic and cultural advancement.”
The Prime Minister then said he would like to suggest the following sentence regarding the Bonin Islands: [Page 414]
“The President expressed his readiness to give further sympathetic study to the possibility of the return to the Bonin Islands of a limited number of those Islanders who are now residing in the home islands of Japan.”
The Secretary replied that he did not think that this would do. The Prime Minister said that he would not insist on this appearing in the communiqué, but he wondered whether he could understand that the United States would be willing to carry out this study in view of the previous day’s discussion.
As he had indicated, the Secretary said, as far as a return to the Islands was concerned this could not be done for more than a very few people. This would cause more trouble than would be worthwhile. The Prime Minister had suggested indemnification in lieu of this and the Secretary had said that he would explore this matter and communicate further with the Prime Minister regarding both possibilities.
Mr. Kishi then requested that persons be allowed to travel back and forth between the main islands of Japan and the Bonins for the purpose of visiting their family graves in the Islands. The Secretary said that this would be included in the study.
The phrase “special restrictions in certain states” was then changed to read, “local restrictions” in connection with legislation discriminatory against Japanese products. The phrase “early cessation of both the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons” was changed to read, “the early cessation of both the testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons.”
The Prime Minister asked whether some reference might be made in the communiqué to the fact that he had presented his ideas on economic assistance to Southeast Asia. Ambassador MacArthur pointed out that the paper on this subject2 had been received only the night before from the Japanese and there had not been time to make a study. At the Secretary’s proposal, however, the sentence, “The views of the Prime Minister will be studied by the United States” was added to this section of the communiqué.
The Secretary then said he would like to strengthen the reference to the threat of Communism by changing, “The objectives of international Communism remain unchanged” to “international Communism remains a grave threat,” Ambassador Asakai asked that this be changed to “major threat,” and this amendment was agreed upon.
[Page 415]The Secretary then asked whether it was quite clear that the proposed intergovernmental committee was not to deal with war plans, strategy, etc., but with the political aspects of security arrangements. The Prime Minister replied that this was his understanding.
The Secretary then asked that the phrase, “intergovernmental committee to study basic problems concerning the implementation of the Security Treaty and to consult, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces” be further changed to read, “intergovernmental committee to study problems arising in relation to the Security Treaty including consultation, whenever practicable, regarding the disposition and employment in Japan by the United States of its forces.” This proposal was also adopted.
The Prime Minister then said that he had been happy to hear that morning the Secretary’s statement that Japan need have no reason to fear that the United States would embark upon any project as a result of which the Japanese might find themselves unexpectedly in a state of war; that in the very remote eventuality of such a situation, that eventually itself would mean that it was in the United States interest to maintain close contact with Japan and that, therefore, the United States would expect cooperation from Japan and Japan did not need to fear that close contact would not be maintained. Now, continued the Prime Minister, it would be desirable for me if I could understand that I might, when I see fit, say that Mr. Dulles had made such a statement.
The Secretary said that he saw no reason why that could not be done. He would look over the transcript of the meeting and after verifying its accuracy would give a quotation to the Prime Minister to use as he saw fit.3
The Secretary said that if the question were asked it might be stated that the intergovernmental committee would be set up in Tokyo and that the American members would be our Ambassador and the senior American military commander. After reflection, however, the Secretary withdrew this latter statement and said that it might be better to answer that the committee would be set up in Tokyo but that there had been no decision as to its membership.
The meeting then adjourned at 3:15 p.m.4
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 889. Secret. Drafted by Zurhellen and cleared by Robertson.↩
- Reference is to a Japanese memorandum handed MacArthur by Chiba; for text, see vol. xxi, p. 356. (Attached to covering memorandum by MacArthur dated June 20; Department of State, Central Files, 890.00/6–2057)↩
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Under a covering letter to Kishi dated June 21, Dulles enclosed a brief transcript. The transcript is identical in wording to the Secretary’s statement on the subject, marked off by direct quotes, contained in Document 191.
In his covering letter, Dulles wrote, “I have no objection to your making public use of this statement if you feel this useful.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181,CF 889)
↩ - For text of the joint communiqué issued at Washington on June 21 by the President and the Prime Minister, see Department of State Bulletin, July 8, 1957, p. 51. During his news conference held June 25, Dulles responded to several questions pertaining to the communiqué and the Prime Minister’s visit. The transcript is ibid., July 15, 1957, p. 96.↩