188. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957, 3 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Conversation between Prime Minister Kishi and the Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
- Prime Minister Kishi
- Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishida
- Ambassador Asakai
- Counselor, Japanese Embassy, Mr. Tanaka
- Director, American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office, Mr. Koh Chiba
- The Secretary
- Assistant Secretary Robertson
- Ambassador MacArthur
- Mr. Becker, L
- Mr. Parsons, NA
- J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.
The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that he was prepared to discuss the question of war criminals unless the Prime Minister wished to refer back to any of the subjects discussed during the morning meeting.
[Page 393]The Prime Minister said that he would like to proceed to the matter of war criminals and then go back later to other subjects. He explained that Prime Minister Menzies of Australia had recently visited Japan and had announced that Australia agreed to the release of the war criminals being held at its direction; the United States therefore was the only country which still required the Japanese Government to confine war criminals on its behalf, of whom there are sixty-six. No doubt the United States has many reasons for this, but on the other hand more than ten years have now passed since the end of the war, and there is no information as to when these prisoners may be released. This is not to the advantage of either country. Moreover, the Prime Minister continued, those Class A war criminals who have been released are still under parole and their activities are therefore restricted.
The Secretary stated that consideration had been given to the latter category, Class A criminals who had been sentenced by the international courts, and the United States desired to do whatever seemed to be legally feasible. The question of pardon had been considered, but after a study of the history of the Peace Treaty it had been concluded that this was not practicable. Originally, he explained, the draft of what became Article 11 of the Treaty had contained a provision for pardon but this had been stricken out because of the opposition of some of the Allies. If the agreement of the majority of the members of the international tribunal can be obtained however, we think that the sentences can be reduced to the time already served, and thus the parole status will automatically terminate and the restrictions will be removed. This would, under the Peace Treaty, require a request by Japan and the concurrence of the majority of the countries represented on the tribunal. No public announcement could therefore be made at this time. If Japan so desires, however, the United States would informally inquire of the other nations represented on the tribunal whether they would accede to a formal recommendation from Japan for clemency, so that Japan might be spared any embarrassment in the event such concurrence could not be obtained.
Mr. Kishi said that he would be very grateful if this could be done, and the Secretary replied that we would act accordingly.
As to the 66 war criminals subject to American control, the Secretary continued, we are prepared to try to find a solution, but it should be said in advance that no public announcement would be practicable at this time because of the agitation over the Girard case. These 66 men, he said, have really very bad records and have been guilty of very grievous atrocities. It would be undesirable to take any public action which would revive memories which are recorded in the [Page 394] sentences of these men. As soon as the atmosphere has become somewhat calmer, however, the United States would be prepared to consider the formula which the Secretary said he would outline.
Under this formula, the United States would suggest that the Japanese Government establish a responsible, non-political board to review the cases, including the trial records; the United States would make the trial records available for this purpose. To the extent that this board, after examination of the cases, considered clemency appropriate and the Japanese Government recommended accordingly, the United States would be prepared generally to accept the recommendations. The United States would expect the board to exercise genuine and honest judgment in the light of all the facts and we would then follow the recommendations of the Japanese Government. We believe that this can be reconciled with the provisions of Article 11 of the Peace Treaty which gives the power to grant clemency to the Government which imposed the sentence, on the recommendation of Japan. This would mean that we would expect in general to follow the recommendation so made without any further independent investigation on our part, thus placing the responsibility fully on Japan.
The Prime Minister said that this would be a very satisfactory solution.
The Secretary cautioned the Prime Minister that this procedure could be put into effect only after the present situation had quieted down, and that it would not help either the United States or Japan to bring up the details of these cases at this time. When the time comes, however, if this formula is agreeable to Japan, we would proceed as rapidly as possible.
Mr. Kishi said that this would be a happy solution. He then went on to say that Japan had long hoped for the repatriation of the inhabitants of the Bonin Islands. He did not desire, however, to bargain with the Secretary over the question of numbers, and he fully appreciated the remarks which the Secretary had made about the possibility of long range friction and difficulties if even a limited repatriation was carried out. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister felt that in spite of these facts, it would be beneficial to both Japan and the United States if repatriation could be permitted for those persons whose families had resided in the islands for generations, and on whose behalf the Japanese Government felt that it could assume full responsibility.
However, he continued, if, regardless of this, the United States should still find it extremely difficult to permit even those persons to return, then he had to point out that the question arose of indemnification for those persons who were unable to return and who were having difficulty in maintaining their livelihood in Japan proper.
