Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

186. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Kishi, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957, 9 a.m.¹

KIV/MC–5a

Washington, June 20, 1957, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Security and Defense

[Here follows a list of participants (28). Dulles and Radford were the senior United States representatives. Kishi’s principal aides were Ambassador Asakai and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirohide Ishida.]

The Secretary of State opened the meeting by referring to the general and useful discussions which the Prime Minister had had the previous day with the President. He stated that it had already been made evident that we are approaching common problems in the spirit of friendship and are searching for solutions in the common interest. He was particularly happy to be present himself because of the earlier role he had had in making the Peace and Security treaties with Japan. It was recognized at that time that the relationship then being established was in the spirit of respect for Japan and the desire to create a relationship on a lasting basis. The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the same spirit now animated us as we approached a new era in our relations.

He suggested that for today’s agenda, the Prime Minister might first give a presentation and then Admiral Radford might address the group on the world military situation.

Prime Minister Kishi said that on the afternoon of the previous day he had discussed basic Japanese-United States relations with the President and the Secretary, and had told them that Japan would stand firm with the United States and the western world for their common safety in the future. The Japanese, he said, consider themselves as belonging to the free nations and cooperation with the United States is necessary for achieving peace throughout the world. It was his understanding that the purpose of these conversations is to establish friendly relations between the United States and Japan on a firm basis.

It is not enough to have treaties on paper in order to achieve the purpose of consolidating our relationships, but rather it is essential that there be a true partnership. In this sense, the Prime Minister looked to these conversations to achieve some of the understanding that would provide the necessary foundation for such a relationship.

Prime Minister Kishi remarked that there were certain specific problems which he would like to raise but he thought it best to hear first Admiral Radford’s remarks.

The Secretary suggested that, in order to ration time to the best advantage, after Admiral Radford’s remarks the present meeting should continue until 11 o’clock, following which a more restricted session could be held to discuss certain matters.

Admiral Radford, directing his remarks to the Prime Minister and the members of the Japanese delegation, stated that he represented the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, who by law are charged with the military planning for the security of the United States. They are also charged by law, he said, with advising the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense on military matters. In carrying out this responsibility, they have to be careful to avoid allowing extraneous factors to influence their judgment.

Admiral Radford then outlined the world military picture, showing the order of battle between the Soviet bloc and the free world side. On the free world side, a considerable force has been created. He gave the figures as of March 1, 1957.

As for deployment and strength of ground forces, the Soviets have 8,213,000 men and the Allies 6,538,000. These figures include organized police forces having military capability. Of the Soviet strength, 31 divisions are in the Vladivostok area and the remainder in western Russia and the eastern satellites. There are also 33 Communist divisions in north Korea. As for the allied strength opposed to this, there are two United States divisions in south Korea and 21 ROK divisions. In Japan there are six JSDF and USFJ divisions. Additionally, there are twelve United States and one Canadian division in North America.

With respect to naval forces the Communist bloc has 728 ships, including six major ships, 34 minor ships and 150 submarines in the Far East. The Soviet submarine force is based primarily in Siberian ports and is larger than the German submarine fleet at the outbreak of World War II. The total Russian submarine force is 450 boats and will soon exceed 500. It is the largest such force ever built.

As opposed to the Communist naval forces, the Allies have a considerable naval superiority and their superiority in the navel area is greater than on the ground or in the air. This fact stems from the geographical considerations, namely from the necessity to maintain communications with our allies. The Communist bloc is self-contained and does not require the same type of naval strength. Its main naval objective is to interfere with allied communications.

With respect to air forces, Admiral Radford stated that there is a rough balance at the present time in over-all operational categories. The Soviets are making great efforts to build up their bombing force, where they already have good modern types. Their units are concentrated in Siberia, Manchuria and China proper, constituting a powerful force in the Far East.

