Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

58. Outline Plan by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, February 27, 1957.

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO BURMA²

Introduction

A. References:

(1) U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1), approved by the President, September 5, 1956.³

(2) NIE 61–56, Probable Developments in Burma, April 10, 1956.⁴

(3) Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Burma (pursuant to NSC Act. 1290–d) and Recommended Action.⁵

(4) Operating Plan on Sale of Arms and War Materials to Burma (Approved by OCB October 27, 1954).⁶

B. Special Operating Guidance:

1. U.S. operations in Burma should be conducted in the context of U.S. objectives which are: to prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

2. Burma’s continued political and economic evolution as a free and independent democratic state is important to our basic objectives in both Asia and Africa. Strategically a non-communist Burma is of utmost importance to the security of the Southeast Asian region as a whole and especially to our SEATO allies—Pakistan and Thailand, which flank Burma; politically, Burma has become an important factor in Afro-Asian groupings which are becoming increasingly significant in the formulation of world attitudes and pressures. For these reasons, every effort should be made to insure the internal security of Burma and to encourage economic and political stability which will make communist domination impossible by means other than invasion. Special thought should be given the problem of preventing the acquisition of hegemony over Burma by Communist China through “massive penetration.”

3. Two important factors in Burma’s orientation have overriding significance in U.S. policy consideration: a growing but still insufficient awareness of the communist threat to Burma’s independence and a compulsion to neutrality in world affairs motivated largely by an unprotected thousand-mile border with Communist China, by fear that involvement in another world war would ruin Burma, and by emotional nationalism which is suspicious of any larger power, especially one associated with memories of white man’s past colonial domination.

4. Burma has agreed to accept Russian experts who will provide technical advice in numerous fields. Burma also has accepted Russian gift offers to construct, equip and staff a technological institute as well as to build an exhibition hall, hotel, stadium, swimming pool complex (Burma will reciprocate with a rice gift and assume local currency costs). Nevertheless, significant Burmese elements are becomming increasingly aware of international communist tactics and are now seeking means to counter that threat.

5. Given this improved climate, the U.S. now is in a better position than ever before to influence Burma toward a closer cooperation with Free World activities and identification with Free World objectives.

6. However, Burma’s avowed neutrality and scrupulous avoidance of entanglement with the major power blocs limits both the scope and mode of U.S. assistance to and influence in Burma. The GUB will not often take public positions favoring the U.S. and the Free World in problems involving conflict with the communist bloc. It also may often appear that Burma’s neutrality favors the communist bloc. These are factors which should not distract us from seeking our basic objectives as long as the GUB displays a determination to prevent Burma’s loss of independence or freedom of action.

7. Our posture toward Burma should be friendly and should seek to avoid embarrassing the government by requiring overt support for U.S. objectives in other countries than Burma.

8. Any economic, military, psychological, or police assistance programs should be carried out in a friendly spirit of cooperation and with a minimum of obtrusive U.S. action. Patronizing attitudes or demands for approbation would tend to minimize our limited potential for effectiveness.

9. Burma has recently indicated an inclination to become associated more intimately with the United States in connection with certain economic, military and psychological projects. In implementing aid programs for Burma, care should be taken to assure that procedures be simple and effective; and that any deliveries are timely and compatible with Burma’s requirements. The Burmese should be reassured also that U.S. sales of surplus agricultural products, under P.L. 480, will be made in such a way as not to disturb Burma’s natural rice export markets. In this connection, special attention should be paid to help the Burmese improve the quality, processing and storage of its principal crop, rice.

10. Whenever the opportunity presents, encouragement should be given the Burmese to develop such industries as minerals and lumber, and to the processing of these products, thus increasing its exportable products and reducing Burmese dependence on rice sales. In order to provide some assistance to Burma’s current four year economic development plan, the U.S. should consider sympathetically further P.L. 480 programs for Burma, to be made in such a way as not to disturb other free countries’markets in Burma.

11. Information programs should be directed primarily at the government, both civil and military officials, at the schools, and at the press, and should, as appropriate, support the Burmese Government in its anti-subversive programs. If the Government of Burma desires U.S. assistance, and support, programs should be prepared to offer material assistance, primarily in the areas of publications, exhibits, and motion pictures, as well as such technical and program advice to the information agencies of the Government of Burma.

12. Any military assistance provided Burma should be aimed to meet Burmese internal security needs and should not be inconsistent with U.S. and SEATO objectives in connection with the overall strategy for the area.

13. Maximum advantage should be taken of opportunities arising out of Burnese-communist bloc barter trade difficulties.

[Here follow a list of United States commitments and understandings and a list of actions agreed upon, with citations to NSC 5612/1 and indications of the agencies responsible for each action and target dates.]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Burma. Top Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum by OCB Executive Assistant Charles E. Johnson indicating that the Board concurred in this plan on February 20.
2. In a February 18 memorandum to Hoover enclosing a draft of this outline plan for OCB consideration, Robertson wrote that it did not suggest any new program, but was a listing of programs already being implemented or considered desirable. (Ibid., Southeast Asia)
3. See Document 54.
4. Document 36.
5. See footnote 5, Document 24.
6. See footnote 4, ibid.