54. Editorial Note
At a meeting of the National Security Council on August 30, the Council discussed NSC 5612, August 15 (see footnote 4, Document 51). The discussion pertaining to the differing recommendations on the question of military aid to Burma (see footnote 5, ibid.) reads:
“[Dillon Anderson] pointed out that the State–ODM proposal called for a modest military aid program to be made available to Burma for political purposes, on conditions acceptable to Burma. On the other hand, the Defense–Treasury–Budget–JCS proposal called for making military equipment and supplies available on Burmese request and only on a reimbursable basis.
“After listening to the explanation of this difference of view, the President said he wished to put a question to the Council. Was it not possible to put an aid program technically on a reimbursable basis, even though we knew perfectly well that we would never be repaid for the assistance we had given? Mr. Hollister replied that it was certainly possible to do this. Secretary Dulles pointed out that in fact Burma would insist that, in form at least, any military assistance to her from the United States should be on a reimbursable basis. Admiral Radford warned that any loans of this type would come out of our MDAP funds and thus from the total resources available for our military aid programs. He believed that if we do decide to go in for any military aid program to Burma, it would be best to extend this aid through the agency of SEATO.
“Secretary Dulles reminded the Council of how fluctuating were the positions of the Governments of Burma, Laos and Cambodia. Sometimes they appeared to be moving in our direction, and then suddenly the direction changed and they seemed to move in the direction of neutralism or the Soviet bloc. He added his belief that, as a practical matter, we would have more chance of recouping our weakened position in Laos and Cambodia if we lopped off some of the money we were giving these two states for military assistance and assigned the resources instead to Burma.
“The President expressed the opinion that the version of paragraph 36 proposed by Defense, Treasury, Budget and JCS, was the more correct statement of our policy with respect to military assistance to Burma. As a matter of fact, even though we say this aid will be granted to Burma on a reimbursable basis (as the Burmese themselves desire), we are also pretty certain that we will never get our money back.
“Secretary Dulles then asked if he might invite Under Secretary Hoover to comment on this problem. Secretary Hoover said he thought it would be unfortunate to include the term ‘reimbursable basis’, because that term had come to have the particular meaning of ‘cash on the barrelhead’. Secretary Hoover then called on Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, who briefly commented on Burma’s recent request for U.S. assistance. He pointed out that the Burmese prefer reimbursable aid. Actually, however, they only want to be assured that they may make payment for such aid in rice. Assistant Secretary Robertson added that this was indeed the psychological moment to assist Burma if the United States proposed to take [Page 84] advantage of the current disenchantment of Burma with the Communist bloc. He concluded by pointing out that the Burmese had been authorized to talk with us about the possibility of U.S. military assistance.
“The President then inquired whether anybody could suggest a better word than ‘reimbursable’. Various suggestions were made, and the President himself suggested simply striking ‘reimbursable’ and adding the term ‘loan basis’. Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray pointed out that if we made loans to Burma to provide military aid for political purposes, we would make it clear that there was a distinction between Burma and those countries which we desired to assist as part of our regular military program for military rather than for political purposes. After further discussion, agreement was reached on an appropriate rewording of paragraph 36.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Discussions)
NSC 5612, as amended and approved, was subsequently circulated as NSC 5612/1, “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia”, September 5. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5612 Series) The section specifically dealing with Burma is printed in Department of Defense Study for Use of House Committee on Armed Services United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10 (The Pentagon Papers), pages 1090–1091.