Turning to strategy Admiral Radford stated that in 1953, when the present American administration came in, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a certain basic assumption, namely that they would not prepare for a year of crisis—a critical date. Rather, they would prepare for the long pull and build up deterrent strength so that the Soviet Union would understand the risk of committing aggression against the United States or its friends. The decision was made to modernize, to maintain and to protect our deterrent power. This power in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has, since 1953, prevented the USSR from engaging in further aggression. Under this umbrella our friends have been given time to work out their problems with the USSR and their problems at home. In keeping this deterrent power, the United States has a continental defense system in the United States with advance lines in Canada and Greenland. But maintaining the essential deterrent power and the essential naval power is becoming increasingly expensive and it appeared necessary for our allies to bear more of the costs of maintaining local security.

Admiral Radford stated that there are several facts of life in the Far East which he wished to point out. There is the tremendous offensive and defensive power of the USSR. Communist China’s power is growing along with its industrialization, which is being facilitated by any trade with the West. There is an armistice in Korea and it is necessary to maintain large ROK forces, the third largest military force in the free world. It is necessary to back up these ROK forces with substantial forces. It is also necessary to keep United States forces in Taiwan. Their existence, coupled with the presence of our naval units, has forced the Chinese Communists to disperse their own forces along a 3,000 to 4,000 mile coastline. In Indochina there is another split country and it is necessary to increase the strength of our local friends as we have done in Thailand and are trying to do in Laos and Cambodia. In the Philippines, we have helped generate forces capable of maintaining internal security and able, if necessary, of rendering some help in the SEATO area in the event of Communist aggression.

With respect to Japan itself, Admiral Radford stated that the United States in 1952 was willing to maintain forces in that country in the expectation that Japan would build up its own forces in due course. In Japan also the United States has had a logistic base for the support of Korean operations in case hostilities should resume. This logistic base in Japan also serves all United States army forces in the Far East.

Budgetary limitations in the United States have required the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conclude that the United States forces of one hundred thousand military personnel in Japan must be radically reduced. However, it would be possible to maintain our responsibilities in Korea and elsewhere with much less than 50,000 men stationed in Japan. It is planned to withdraw all ground combat units in Japan. If it would serve the Japanese domestic political purpose the Joint Chiefs of Staff has concluded it could withdraw all forces from Japan. They must not look at the problem sentimentally but with the freedom which military men require. For this reason it is not possible to alter the strategic status of the Bonins and the Ryukyus. On the other hand, the Admiral said, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not think Japan has built up its forces with the speed required or the speed that might have been possible. The reason for this may have been in part that Japanese military men are not accorded the prestige required for them to discharge their responsibilities. In the United States, civilians carry the principal responsibilities but they also lean heavily upon military men for advice. The Admiral thought that United States withdrawal might speed Japan’s defense build-up. He was also of the opinion that the Japanese defense forces have reached maturity in the sense of knowing what is required for Japan’s defense. The military people of the United States will not, therefore, comment further on Japan’s defense goals unless specifically requested to do so.

On modern weapons, including missiles, the United States military have not given Japan the information necessary for them to proceed, but this has been because of lack of security legislation which would permit passing on this information under our own laws.

This concluded the remarks by Admiral Radford. The Secretary asked whether the Prime Minister desired to make any observations.

Prime Minister Kishi stated that Japan is gradually building up its defense forces and is going forward in response to the needs of the situation and in proportion to the national economic strength. Although he appreciated the remarks which Admiral Radford had made, he pointed out that it is Japan’s policy to put greater emphasis upon quality than upon quantity. As the Secretary probably knew, the Japanese government had just adopted a plan to increase its defense forces by the end of Japanese Fiscal Year 1960. He agreed with Admiral Radford on the necessity of increasing the scientific study of advanced-type weapons and he realized that the lack of certain legislation was creating an obstacle, but it was his intention to see that the Diet passes such legislation before long.

The Secretary said he would like to supplement Admiral Radford’s statement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, believe that the best results can be achieved by continued cooperation and with the continuing presence of some United States forces in Japan, particularly air and naval forces. But, as President Eisenhower said yesterday at his press conference, it is not our purpose in any part of the world where we have forces and bases to remain there in opposition to local desires. We would hope that it is the desire of the Japanese people to continue the present cooperation. We have forces in the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and in those places, too, we can always accommodate ourselves to a local request that we retire, much as we would regret the appearance of such a sentiment. It is up to the Japanese Government to make the determination about the continued presence of American forces.