[Page 395]The Secretary interjected that the records which the United States has indicate that virtually all of the land in the Bonins was owned by the Japanese Government, and that the inhabitants did not have any property rights of their own. This question would be examined more closely, however, and a more precise reply would be made tomorrow or later.
Mr. Kishi pointed out that according to the Japanese Government’s information, the inhabitants of the Bonins had owned a number of parcels of land of their own, however small, and that they also possessed fishing rights, which were considered property.
Lastly, said the Prime Minister, he desired to bring up the matter of the prohibition of nuclear tests. He was not, he maintained, acting on instigation by any communist sources, nor with any intent of aiding the communist side. The point was purely and simply a humanist one. The Japanese Government has made very stiff recommendations to the Soviet Government as well, asking them to end their nuclear tests. The Prime Minister would like the Secretary to understand that the Japanese are very serious about this matter and have presented their opinions to the UN Disarmament Committee not because they might expect communist support but because of their own intense feelings on the subject. He felt it most desirable, and it was his fervent hope, that under United States initiative some arrangement could be arrived at to prohibit all nuclear tests.
The Secretary said that he would like to take a few minutes to explain the philosophy which underlies the United States position. In the first place, we are fearful that too much concentration on the evils of atomic warfare may give the impression that war is permissible if only atomic weapons are not used. In the second place, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, we seek cessation of testing under certain conditions. One condition is that any cessation or suspension of testing be adequately supervised. The Soviet Union has indicated that it is willing to accept supervision. I think, the Secretary said, the fact that the Soviet Union now accepts supervision represents justification of the unwillingness of the United States to consider suspension of these tests without agreement on supervision.
There is still a danger, he went on, that the Soviets might make elaborate preparations for carrying out tests in violation of their agreement on the theory that to do so would give them enough knowledge to get ahead of us. However, some risk in this field must be accepted, and we are prepared to take certain risks. But we also believe that in connection with any suspension of tests further measures are necessary to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and to put an end to the build-up of such weapons by countries already possessing them. Therefore we seek an agreement that after some agreed date no further fissionable materials would be used by any [Page 396] nation for weapons. It will require time to establish the procedures for supervising the undertaking that no fissionable materials will be used for weapons. We are willing to accept the suspension of tests while this machinery is being established, which might be about one year.
This point we are now discussing, said the Secretary, is significant in connection with some confusion which resulted from the President’s press conference yesterday.2 The President was asked whether we would agree to suspend the tests without some time specified after which fissionable materials would not be used for weapons. The President answered no, said the Secretary, but indicated that we would be willing to suspend the tests before the actual date for the cutoff of the use of fissionable materials for weapons. This did not mean, however, that we would suspend testing without a firm agreement looking forward to the cutoff of fissionable material for weapons.
For instance, continued the Secretary, suppose that June, 1958 is set as the date for the suspension of tests. At that same time, we would begin to install the system to insure that fissionable material would not be used for weapons in the future. If it took one year to set up this supervisory system, then the cutoff date for the use of fissionable materials in weapons would be June, 1959.
We do not believe, the Secretary said, in the suspension of testing apart from a larger attack on the problem. We are convinced that if properly conducted the tests are not injurious to human health or genetics. The tests have accomplished some important things. They have shown us how to have clean weapons, and also how to have small tactical weapons so that it would not be necessary in all cases to use mass destruction weapons. If we merely suspended testing today it would mean that many countries would shortly be able to make very big and very dangerous weapons but unable, through testing, to make small and clean weapons. For instance, country X, which I will not name, does not now have atomic weapons. If that country is allowed to use fissionable materials for weapons but is not allowed to conduct tests or experiments, the only kind of weapons that country would be able to build would be the type most destructive of human life. Therefore, we wish not only to stop testing but to stop the use of fissionable materials which, if not tested, would be extremely destructive.
We are hopeful, the Secretary said, that we shall accomplish much more than was sought when the original proposals were made to stop testing on an unverified basis. We ask, however, that the Japanese not try to hurry us into an inadequate program, or create a public opinion that would be satisfied by an inadequate program. We can accomplish much more if there is understanding of the larger goal.
[Page 397]The Secretary asked the Prime Minister to treat as confidential what he had said about the relationship between the suspension of testing and the cutoff of fissionable materials for weapons; this had not yet been explained to the American public or to our NATO allies except for the United Kingdom and France.
The Secretary then proposed that the group proceed to the larger meeting where others were waiting. Mr. Kishi remarked that he would like to use the 9:00 a.m. meeting the next morning with the Secretary to iron out any difficulties which might arise in agreeing on the final communiqué. The Secretary agreed, and said that as much agreement as possible should be obtained before he and the Prime Minister met with the President at 11:00 the next morning.
The meeting then adjourned.