Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

36. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 61–56

Washington, April 10, 1956.

PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA²

[Here follows a note concerning the distribution of the estimate.]

The Problem

To analyze recent trends in Burma and to estimate probable developments over the next few years, with particular emphasis on Burma’s international orientation.

Conclusions

1. The political life of Burma is and will probably continue for the next few years to be dominated by a handful of leaders who share a common outlook based on Marxist economics, Western political principles, and Burmese nationalism. Although in terms of basic values Burma identifies itself with the free world, residual anticolonial sentiment and fear of provoking Communist China have led it to adopt a neutralist position. (Paras. 9, 11, 53, 64)

2. Both the current stability and the future growth of Burma’s economy are heavily dependent on the export of rice. The world price of this commodity has fallen substantially in the last couple of years and Burma has had difficulty in marketing its rice. Burma’s economic development will remain limited not only by the price of rice, but also by the lack of competent administrators and trained technicians and by the internal disturbances which hamper transportation and disrupt agricultural production. However, it is unlikely that economic conditions will seriously affect political stability during the next year or so. (Paras. 34, 38, 42, 52, 67–68)

3. Although Burma’s need for markets for its rice has provided the basis for a significant expansion in Bloc-Burmese relations, particularly in the trade and technical assistance fields, Burma will almost certainly try to continue to balance its economic and political relations between the West and the Bloc. While trade with the Bloc will account for a large share of total Burmese trade and carries potential dangers, Burma’s economic involvement alone will not, at least for the next year, be so great as to destroy Burma’s freedom of maneuver. (Paras. 49–50, 70)

4. However, Burma is now a major Bloc target, and over the longer run there is danger of a substantial increase in Bloc influence as a result of economic arrangements already concluded or under negotiation and Burma’s likely receptivity to further Bloc offers of trade and technical assistance. Other factors which may increase Burma’s vulnerability are: (a) the probable susceptibility of Burmese students and other potential leadership groups to the current pattern of Communist propaganda; (b) Communist China’s ability to exert diplomatic or if necessary military pressures on Burma; and (c) U Nu’s apparent belief that he can deal with the Bloc without losing his freedom of action. (Paras. 69, 71–73)

5. The extent to which the Communists realize their potential in Burma will depend in part on the actual economic gains realized by the Burmese and in part on the skill and restraint with which the Communists comport themselves; premature efforts to apply pressure could result in alarming Burmese leaders. The Burmese have been disturbed by Communist China’s sale of rice to Ceylon, and this concern would be intensified should the Bloc re-export increasing amounts of Burmese rice to traditional Burmese markets. But to a major extent, Burmese receptivity to Communist offers and influence will depend on the ability of Burma to dispose of its export commodities, especially rice, in non-Communist markets. (Paras. 75–77)

[Here follows a detailed discussion of the subjects dealt with in summary form in the Conclusions section, followed by a map.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

2. A note on the cover sheet reads:

   “Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

   “Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 10 April 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”