The Secretary stated he would like to point out that the effectiveness of our deterrent power depends upon there being a series of points around the Soviet-Chinese bloc from which points retaliatory attacks can be launched. By looking at the map it can be seen that it is not possible to maintain at all points on the 20,000-mile perimeter of the bloc forces sufficient to stop communist forces which could be directed at them at any time from the interior. Therefore, to restrain such attack it is necessary to depend, as Admiral Radford has said, upon retaliatory power, but to be effective this retaliatory power must be based on many places. If based only on one place, for example, the continental United States, it could be nullified with only one attack. Only if staging areas for retaliatory striking powers have diversified geographic locations, will they adequately serve the purposes of deterring attack.

We naturally hope, said the Secretary, that Japan will cooperate in this collective defense approach which is shared by most of the free countries located around the Soviet-Chinese bloc. By looking at the map you can see that it is indispensable for us to have such bases in the Far East. The problem of working the problem out so far as Japan is concerned is a matter we would wish to discuss on the basis of mutuality and common interest. He thought it might also be mentioned that countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, the Philippines, Formosa and Korea are anxious that United States forces should be physically present to some extent because their presence provides a guarantee that the United States will automatically retaliate if those areas are attacked, since United States forces would have been attacked, too.

The Japanese Prime Minister agreed with the Secretary’s view that Japan’s security is closely related to the safety of all free countries. He would like to go beyond that and state his belief that in the Far East Japan’s safety depends upon the security of the free countries in that area. Therefore, the peace and safety of the Far East and that of Japan itself require cooperation with the United States. He was in complete accord with the Secretary and thought that the subject required no further enlargement. He thought that on the whole there is understanding by the Japanese of American problems and vice versa, but on the question of defense the two nations are not in complete accord. He wished to say that defense to be effective must go beyond mere forms. It is a realm in which the wholehearted support of the people is required. We must establish in these discussions the foundations upon which the two nations can cooperate wholeheartedly in all areas of defense.

The Prime Minister surmised that the lack of a really stable government in Japan in the few years since the Peace Treaty has created some difficulty, but he is happy to say that now a new and better situation has been created. Progress has been made in the defense area and he hopes for more. As the Secretary pointed out, it was not desirable that United States forces be in any foreign country if it could be avoided. He hoped that the Americans would understand that the Japanese themselves are making all possible efforts to increase their own defense capability and that they will continue on this course.

Mr. Dulles said that he would like to add a word. Nations and peoples forget very quickly, and like to be lulled into a sense of security and safety. The Soviet Communist leaders generally talk constantly about peace, but the Secretary thought that we tend to forget that Communism basically believes in the use of violence and has used violence whenever it has thought it could do so successfully. In this connection it is helpful to look at a map to follow the Communist conquest by force. In the north there is Finland which was overcome in a war by the USSR. Below that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia no longer appear on the map because they were overrun and extinguished. Poland was obliterated in 1939 by the joint Russian-German attack. East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania all are held at Soviet swordpoint. Recent events in Hungary show the dependence of the USSR upon armed force to maintain its conquests. Turkey and Iran have been threatened from time to time but unsuccessfully. Greece was subject to a communist insurrection in 1947. The Communists supported war in Indochina and brought about the defeat of France at Dien-Bien-Phu. There was a Huk rebellion in the Philippines supported by Communists from the outside. At the present time there is a growing military threat opposite Formosa and there is a suspended war in Korea. Tibet has been seized by force. The fact should be kept in mind that any nation which stood alone around the Communist orbit either has been endangered or has been seized by the Communists; most of them have been seized. Only if they benefitted from collective security have they been safe. Not a single nation which was party to collective security arrangement with the United States has been lost to the USSR or to Communist China. The collective security relationship coupled with the tremendous retaliatory power of the United States has given safety. But there is no doubt in the mind of our political and military leaders that if the collective security system should collapse, or if the USSR should gain the upper hand, the conquest of the rest of the world would be resumed by the USSR. That is an important fact that the peoples of the world would like to forget but which statesmen must remember.

Mr. Kishi said that he felt at one with Mr. Dulles regarding the world situation. In this situation the problem was how to make firmer the cooperation between the two countries. Some fundamental matters must be considered in this connection.

First, security and defense. Two years ago Mr. Kishi was here in Washington with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu when the latter told of Japan’s tentative plan for its self-defense forces. Since then there have been a few developments. A law has been passed establishing a National Defense Council to consider long range plans. Recently the Council had set forth Japan’s principles of defense and a long range plan which the government had adopted. There is nothing much new in the plan and he would not go into details as he thought they were known. But its main purpose, he said, is to make the necessary appropriations by 1960 for a 180,000 man ground defense force, 120,000 ton sea defense force and 1,300 plane defense force. He added that while the appropriations would be made by 1960 the actual construction, particularly by the navy and air force, might require another two years. The Prime Minister stated that Japan has been following the policy, as America knew, of gradually increasing its defense capabilities. The requirements for Japanese security can only be covered by a common Japanese-United States arrangement. This is necessary and is recognized by Japanese conservatives but it should be borne in mind that conditions are now different from what they were at the time of the Security Treaty. Japan is now able to share in its own defense. Japan has now been admitted to membership in the United Nations and is consequently in a collective security arrangement which it was not in at the time of the Security Treaty. So the time has come to review the security arrangements, not because they are unequal and must be equalized nor because they are one-sided and have to be neutralized but rather because of the need for creating wholehearted cooperation between the two peoples.

The second fundamental matter Mr. Kishi desired to touch upon was territorial problems. There is a strong national sentiment, he said, to ask for the return of such territories as have always been Japanese. In the north this embraces the Kuriles, especially Kunashiri and Etorofu, and in the south the Ryukyus and the Bonins. The Japanese recognize that security requirements not only of the United States but also of Japan and of the other free nations, involve the Ryukyus, and they recognize the necessity for military installations in the Ryukyus, but even so they do not quite agree that full administrative powers cannot be returned by the United States. The strong national feeling on this point is evident in the resolutions on the subject which have been passed by the Japanese Diet. Of course, the Japanese understand the need for strong military bases and they understand that there is some difficulty in reconciling military requirements with the transfer of civil administration, but Mr. Kishi wanted Mr. Dulles to understand the strong national feeling and to realize that the 800,000 people living on Okinawa are Japanese citizens. Moreover, somewhat more than 100,000 people of Okinawan origin were living in Japan. Thus United States administration in Okinawa was not just a matter affecting 800,000 Okinawans. All the people of Japan are concerned.

A second territorial problem concerns the land in Okinawa. If land is requisitioned for military purposes no other land can be found to be used in its place. The United States should handle this matter carefully, understanding Japan’s sensitivities on the point.

The Bonins provide a third territorial problem, said Mr. Kishi. The same things can be said of the Bonins as of Okinawa but there is the additional problem of the return of some of the previous inhabitants. Some of the former inhabitants, numbering about 200, were allowed to return but these were of European extraction. This represented a discrimination in Japanese eyes.

Mr. Dulles stated that the United States recognizes the changes which have occurred since 1951 when the Peace and Security treaties were made in the spirit of friendship which still characterizes the relations of our governments. These matters should be subject to review in light of changing conditions, but the United States does not think that Japanese membership in the United Nations adequately takes care of its security needs or those of others. The drafters of the United Nations Charter, of which he himself was one, hoped that a collective security force could be maintained to deter aggression. Articles 43 and 44 were drawn up for this purpose but they became dead letters because of the Soviet refusal to implement them, a refusal demonstrated through the use of the veto. Therefore, those who desired to insure the application of the collective security principle had to proceed through Article 51 which was devised to overcome the anticipated Soviet veto of 43 and 44 action. Forty-six nations of the free world have in fact acted under Article 51. We also, of course, observe with satisfaction the increase of Japan’s military power as contemplated by the Preamble to the Security Treaty—“Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense”. We would hope, however, that Japan’s efforts would become more serious because, when compared to the efforts of other free nations they are not so great. The United States devotes 11% of its gross national product to security measures; the United Kingdom, despite a serious financial situation, 10%; and most of the European NATO countries devote 8% to 9%. We calculate that Japan devotes about 2%. We recognize that Japan faces serious economic problems and we would not expect it to devote the same percentage as the United States does, but it is difficult in the United States and in our Congress to avoid the view that Japan is taking its defense responsibilities lightly. There is danger of a vacuum of power developing in a part of the world where Soviet-Chinese communism is strongly at work. This could lead to complications because we know that the industrial power of Germany in the West and Japan in the East are major objectives of the international communists.

Despite these observations, said the Secretary, he would like to express gratification for the statements which had been made by the Prime Minister. In our view certain steps could be taken within the context of the present Security Treaty to allow more scope to Japan in the conduct of its own self-defense. One of these, and most important, would be the substantial reduction of United States forces in Japan. Other steps were more technical in character.

With respect to territorial arrangements, stated the Secretary, we appreciate Japanese sentiments toward the related population in the Ryukyus and particularly Okinawa. The United States has no desire to assume administrative responsibilities not necessary for the military use of an area. It has no desire to exercise power just for the sake of power. This fact he thought was demonstrated by the voluntary relinquishment of administrative control by the United States of Amami Oshima in 1953. However, we do not see any possibility of relinquishing control in Okinawa because our responsibilities for the defense of Japan, ourselves and other free nations. The Secretary recalled that when he was negotiating the Peace Treaty the United States was under very substantial pressure from some countries to annex the Ryukyus. These countries wanted it to be certain for all time that the United States would have a bastion of strength in that part of the world as they regarded it necessary for their own security. The United States resisted that pressure and accepted a formulation which would involve the retention by Japan of residual sovereignty. But we cannot in justice to ourselves, and other countries dependent upon us, take steps which we consider would dilute the strength we consider necessary in the present situation. Of course if the international situation should change we would review our position. In any event, said the Secretary, we shall strive as the Prime Minister suggested to control our actions in the Ryukyus with care and concern for Japanese and Okinawan sensitivities.

The problem of the Bonin Islands is one involving a position of considerable strategic value and very little economic value and at present little administration, the Secretary pointed out. He asked the Prime Minister to consider whether we would really improve the relations of our two countries if the United States introduced into these Islands people who would have a hard time earning a livelihood and whose presence would involve the same type of problems we now have in Okinawa.

The Secretary noted that the hour of eleven had been reached and he said he would defer to the Prime Minister’s desires with respect to continuing the present meeting or transferring to his office for a smaller meeting.

The Prime Minister said that the Japanese side had now heard various opinions from the American side with respect to the Security Treaty. For these they were grateful. They were especially grateful that the United States was willing to study this matter if the international situation should change.

Mr. Dulles then asked the Prime Minister before the present meeting should break up to designate two persons from the Japanese side to work on the Communiqué Committee. The Prime Minister designated Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishida and Foreign Office American Bureau Chief, Chiba, who would work with a few assistants. The Secretary on his side appointed Assistant Secretary Berding and Mr. Parsons.

The Secretary then said we must consider what we would tell the press following the present meeting. There should be no leaks which the final communiqué would not justify. The Prime Minister thought it better not to mention substance, particularly his remarks on the necessity for security legislation, as this would be embarrassing to him. Mr. Ishida said we might tell the press that we had had a general discussion on matters of a political nature between the United States and Japan. The Secretary proposed and it was agreed that the press be informed that political and security problems had been discussed and views on these matters had been exchanged.

The meeting then adjourned.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 889. Drafted by Martin and cleared by Robertson.